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The study of the irrigation system as a common property resource has been well documented. 
Most of the irrigation systems that survive for generations enjoy relatively uninterrupted use 
of water. The present, however, is no longer the same as what it was hundreds or, even, fifty 
years ago. Today, there is intensifying many more direct and indirect socio-economic driving 
forces put water resources under pressure. This calls for more suitable water resource 
development and management systems. This study sought to find answers to the following 
questions:  
1) Are there plausible water management options that could maintain agricultural systems and 
rural economies, without constraining water for the development of other sectors?  
2) What set of institutional arrangements would enable efficient and equitable use of water?  
Using these questions to guide the research agenda, this thesis uses Common-Pool Resources 
(CPRs) theory and, in particular, the eight design principles (DPs) for the development of 
robust institutions proposed by Elinor Ostrom in 1990. The results are presented in three 
analytical chapters. 
The first analytical chapter seeks to identify a set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the development of robust institutional arrangements for the management of irrigation. 
Using a meta-analysis of 62 irrigation case studies across 37 countries, the data was analyzed 
using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA). The results show that out of the 
eight principles, four are necessary conditions for a robust institution, i.e. 1) Clearly defined 
boundaries; 2) Monitoring of user with enforcement capacity; 3) System-wide monitoring of 
resources; and 4) Minimum rights to organize. The results also identify two minimum 
configurations that appear to be sufficient. The first configuration involves a combination of 
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user monitoring AND system-wide monitoring arrangements. The second involves a 
combination of congruence with local condition AND system-wide monitoring AND minimum 
rights to organize. Based on the findings, a modification of three of Ostrom’s design principles 
is proposed so that the principles take fully account of the characteristics of water resources. 
The resultant modification Ostrom’s DPs is applied in the second analytical chapter. 
This chapter aims to examine the role of Water User Associations (WUA) in Southeast 
Sulawesi Province, Indonesia. The research collected data from a series of interviews, a 
stakeholder workshop and six focus group discussions in three regencies of the province. The 
study resulted in propositions for sustainable irrigation system institutions in Southeast 
Sulawesi and Indonesia in general. In addition, the prepositions signify the need for hierarchical 
arrangements to foster the emergence of locally defined solutions of collective action problems 
in managing the common irrigation system. 
The third analytical chapter focuses on the development of guidelines for the nesting of 
local management arrangements within broader hierarchical arrangements which typically are 
examined last in any discussion that seeks to use Ostrom’s Design Principles. Turning this 
approach on its head, the analysis undertaken begins by putting Ostrom’s nested principle first.  
to examine a complex, and large-scale CPR system, with heterogeneous values and uses. By 
putting the nested principle first, a new perspective emerges. In particular, the user is forced to 
accommodate the other principles within a hierarchy. In fairness, Ostrom acknowledged is that 
this was necessary but she did not propose a way to do it. Taking her advice literally and to test 
it this third chapter puts her last principle first – rather than last – and then searches for ways 
to apply her other principles within a suite of hierarchical institutional arrangements developed 
for river basin management in the province of Southeast Sulawesi. The resultant analysis makes 
use of the data from the previous chapter, in addition to the review of regulations, existing 
basin plan documents and relevance studies in the period of the first water law promulgation. 
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That is, Ostrom’s design principles are combined with a transaction cost analysis. In the basin 
examined, the results show that existing institutional arrangements are not sufficient and, 
indeed, prevent users from adapting to foreseeable future changes in a manner that is efficient 
and equitable. Further, the analysis finds that the hierarchical structure of the extant institutions 
do not align with the complex nature of water resources in the province. The resultant analysis 
developed a list of gaps which, if addressed, would improve prospects social and economic 
development while keeping use within sustainable limits. 
Based on all the analysis, the thesis closes in a final summary chapter with a suggested 
modification of Ostrom’s design principles and a set of policy recommendations for 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
It is more appropriate to say that the state’s power lies on its authority to create rules for the 
economy to function, a rule that forbids the exploitation of the weak by those who own 
capital. (Mohmmad Hatta, the Founding Father of Indonesia; cited in Al-Afghani, 2016) 
 
1.1 Research background and motivation 
The study of irrigation systems as common property resources has been well 
documented. Most of the irrigation systems that have survived for generations enjoy 
relatively uninterrupted use of water. However, present-day conditions are no longer the 
same as those of hundreds, or even fifty, years ago. The intensification of competing 
demands from a variety of direct and indirect socio-economic drivers puts water resources 
under pressure (Turner, 2004). Because agriculture is the primary water user, capturing more 
than 70% of the world’s freshwater, its allocation is currently under scrutiny. Even in a water 
abundant country, seasonal variability and uneven spatial distribution of water create the 
problem of water not being available in the right place and/or at the right time (Hanemann, 
2006; Turner, 2004). As demand outgrows supply, reallocation from surplus to deficit 
regions, or from agriculture to other sectors, has become the norm. However, when a transfer 
takes place without the proper support of appropriate institutional arrangements, it may have 
harmful effects on communities that are deprived of access to water, and generate resistance 
to change.  
Evidence suggests that reallocating water from agricultural to non-agricultural uses 
has the potential to result in significant negative impacts for agricultural and rural livelihoods 
(Komakech et al., 2012; Meinzen‐Dick and Ringler, 2008; Rosegrant and Ringler, 1998). 




reliant on limited water supplies), this may cause loss of livelihood and assets, which may 
lead farmers into poverty (Cook et al., 2009). Negative outcomes may also accrue to urban 
water users where transfers from agricultural uses to cities may be undertaken without first 
understanding the needs of domestic water users, and thus disrupt farmer’s access to water 
and livelihoods for little gain (Komakech et al. 2012).  Birkenholtz (2016) agrees, finding 
that farmers often resist water being reallocated to cities and industries, especially when 
farmers experience material losses while lacking support or recompensate to other 
livelihoods alternatives from the state. 
However, the requirement for water to increase agricultural production to feed 
growing populations, while not constraining water supply to other sectors including that 
required to maintain ecosystem services, is a challenge shared by many countries. The 
proposed solution often calls for more suitable water resource management which focuses 
on institutional design solutions rather than engineering projects (Ostrom, 1993). Focusing 
on augmented supply from the construction of more dams or storages will only buy time in 
many contexts; eventually, demand management will need to be put in place (Young, 2019). 
Further, this challenge is not limited to arid and semi-arid countries; it also applies to tropical 
rain forest countries, like Indonesia. 
1.2. Water, irrigation and rice policy: Indonesian context 
For many years, Indonesia has depended on the agricultural sector for national food security, 
and in particular rice production. Approximately 77% of Indonesia’s farmers produce rice 
on average landholdings of less than one hectare (ADB 2016). Irrigated rice cultivation has 
a long history, dating back to the fifth century in Java and Bali, and while the traditional 
rice-irrigation systems in Java eroded during the colonial era (Van Setten Van der Meer, 




In Indonesia, the first modern irrigation system was introduced in Java by the 
government of East Indie (the colonial government) in 1830 (Booth, 1977a; Ravesteijn, 
2007). The irrigation development was initially intended to support sugar cane, one of the 
export crops that was forced to cultivate by the colonial government during the Cultivation 
System period from 1830 to 1870 (Booth, 1977a; Ertsen, 2006; Ravesteijn, 2007). The 
technical inadequacies of village-based small-scale irrigation systems were inappropriate for 
large estate cultivation (Booth, 1977a). Thus, modern irrigation technology was started and 
took place on both the already existing indigenous system and the newly built irrigation 
network (Horst, 1996). Only after the widespread of famine in Demak and Grobogan 
regencies in 1948-1950, the government of East Indie started to support wet rice farming in 
the irrigation development project (Ersten 2006; Ravesteijn 2007).  
The importance of irrigation development was emphasized during the first three 
decades of the twentieth century. It was aimed to increase rice production which was 
considered to be a determinant factor of people’s welfare in Java (Booth, 1977a; Van 
Oosterhout, 2008). However, this irrigation enthusiast was later criticized and viewed as less 
effective and even seamed to lead to a decrease in productivity (Van Oosterhout, 2008). As 
noted by Booth (1977a), rice yields in Bali and Lombok, where the government had not 
initiated any irrigation project, were significantly higher than those in Java. Likewise, in 
North and West Sumatera where irrigation controlled by Public Works was relatively small, 
it was also reported to have higher yields (Booth, 1977b). Further, Booth (1977a) concluded 
that the colonial government expenditure on irrigation development had little effect on the 
level of people’s welfare in Java. 
After Indonesian independence in 1945, irrigation development continued at a slower 
pace. It focused on infrastructure in Java and outer islands. However, deferred maintenance 




50% drop in the irrigation canal average capacity, which further caused declining of 
irrigation coverage area (Booth, 1977a). Thus, during the first two decades following 
independence, Indonesia experienced a continuous shortage of food (van der Eng, 2014). 
The limited stock of rice, insufficient foreign exchange for imports, and more than 300%  
spike in the price of rice contributed to a crisis in 1966 (Mears, 1984). Only after the crisis 
in 1966, Indonesia started to receive food aid and continued for several years due to local 
famine in Central Java and Nusa Tenggara (van der Eng, 2014). Therefore, it is not surprising 
that Indonesia’s general development objectives have been closely linked to rice policy 
(Mears, 1984). 
To secure the country’s food supply, rice self-sufficiency has always been a target of 
Indonesia’s development since Repelita I (the Five Year Development Plan) from 1969/70-
1973/74 (Mears, 1984). The state-led irrigation development strategy focused on 
rehabilitation, expansion, and construction of new irrigation schemes and system operation 
and maintenance (Oad, 2001). The Plan arrangement ultimately achieved rice self-
sufficiency in 1984. The policy persists, but its outcome is no longer quite as successful. A 
lack of water supply has been identified as a principal constraint to further rice area 
expansion and intensify rice production. This argument has reinforced the dominance of 
physical construction for irrigation development (Oad, 2001; Sumaryanto, 2012).  
The problem of the construction-oriented development, however, was apparent 
during the financial crisis due to the fall of oil prices in the mid-1980s (Bruns 2004). The 
focus on new infrastructure development has neglected the routine maintenance, and the 
performance was below expectation (Oad, 2001; Bruns 2004). By 1987, the Indonesian 
government had issued an Irrigation Operation and Maintenance Policy (IOMP), primarily 
aimed at encouraging better management of irrigation systems by transferring management 




2001). Limitations in the IOMP and its outcomes, however, led to another set of reforms and 
the release of Presidential Instruction Number 3 in 1999 in response to concerns raised by 
the World Bank through their Water Sector Adjustment Loan (WATSAL). This new set of 
reforms again focused on improved irrigation institutions, empowering farmers to be 
decision-makers, and encouraging them to take more responsibility for the operation and 
maintenance of local irrigation systems. Nevertheless, transfers of responsibility to 
farmers/WUAs via the Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) in 1999 have not improved 
the performance of irrigation institutions as hoped. This is partly due to a lack of capacity 
by farmers/WUAs to perform their new role successfully, and conflicting interests with 
irrigation agencies that control the irrigation development agenda and prefer large 
construction projects to local maintenance (Bruns, 2004; Suhardiman and Mollinga, 2012; 
Vermillion et al., 2000). More recently, persistent problems with irrigation institutions have 
been further complicated. The requirements to secure water to support the long-standing 
policy of rice self-sufficiency is being challenged by the emergence of competing demands 
for water by non-agricultural sectors such as tourism, mining and growing urban demand. It 
is expected that further reforms will thus be needed.  
1.3 Sustainable irrigation under a competing demand for water 
In Indonesia, water is currently considered sufficient to meet population and economic 
growth demands (Piesse, 2016). Data from ADB (2016) shows the total water availability in 
Indonesia is 690 x 109 cubic meters per year, while the demand is 175 x 109 cubic meters 
per year. Despite this, DGWR (2003) acknowledges that an imbalance between demand and 
supply is one of the main constraints on economic development. This is due to the fact that 
unequal spatial distribution of water resources, annual and seasonal variation in rainfall, poor 




related issues increasingly contribute to localized water scarcity in Indonesia (Piesse, 2016; 
Sumaryanto, 2012). 
At present, most water withdrawals accrue to agricultural users; the sector accounts 
for 81% of total water use, while the remaining water is allocated to industry (7%) and 
municipal (12%) users (Figure 1.1, FAO 2012). However, DGWR (2003) estimates that, by 
2020, demand from industry and municipalities will increase in total between 25% and 30%. 
Since total water resources are ultimately limited, this will require some form of water 
reallocation from agriculture to industry and municipal users, especially during dry seasons 
(DGWR 2003; FAO 2012). 
 
Figure 1. Water withdrawal by sector (Source: FAO 2012) 
 
Competition over water resources is already occurring in some parts of Indonesia. 
For example, Kurnia et al. (2000) describe how competition over water resulted in conflict 
within farming communities, and between farmers and factories in West Java. In these 
examples, reallocation of agricultural water to industrial factories was facilitated via permits 




since the factories often needed large quantities of water, which often exceeded the volume 
of water granted to them by the Agency permits, many sought ways to gain additional water 
resources. Some acquired water by buying or renting agricultural fields with access to 
irrigation water. This form of water right transfer was not a formal part of the irrigation 
system, but was usually accepted by local farmers. However, other factories acquired 
additional water illegally, and/or took water out of turn (i.e. ahead of other users). As a 
consequence, due to the poor institutional arrangements, farmers often lost their harvest and 
income. 
In Bali, there are additional examples of how current water management 
arrangements have failed to address water scarcity, resulting in the overexploitation of water 
resources and inequitable water allocations. According to Cole and Browne (2015), 
interactions between highly diverse water use groups, coupled with weak governance 
systems and the economic power of the tourism industry, has led to a deterioration of water 
resources and inequitable water allocation. Feedback structures that should monitor for such 
outcomes, and trigger change in response, are either absent or underdeveloped and the 
governance system therefore does not respond to inequitable allocations. Cole (2012) reveals 
how water appropriation for the tourism sector is favored because 80% of Bali’s economy 
depends on this industry. He reports that a new reservoir constructed in the Tabanan area 
specifically for irrigated rice farming had more than 50% of its water reallocated to the 
tourism sector. As a consequence, conflict now regularly occurs between the Subak 
managers (a traditional institution that manages water for farming) and local villagers who 
have sold their land and water assets to tourist developments or bottled water companies 
(Cole, 2012). Conflict typically results from the fact that water is scarce due to these historic 
sales, and that negatively impacts smallholder farmers who depend on agriculture for their 




These examples signify the need to evaluate the institutional arrangements of water 
resource development in Indonesia. A set of reforms are required that can minimize current 
impacts on agriculture and smallholder farmers, and capable of responding to dynamic 
change in the future. Fortunately, this is an ideal time for such an examination of Indonesian 
water management arrangements. The Indonesian government has previously undertaken 
broad reforms to improve national water policy (Sarwan et al., 2005), resulting in the 
implementation of the 2004 Water Resource Law (WRL) No. 7 as a regulatory framework. 
That Law covered all aspects of management, as well as conservation and infrastructure, and 
allowed more scope for public participation in managing water resources (Al'Afghani, 
2006). Another important aspect of the Law was that it defined water use rights, and how 
these rights were to be exercised (Sarwan et al., 2005). However, in February 2015, the Law 
was cancelled by the Constitutional Court because it contradicted Article 33 of the 
Indonesian Constitution – (UUD 1945). After four years of discussion and negotiation in 
Parliament, a new WRL was passed and promulgated in October 2019. The main feature of 
this new WRL is an emphasis on the public’s right to water. This includes, in order of 
priority, meeting people’s daily needs for water, the needs of smallholder farmers, and the 
needs of the public water supply system. Once higher priority uses are satisfied, and if there 
is surplus water available, lower priority water resources can be allocated including non-
commercial public uses and, lastly, license-based commercial uses. However, the method by 
which the state can secure water for these prioritized uses, while simultaneously balancing 





1.4 Research questions 
This thesis is therefore undertaken to evaluate the institutional arrangements that 
govern water resource development in Indonesia and to consider how they can be improved 
to address future challenges in water supply and demand. Considering its priority status as a 
primary water user, and its role as a major player in the Indonesian economy, the study has 
a deliberate focus upon the agricultural sector. In particular, the research is aimed at 
answering the following questions: 
1. Are there plausible water management options that could maintain Indonesian 
agricultural systems and rural economies, without constraining water availability for 
the development of other sectors? 
2. What set of institutional arrangements would enable the most efficient and equitable 
use of water in Indonesia? 
1.5 Research Objectives 
Using the above questions to guide the research, the research objectives are defined 
as follows: 
1. To investigate necessary and sufficient conditions for institutional arrangements that 
promote robust irrigation systems. 
2. To investigate whether institutional arrangements at the local level are capable of 
dealing with future uncertainty and changes in water availability. 
3. To search for possible alternative institutional arrangements to govern water resource 
development in Indonesia, and the processes needed to create the capacity of the 




1.6 Overview of the research design and data collection methods 
Since the main topic of the thesis is institutional design, common-pool resource (CPR) 
theory and the eight design principles for robust, self-governing institutions proposed by 
Elinor Ostrom in 1990, form a basis for the work. To achieve the research objectives, work 
was conducted in three phases: 1) a global comparison of irrigation case studies, 2) a case 
study of a local irrigation system, and 3) an investigation of regional river basin 
management.  
To define the necessary and sufficient conditions for robust irrigation institutions, it 
was determined that a suitable methodology involved a combination of meta-analysis and 
fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fs/QCA). The meta-analysis was used to 
synthesize data from existing case studies, while the fs/QCA was used to establish causal 
conditions that effectively link the design principles to the outcome, which is robust 
institutions. The meta-data from case studies were gathered first from Web of Science and 
Scopus databases, using the following keywords: ‘farmer-managed irrigation’, ‘indigenous 
irrigation’, ‘traditional irrigation’, and ‘water user associations.’ Two criteria were used to 
decide on the inclusion of an article: 1) the case study must have examined the institutional 
arrangements in detail, and 2) two or more materials that discuss the same irrigation system 
were combined into one case study. Snowball sampling was used to extend the initial list of 
potential case studies; references cited in the case studies and other articles that cited the 
case studies, noted by Google Scholar, were included. Following Poteete et al. (2010), non-
peer reviewed articles were also included. These inclusion criteria resulted in the inclusion 





The second and third parts of the thesis were based on a case study of Indonesia’s 
Southeast Sulawesi Province. The use of the case study method was justified since the study 
of institutions requires an in-depth investigation of this phenomenon within its real-world 
situation (Yin, 2018). The province was chosen for several reasons: 1) It is located in eastern 
Indonesia, which is an area that is considered to lag behind the country’s western provinces, 
2)  The province has seen rapid growth of the mining sector and commercial agriculture 
(palm oil plantation), which both use the water resources, traditionally used for rice 
production, 3) The province has experienced environmental and water quality issues due to 
mining activities and land clearing for palm oil plantations, 4) There were ongoing 
multipurpose dam projects to support various water uses in the province, and 5) It has 
witnessed continued urban development.  
Data for the case study were collected using qualitative approaches. To understand 
the contexts and institutional arrangements of irrigation systems and water management in 
the province, I integrated data from various sources: 1) interviews (with government officials 
at different levels of water management, officials from the agriculture department, village 
heads and head of a water user association federation), 2) six focus group discussions, and 
3) a stakeholder workshop. For the third part of the analysis, a study of relevant key 
documents and literature were included. This range of data sources served as a form of data 






Figure 2. Research roadmap 
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of five chapters: this introduction, three analytical chapters 
addressing the research objectives and the last chapter, which synthesizes the research 




analytical chapters were designed as ‘stand-alone’ papers. Further, since Chapters 3 and 4 
are interlinked, the sections on data collection and methods contain some repetition. The 
outline of the remaining chapters is set out below.  
Chapter 2 investigates the necessary and sufficient conditions for robust irrigation 
systems institutions through a meta-analysis of sixty-two irrigation system case studies 
drawn from thirty-seven countries. The study finds four necessary conditions, and two 
minimum configurations of conditions to ensure irrigation system institutions that are robust.  
Chapter 3 examines alternative institutional arrangements for sustainable irrigation 
systems based on a case study of six irrigation systems in Indonesia’s Southeast Sulawesi 
Province. The study uses a modification of Ostrom’s DPs in Chapter 2. The study found that 
for self-governing irrigation systems to work, there is a need for them to be backed up by 
institutions at higher levels of management, which leads to the study in Chapter 4. 
Developing the implications of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 moves forward to analyze 
water management at a regional level and applies the revised order of Ostrom’s DPs. The 
focus was on two river basins in Southeast Sulawesi Province; one is managed by central 
government, and the other by provincial governments. The framework for a social-ecological 
system for water governance is developed to analyze water governance in general. Here, the 
design principles were combined with the transaction costs economic approach to add rigor 
to the institutional analysis.  
Chapter 5 provides a summary of the thesis, its contribution to existing scholarship, 
the limitations of this research and directions for future research.  The contributions of the 
thesis were discussed in three sections outlined in this chapter. The first is the contribution 
to the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis calibration procedure, which is discussed 




principle first can provide a new perspective on how Ostrom’s design principles can be used 
to analyze complex and large-scale common pool resources.  The third contribution are the 
policy recommendations based on the exercise using the design principles in three different 
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Chapter 2: Robust irrigation system institutions: A global 
comparison 
Abstract 
In many places irrigation systems rely on robust governance for continued existence. Elinor 
Ostrom listed design principles that should achieve robust governance, but doubted that any 
list could be both necessary and sufficient to result in robust governance. To date this 
assumption has never been formally tested. We conduct a meta-analysis and ultimately 
evaluate 62 case studies via fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to identify 
necessary/sufficient conditions for robust irrigation system governance. We identify four 
necessary conditions and seven configurations sufficient for robust governance. Further, we 
identify a union of conditions that, when absent, are likely to result in system failure. 
 









• Ostrom doubts that any list of design principles would be necessary or sufficient for 
robust outcomes 
• We examine 62 irrigation systems in 37 countries and investigate robust outcomes 
with respect to Ostrom’s Design Principles 
• The four most important criteria for robust irrigation system are: 
i. Presence of clearly defined boundaries; 
ii. User involvement in monitoring and enforcement;  
iii. Comprehensive resource condition monitoring, 






There are many examples of common property regimes (CPRs) such as fishery, forestry, 
pasture and water supply that involve collective self-governance arrangements. Within that 
list of CPRs, small-scale irrigation water institutions often provide effective self-governance 
exemplars that are long-lasting (e.g. Janssen and Anderies, 2013). Shepsle (1989) defines 
long-lasting institutions as robust, especially where operational rules are devised and 
modified over an extended period so that desired system characteristics remain. Robust water 
governance institutions persist because, under duress, they are able to produce efficient, 
socially-acceptable outcomes (Young, 2014). 
An issue for future robust water governance is that many current institutions were 
established during eras when there was abundant supply (Randall, 1981; Turton, 1999; 
Wheeler et al., 2017; Young, 2014). Increased water demand and rapid environmental 
change is testing those institutional arrangements, leading to concerns about future water 
crises (World Economic Forum, 2019) and attempts to identify robust water policy and 
institutional reforms (Gruère and Le Böedec, 2019). In an effort to identify institutional 
arrangements that would result in best outcomes for CPR Ostrom (1990) provided a list of 
design principles (DPs) based on common findings from detailed case studies of 80 irrigation 
and fishery institutions. The DPs included factors that may improve the probability of 
collective action and robust water institutional arrangements in the face of scarcity and 
uncertainty. 
Collective action should be most prominent where property rights are shared equally 
among users in CPRs, although free-riding and rivalry problems may reduce collective 
organisation (Feeney et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1990). CPRs are different from open access 
resources to which no right of any kind is assigned (McKean, 1992; Quiggin, 1988), and 




fisheries. Thus, CPRs are not private or public property; they are geographically confined 
resources (Dasgupta, 2005) that are subject to the rights of common use by a group of co-
equal owners (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975). Ostrom’s governance DPs for CPRs 
have been applied to the study of collective action and updated in response to criticism that 
they may be too general in nature (Cleaver, 2000). Original CPR research detailing 
institutional arrangements for successful governance outcomes include Wade (1989), 
Ostrom (1990) and Baland and Plateu (1996). These studies found that neither private nor 
state control determines the sustainability of CPRs, but rather success comes from the 
robustness of self-governing institutions and, in particular, their capacity to sustain 
productive use of a resource as conditions and demands change. Typically, these institutions 
are characterized by complex rules that allow members of a community to share access to 
the CPR. 
Ostrom’s principles have been widely applied to evaluate/diagnose the effectiveness 
of local CPRs (Cox et al., 2010), and to examine the co-occurrence or combination of DPs 
necessary for social and ecological success (Baggio et al., 2016). Her principles have also 
been used to assess case studies of success and failure in governance (Barnett et al., 2016), 
and the scope and scale limits of analytical approaches involving the use of synthesis, meta-
analysis and validation methods (Ratajczyk et al., 2016). While these studies have therefore 
established measures of success across multiple CPRs (e.g. fishery, forestry and irrigation 
using presence/absence conditions), questions remain as to whether Ostrom’s CPR 
institutional DPs are necessary—or necessary and sufficient—conditions to ensure 
sustainability and long-lived robustness (Ostrom, 2009). Ostrom herself doubted that any list 
of DPs would be necessary and sufficient to ensure robustness, and this is supported by a 
general scan of the literature (Mahoney et al., 2009). To explore this question, we focus 




institutional arrangements appear to be robust, fragile or prone to failure. These outcomes 
are particularly important factors for future water governance arrangements under 
expectations of scarcity and uncertainty with respect to supply (Young 2014). Water is a 
unique resource that can be used multiple times, across multiple locations, making robust 
adaptation to future uncertainty challenging. Many water resources have an additional 
challenging characteristic. Water tends to flow in a single direction with the consequence 
that the impacts of (ab)use tend to be uni-directional. Therefore, in this paper, we search for 
necessary conditions and explore whether there are groups/combinations/configurations of 
sufficient conditions that constitute alternative pathways to robust institutions in the field 
using a large-N case study approach. Based on our findings, we then offer some possible 
enhancements to Ostrom’s DPs in an attempt to assist others involved in searching for ways 
to improve the management of irrigation institutions, and the use of water. 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
The overarching basis for our study is the theory of collective action which seeks to 
understand what factors enable some groups to achieve difficult collective outcomes, while 
others fail (Ostrom, 2011). Consistent with a focus on empirical validation of resource 
governance institutions (Janssen and Anderies, 2013), we apply Ostrom’s DPs as updated 
by Cox et al. (2010), and used by Ostrom in the address she gave when she accepted her 
Nobel Prize (2010). The update resulted in a total of 11 DPs, which span the boundaries of 
a resource system, local conditions, rules and organizational arrangements, monitoring, 




Table 1. DPs modified by Cox et al. (2010) and endorsed by Ostrom (2010) 
Design Principles 
1A. User Boundaries: Clear and locally understood boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers are 
present. 
1B. Resource Boundaries: Clear boundaries that separate a specific common-pool resource from a larger 
social-ecological system are present. 
2A. Congruence with Local Conditions: Appropriation and provision rules are congruent with local social 
and environmental conditions. 
2B. Appropriation and Provision: appropriation rules are congruent with provision rules; the distribution of 
costs is proportional to the distribution of benefits. 
3. Collective Choice Arrangements: Most individuals affected by a resource regime are authorized to 
participate in making and modifying its’ rules. 
4A. Monitoring Users: Individuals who are accountable to, or are, the users monitor the appropriation and 
provision levels of the users. 
4B. Monitoring the Resource: Individuals who are accountable to, or, are the users monitor the condition of 
the resource. 
5. Graduated Sanctions: Sanctions for rule violation start very low but become stronger if a user repeatedly 
violates a rule. 
6.  Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: Rapid, low cost, local arenas exist for resolving conflicts among users 
or with officials. 
7. Minimal Recognition of Rights: The rights of local users to make their own rules are recognized by the 
government 
8. Nested Enterprises: When a common-pool resource is closely connected to a larger social-ecological 
system, governance activities are organized in multiple nested layers. 
 
The presence/absence of institutional arrangements that are consistent with these DPs 
may help in informing whether or not CPR institutions can be improved, and whether they are 
prone to failure as discussed by Ostrom (2011) during her reflection on the work of Coman 
(1911). In that work, Ostrom offered advice on ways that specific institutional arrangements in 
particular contexts can increase the effectiveness of irrigation systems’ management, and ways 
to assess when collective management may produce outcomes that are superior to private or 
public property rights. Building on that work, we focus on case studies of common property 
regimes, rather than common pool resources as studied by Ostrom (1990, 2010). In particular, 
we focus on the institutional arrangements that determine how a resource is used and, when 
they fail, abused. Finally, we search for the relationship between DPs and robust water 




earlier definition of robust institutions as the system outcome, where irrigation governance 
arrangements persist under duress producing efficient use, investment preservation, and 
socially-acceptable outcomes. Table A2 in the Appendix to this paper details the definition of 
successful robust outcomes, while the following section details our analytical method and 
approach in greater detail. Far greater detail can also be found in the Supplementary Material 
for this paper. 
2.3 Methods and materials 
This study employs a meta-analysis approach based on identifying what does and does not 
work in the governance of irrigation systems. Other studies have noted limits to the comparison 
of global assessments in this space (Ratajczyk et al., 2016). However, we argue that much can 
be learned from comparative research. We begin by searching for irrigation institutions with 
similarities that make meta-analysis of their key features possible. The methodology we use is 
based on systematic coding approaches (Poteete et al., 2010b) that use Ostrom’s DPs as 
explanatory variables. Coding objectivity requires an iterative process of refining the way each 
variable is defined through the use of qualitative comparative analysis techniques (Rudel, 
2008). 
2.3.1 Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) bridges quantitative and qualitative data through a 
capacity to identify decisive cross-case study patterns. The cross-case pattern assessment 
process is designed to accommodate diversity among cases and account for heterogeneity with 
regard to different causally relevant conditions (Ragin, 1994). QCA approaches can also 
identify alternative combinations of conditions capable of generating the same outcome. That 
is, QCA is grounded in the assessment of complex relationships among variables, rather than 




feature of QCA is that it allows researchers to reduce the complexity of empirical information 
to achieve greater parsimony by looking for similarities and differences among cases through 
logical minimization (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The approach we use is consistent 
with Ostrom and Cox’s (2010) recommendation for the use of QCA approaches for the 
development of future DPs to deal with the lower-level aggregation of social-ecological 
systems (SES), especially where small to medium sample sizes preclude the use of more 
conventional statistical methods. A main strength of QCA is that it can analyze complex 
causations from small samples and identify the drivers of outcomes from multiple 
configurations of causal conditions (Ragin, 2009). The method enables assessment of context-
specific causality including conditions that might have a positive or negative effect depending 
on the context in which it is set (Marx et al., 2014). To date, QCA has been used to study 
irrigation institutions by Lam and Ostrom (2010) and (2015) using crisp and fuzzy datasets, 
respectively, derived from interview methods. Further, Baggio et al. (2016) assess the presence 
and absence of Ostrom’s DPs using a crisp-set QCA across forestry, fishing and irrigation 
CPRs. While valuable, however, the results from these studies tend to be too general to enable 
the development of recommendations for a change in the way a specific water resource is 
governed. 
2.3.2 Fuzzy-set data calibration 
In this study, fuzzy-set QCA (fs/QCA) methods (i.e. assessment values ranging between 0 
and 1) are adopted over the more common crisp-set methods (assessment values set to either 0 
or 1). This is justified on the basis that we seek to explain the degree of DP membership in the 
configuration of causal conditions that result in the emergence or maintenance of a set of 
arrangements that, in concert, help to maintain the robustness of an institution. In this sense, 
robustness is determined by institutional capacity to adapt equitably and efficiently to ever-




that determine the way the institution operates. The underlying structure and rules associated 
with each DP condition are not simply present or absent, but vary from context to context and 
thus require a more graduated metric in a manner that complicates the process significantly. 
Development of a well-constructed fuzzy-set requires a well-thought-out calibration 
process, as the degree of fuzzy set membership strongly influences the result of the analysis 
(Basurto and Speer, 2012). Consequently, Ragin (2006) recommends attention to transparency 
and replicability in the membership and calibration processes. Few sources provide explicit 
procedural advice on how to transform qualitative concepts to fuzzy values (de Block and Vis, 
2018). While Basurto and Speer (2012) and Toth, Henneberg and Naude (2017) offer explicit 
calibration procedures as a part of their research. Unfortunately, the calibration process in both 
studies is not suitable for our data because their calibration was predetermined before the data 
collection, whereas ours takes place after. Further, we require calibration after the fuzzy set is 
defined. Thus, we turn to Adcock and Collier’s (2001) measurement validity framework and 
follow the structured calibration procedure set out in Figure 1. We stress that, as indicated by 
the arrows, this is an iterative process and that care needs to be taken to ensure that the data are 











Figure 3. Scoring, coding and calibration procedure. 
In fs/QCA approaches, the causal conditions selected and outcomes chosen should be 
based on prior theoretical knowledge and empirical insights gained throughout the research 
process (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010). Since our study is based on Ostrom’s DPs, we use 
the concept definitions provided by Ostrom (2010) in Table 1 as the basis for our causal 
conditions. However, some of these definitions are slightly modified to conform with the 
irrigation institutions under examination as indicated by the bold text in Table 1. For example, 
consistent with recommended practice (Schneider and Wagemann 2010), we reduced the total 
number of conditions by joining User Boundary (DP1A) and Physical (resource) Boundary 
(DP1B) into one condition: Clearly-defined Boundary. This was done because, in most of the 
case studies, user boundary is confined within the physical boundary of the irrigation system. 
That is, users are typically socially and physically constrained to the extent of the area covered 




Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Modifications to Ostrom’s DPs for irrigation system case calibration 
Condition (DP) Definition 
1. Clearly-defined boundaries Legitimate users are clearly defined and identifiable. Physical 
limits on the extent of the resource are defined at all points in 
time, and across space. 
2a. System congruence with 
local conditions 
Appropriation and provision rules are congruent  with local 
and system-wide social and environmental conditions as they 
change. 
2b. Proportional equivalence 
between benefit and cost 
The benefits obtained by water users are in proportion to fixed 
and system-wide costs of operation. 
3. Collective choice 
arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can 
participate in the processes leading up to rule modification. 
4a. Monitoring of users Monitors are accountable to the users and have the 
enforcement capacity necessary to ensure compliance with 
appropriation and use rules. 
4b. Resource system 
monitoring 
System-wide monitoring and reporting exists and is 
reported to users. 
5. Graduated sanctions Appropriators who violate operational rules face sanctions, 
preferably graduated. 
6. Conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost 
local arenas to resolve conflicts. 
7. Minimum recognition of 
rights to organize 
The rights of local appropriators to devise their own 
institutional structures and rules are not challenged by external 
government authorities. 
8. Nested enterprises Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple 
layers of nested enterprizes. 
 
2.3.3 Case selection 
The cases for the meta-analysis were sourced from Scopus, Web of Science and Google Scholar 
using search terms that initially included ‘farmers’ managed irrigation institution’, ‘indigenous 
irrigation institution’, ‘traditional irrigation institution’, and ‘water user association’. 
To expand the initial list of potential case studies, snow-ball sampling methods were 
employed. That is, the links and references embodied in the initial articles found were used to 
source additional material, which continued to other articles that cited the original study via 




followed recommendations provided by Poteete, et al. (2010a) and added all articles including 
those that had not been peer-reviewed in the database. As a result, we ended up with an initial 
list of 240 potential case studies that were then screened using two inclusion criteria. First, the 
case study article had to examine institutional arrangements in detail. Second, where a case 
study did not provide enough information, we combined two or more articles that discussed 
the same irrigation institution into one case. In addition, we excluded any case studies that used 
Ostrom’s DPs to evaluate planning processes, and (combined or individual) cases studies that 
did not contain enough information for further analysis. Figure 2 shows the global scope of the 
case studies with the number per country listed in the caption to this figure (in parentheses). 
We ended up with 62 case studies located across 37 countries. 
 
Map Source: Esri (2017) 
Figure 4. Case distribution across 37 countries:  
Afghanistan (1), Algeria (1), Argentina (1), Australia (1), Bangladesh (1), Bolivia (1), 
Bulgaria (1), China (2), Ecuador (1), Egypt (2), Eritrea (2), Ethiopia (2), Haiti (1), India (2), 
Indonesia (5), Iran (1), Japan (1), Jordan (1), Kenya (3), Nepal (2), New Zealand (1), Niger 




Suriname (1), Taiwan (1), Tajikistan (1), Tanzania (3), Thailand (3), United States (4), 
Yemen, (1) and Zimbabwe (1). 
2.3.4 Development of the fuzzy-set 
The preliminary list of sub-sets was derived from best-worst practices typically found in the 
literature and combined with insights from the case studies (Table A1 of the Appendix). The 
literature and sub-set of information was then used to develop systematic coding guidelines. 
After the first round of the coding, we refined the fuzzy-sets and coding guidelines in 
accordance with the methodology’s recommended iterative process. As discussed above, a 
combined condition representing Clear Boundaries (BOUND) was created to more accurately 
represent case realities, and to reduce the total number of conditions for the fs/QCA. In the case 
of water governance institutions, we also specified water use rights as clearly defined if i) users 
have a right to abstract a certain amount of water, ii) the location as to where and when water 
can be abstracted are specified; and iii) the ways that abstracted water can be used are pre-
determined (Meinzen-Dick, 2014). Table 3 provides a list of the final fuzzy-set conditions and 
outcomes. Table A1 of the appendix lists the scoring guideline that were applied 
Table 3. Abbreviation of the DPs that are used in the analysis. 
Ten Conditions and an outcome Design Principle Abbreviation 
Clearly-defined boundaries DP 1 BOUND 
Congruence with local conditions DP 2A LOCCON 
Proportional COST and benefit DP 2B BENFCOST 
Collective governance DP 3 COLLGOV 
User monitoring DP 4A USERMON 
System monitoring DP 4B SYSTMON 
Graduated sanctions DP 5 GRADSAN 
Conflict resolution mechanisms DP 6 CONFRES 
Minimum right to organize DP 7 RIGHT 
Nested enterprizes DP 8 NESTENT 





2.3.5 Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Transforming the raw case study data into fuzzy-set values always produces some degree of 
arbitrariness (Skaaning, 2011). To reduce arbitrariness, measurement is needed to translate 
fuzzy concepts into quantitative scores, that can be subsequently transformed into final fuzzy 
values. For validity, the measurement criteria need to capture meaningful ideas that accurately 
reflect the concept being used (Adcock and Collier, 2001). We, therefore, followed the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process developed by Saaty (1990) which suggests two-stage pairwise comparisons 
prior to setting the final fuzzy scores. The first pairwise comparison weights the measurement 
criteria. The second pair-wise comparison then compares the fuzzy-set based on all criteria. 
For example, as described by Saaty (1990), if we were buying a house we could first assess 
each individual option using a common set of criteria, and then secondly (when all houses were 
evaluated) use those criteria again to compare the full set of purchase options and identify the 
best purchase choice. 
Thus, we first identified a set of criteria to measure the fuzzy-set using information 
from the literature and substantive knowledge from the case studies. We then translated the 
DPs into a series of questions that could be used to identify opportunities to increase the 
robustness of a water institution (Ostrom, 2009). For example, for DP1 we identified four major 
criteria for clearly-defined user/resource boundaries and water use rights that could be used to 
increase robustness. Second, we employed the two-stage pairwise ranking of conditions 
wherein the first stage comparison allowed us to weight each criterion, and the second stage 
allowed us to determine how much the fuzzy-set complied with each criterion. The resultant 
pairwise comparison matrixes had a consistency ratio of CR ≤ 0.1, meaning that the priority 




2.3.6 Systematic coding 
Next, a coding system was developed in Nvivo based on the fuzzy sub-sets listed in Table A1of 
the Appendix. We conducted content analysis on the 62 cases, and each case was coded 
according to the fuzzy definitions. A memo was linked to a case whose content did not directly 
comply with the fuzzy-set, but where the meaning was implied throughout the article. In these 
cases, the data was coded accordingly. The memo also included citation details from other 
supporting documents to supplement information from the main case study article. Where 
possible (and necessary) additional information was obtained via personal communication with 
case-study authors to clarify ambiguous data. All coding was conducted by the first author and, 
hence, no inter-coder reliability tests were required. In recognition of the fact that this could 
result in coder bias, however, we developed a set of strict procedures to minimize the risk that 
this could occur as detailed in the Supplementary Materials to this paper. 
2.3.7 Calibration of the fuzzy-set scores 
Using indirect methods of calibration recommended by Ragin (2006), we transformed the 
initial fuzzy-set score into one of four values. A full membership value of 1 was assigned to a 
fuzzy-set with the highest score, indicating the most favorable manifestation of the institutional 
criteria. A membership value of 0 was assigned to fuzzy-set with the lowest scores, indicating 
the worst manifestation of the institutional criteria. A challenge with fuzzy concepts is that it 
is difficult to justify the cross over (threshold) point; therefore we did not assign 0.5 values in 
the fuzzy-sets. Furthermore, cases with maximum ambiguity (i.e. 0.5 fuzzy values) cannot be 
dealt with in fs/QCA analysis (Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014). Instead, with due consideration 
based on i) our theoretical and substantive knowledge of the empirical studies and ii) the 
distance in a compliance score between full- and non-member, intermediate scores were 




out than in; and 0.67 for a governance arrangement that was more in than out (Basurto and 
Speer, 2012). The fuzzy-set values were then assigned to all cases in the fuzzy data matrix. 
2.3.8 Missing data and the meaning of zero “0” 
Out of the 62 cases, there are 46 complete cases, while 16 cases contain missing data 
mainly associated with the presence or absence of graduated sanction mechanisms (13 cases or 
20%) and conflict resolution mechanisms (5 cases or 8%). All missing data were coded initially 
with a zero fuzzy value that resulted in “0” values in the truth table analysis. However, some 
of the cases with missing data showed a ROBUST outcome. Therefore, in a subsequent 
analysis, we chose to explore why the absence (or presumed absence) of these conditions might 
not have compromised a ROBUST outcome rather than assuming that presence of the condition 
increases robustness as typically discussed in the literature. Therefore, a “0” value in this study 
has three meanings, i.e. “truly absent” (when the condition was indeed absent), “not in the set” 
(missing data: when the condition was not specifically discussed in the case study and is 
therefore ambiguous), and “not applicable” (which mainly applied to nested conditions. Since 
most of the case studies were small scale and there was no indication of them being part of a 
complex or larger institution, we suspect that in most cases graduated sanctions operate – even 
though there is no mention of them. All of these meanings are identified and explored in the 
solution path of sufficiency conditions discussed later. 
2.3.9 Data analysis 
Finally, we analyzed the data using fs/QCA v3.0, developed by Ragin and Davey (2017). Based 
on Ostrom’s views regarding DP lists, the model used for analysis is as follows: 
BOUND*LOCCON*BENFCOST*COLLGOV*USERMON
*SYSTMON*GRADSAN*CONFRES*RIGHT*NESTENT 
→ ROBUST (1) 
The above formula simply reflects a hypothesized combination of DPs that may lead to 




in an irrigation area. However, unlike a regression equation that would consist of dependent 
and independent variables, the fs/QCA model presents its causal conditions in the left-hand 
side and the outcome on the right. Further, the process involves Boolean operators as presented 
in Table 4: logical AND (*) which combines conditions (set intersect) to the smallest score, 
logical OR (+) which joins conditions (union set) to the highest score, and logical NOT (~) that 
signifies the negation of conditions or outcomes (ABSENT) (Ragin, 2009). 
 
Table 4. Description of Boolean operators used in the study. 
Boolean operation Symbol Description 
Logical AND  * Combine condition (set intersect) to the smallest score  
Logical OR + Join condition (union set) to the highest score 
Logical NOT ~ Signify negation (absent) of condition or outcome 
 
Finally, Schneider and Wagemann (2012) recommend that study data are first analyzed 
for necessary conditions before performing any analysis of sufficiency conditions. By 
necessary, we mean that whenever outcome Y is present, the condition X was also present. To 
address this requirement, a truth table was constructed from the fuzzy value matrix prior to 
sufficiency analysis. It contains rows of all possible combinations of causal conditions. We set 
the value of 1 for frequency cut-off to identify empirical relevant causal configuration, and 
0.80 for consistency cut-off to determine which configuration pass the fuzzy-set theoretic 
consistency in the Quine-McCluskey minimization procedure (Ragin, 2009). We then 
performed a standard analysis of the truth table for configuration of conditions that are 





2.4.1 Necessary conditions 
The results of the analysis in Table 5 show the consistency and coverage values are 
generally high for the presence of DPs in irrigation institutions, suggesting good approximation 
of set-relations (Ragin, 2006) and the relevance of DPs for ROBUST outcomes. However, only 
four of the DPs pass the 0.9 consistency threshold value (Skaaning, 2011) for identification as 
necessary conditions; that is, BOUND, USERMON, SYSTMON, and RIGHT. Of those, 
BOUND also has the highest coverage value of 0.98 which indicates the relative importance 
of this condition compared to others. We also tested necessary conditions for failed systems 
(~ROBUST) and found that only ~BOUND passed the consistency threshold with a value of 
0.959 and coverage of 0.870; which is clearly not trivial. This again emphasizes the necessity 
of clearly defined boundaries for robust irrigation institutions. 





Condition Consistency Coverage  Condition Consistency Coverage 
BOUND 0.949 0.985 
 
~BOUND 0.960 0.871 
LOCCON 0.761 0.936 
 
~LOCCON 0.855 0.562 
BENCOST 0.862 0.880 
 
~BENCOST 0.672 0.635 
COLGOV 0.833 0.897 
 
~COLGOV 0.733 0.612 
USERMON 1.000 0.889 
 
~USERMON 0.653 1.000 
SYSTMON 0.971 0.950 
 
~SYSTMON 0.858 0.914 
GRADSAN 0.708 0.882 
 
~GRADSAN 0.735 0.474 
CONFRES 0.839 0.771 
 
~CONFRES 0.305 0.405 
RIGHT 1.000 0.889 
 
~RIGHT 0.652 1.000 
NESTEST 0.738 0.894 
 
~NESTEST 0.756 0.508 
      
 
      




Next, following a process described in Goertz (2006), we create 2 x 2 tables to search 
for sufficiency effects associated with the four identified necessary conditions. According to 
this process, when the bottom right-hand cell (X, ~Y) is equal to zero, a necessary condition is 
maximally relevant to a sufficient condition. With regard to the DPs for the irrigation 
institutions included in our study, the results shown in Table 6 suggest that, while all of the 
necessary conditions identified have important sufficiency condition effects, none of them is 
sufficient on its own to produce a ROBUST outcome. The bottom left-hand cells (~X, ~Y) 
show reasonable numbers of observations indicating that necessary conditions are not trivial 
(Goertz 2006). Interestingly, only BOUND has a zero value in the bottom right cell (BOUND, 
~ROBUST) which indicates that the clearly-defined boundary DP appears to be maximally 
relevant as a sufficient condition. However, the presence of two cases in the upper left cell 
(~BOUND, ROBUST) seems to contradict the necessity finding reported above. The two 
deviant cases were the Nshara and Mkanyeni canals in Tanzania. In these cases, the users were 
known but water access and risk sharing were inequitable (fuzzy values of 0.33). Both 
irrigation systems were managed by ethnic groups with significant power asymmetry that lead 
to inequity in the rights to use water. However, despite this inequality, the self-governing 
institutions in question had persisted for many generations. This finding agrees with Agrawal’s 
(2001) observation that hierarchical social arrangements in the distribution of benefits can be 
sustainable despite inequitable access sharing, such as those of caste systems or areas with 
ethnic and/or racial inequality. Rohlfing and Schneider (2013) also suggest deviant cases can 
be the result of under-specification, i.e. omission of the SUIN condition, which stands for a 
‘sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome’ 
(Mahoney et al., 2009). This finding supports our decision to examine joined conditions, and 





Table 6. Necessary conditions for robust irrigation system institutions 
Table 6a. BOUND  Table 6b. USERMON 
 ~BOUND BOUND   ~USERMON USERMON 
ROBUST 2 41  ROBUST 0 43 
~ROBUST 19 0  ~ROBUST 13 6 
       
Table 6c. SYSTMON  Table 6d. RIGHT 
 ~SYSTMON SYSTMON   ~RIGHT RIGHT 
ROBUST 0 43  ROBUST 0 43 
~ROBUST 17 2  ~ROBUST 10 9 
       
 
2.4.2 Analysis of sufficiency conditions 
The results of the truth table analysis show there are seven configurations of conditions 
that are sufficient for ROBUST irrigation institutions, as presented in Figure 3. The notation 
here follows Fiss (2011) and Ragin and Fiss (2008) who differentiate between core and 
peripheral or complementary conditions. Core conditions are those that appear in the 
parsimonious and the intermediate solutions, while peripheral conditions only appear in the 
intermediate solution (Fiss, 2011). The complete set of truth table results are available in Table 
A3 in the Appendix to this paper. 







USERMON*SYSTMON or 0.971 0.231 0.978 
LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT 0.740        0 1.000 
Solution coverage: 0.971    
Solution consistency: 0.978    
 
Figure 3 shows two distinct groups of causal configurations. Group 1 relies on the first 
parsimonious solution, i.e. the combination of user monitoring AND system-wide monitoring 
(USERMON*SYSTMON). The USERMON condition is considered present when monitoring 




condition denotes that a comprehensive monitoring of water resource conditions and status is 
in place, and results are accessible to all in a timely manner. These characteristics allow the 
systems and users to adjust as local circumstances vary. Interestingly, in cases where clear 
GRADSAN or CONFRES conditions—which are considered important in successful CPR 
management—are uncertain, USERMON AND SYSTMON conditions consistently appear. 
The paths that treat GRADSAN as ‘don’t care’ reflect data that may be present or absent in the 
case study but result in the same outcome. Sufficient conditions that include ~GRADSAN 
(i.e. absence of graduated sanctions) are shared by groups of cases that have either i) high 
mutual trust within the community (such as irrigation institutions found in Chaisombat, 
Nishikanbara LID, Shirgin, Tharigat watershed, Ghayl, and Zanjera Danum), ii) high control 
over water allocation mechanisms (Falaj Al Khatmeen, Nabargram, Sidi Okba), or iii) both. 
These cases include evidence of minimum conflict and free-rider problems, which may suggest 
reasons as to why the authors did not discuss this DP in detail—and as such may be coded as 
missing data in our analysis. However, in the Nishikanbara in Japan and Ghayl in Yemen cases, 
the authors discuss the role of social norms and mutual trust that prevent users from free riding. 





Figure 5. Sufficient configurations of conditions for robust irrigation institutions (intermediate 
solution) 
Group 2 (2a and 2b) relies on the second parsimonious solution; the combination of 
Congruence with local condition AND system-wide monitoring AND Minimum rights to 
organize (LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT) as decisive factors. That is, when users have the 
authority to self-organize and devise operational rules within a defined framework (RIGHT), 
they can adapt to various conditions as they change (LOCCON) provided they have required 
information about relevant resources at the right time (SYSTMON). The solution paths for 
Group 2 treat the BOUND condition as ‘don’t care’, as the presence or absence of that condition 
result in the ROBUST outcome. In these cases, the LOCCON condition becomes essential in 
the configuration. Solution 2a belongs to small communities in Tanzania (Nshara) and Nepal 
(Raj Kulo and Thulo Kulo) where conflict resolution is missing (~CONFRES). The importance 
of conflict resolution mechanisms was clearly mentioned in the case study introduction 
material, but then not discussed in the case study findings. However, Raj Kulo and Thulo Kulo 
both displayed evidence of having installed devices that tracked water distribution more 











Raw coverage 0.520 0.447 0.337 0.433 0.315 0.066 0.080
Unique coverage 0.117 0.029 0.008 0.008 0.022 0.059 0.008
Consistency 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Solution coverage 0.689
Solution consistency 1.000
       denotes core condition (present),       denotes complementary or contributing condition (present),      denotes
complementary condition (absent), blank spaces indicate "don't care" situation where a condition could be present 
or absent. Cov= coverage; Con = consistency. 
Cov: 0.74; Con: 1.000Cov: 0.71; Con: 0.978
Conditions





precisely, as a means to reduce conflict (Martin and Yoder, 1988), while in Nshara furrow 
irrigators adopted equity and fairness principles to prevent conflict (Gillingham 1999).  
2.4.3  Tests of joined conditions 
The results above show that all of the conditions which passed the consistency threshold 
of the necessary condition analysis were also present in the parsimonious solution paths—
except BOUND. However, despite being present in the solution paths for both Groups, which 
should indicate its’ necessity, LOCCON did not pass the original consistency threshold test. 
This brings us back the issue of SUIN conditions mentioned previously. We hypothesize that 
both BOUND and LOCCON are SUIN conditions and that their union (BOUND+LOCCON) 
may reveal whether they are individually unnecessary or insufficient for ROBUST institutional 
outcomes, but constitute shared rules necessary for ROBUST irrigation institutions. To test this 
hypothesis, we use the enhanced XY plot (Rohlfing and Schneider, 2013) to determine whether 
these two conditions can be treated as SUIN conditions. All XY plots were created using 
Tosmana v1.6 (Cronqvist, 2018). 
Figure 4a maps the distribution of cases between the BOUND condition and ROBUST 
outcome to show that, despite being highly relevant with zero cases in Cell 3 (see the centre of 
figures for cell numbering references), the two deviant cases in Cell 6 contradict the necessity 
of the BOUND condition as discussed previously. Figure 4b maps the distribution of cases 
between the LOCCON condition and ROBUST outcomes showing that Cell 1 contains 30 cases 
which exclude the LOCCON condition from achieving necessity status, notwithstanding it 
being present in all of the solution paths. This suggests that, consistent with SUIN principles, 
the presence of LOCCON ensures ROBUST outcomes in cases such as Nshara and Mkanyeni 
where the BOUND condition is absent. However, the SUIN condition means that cases without 







Figure 6. Enhanced XY plot of BOUND 
condition 
 Figure 7. Enhanced XY Plot of LOCCON 
condition 
Unlike the rigid irrigation governance systems in Mendoza, both Mkanyeni and Nshara 
have flexible working rules for water appropriation including allowing the limited transfer of 
shares and/or allocation.1 This allows them to reduce some of the inequality dimension between 
users, supporting the persistence of the institutions for long periods of time. A direct 
comparison between these cases might not be appropriate, however, since the irrigation system 
in Mendoza is larger and more complex compared to the small scale irrigation institutions of 
Mkanyeni and Nshara. Nevertheless, we consider that comparison is justified on the basis that 
the three cases were awarded membership in the same fuzzy value category; that is, is more in 
that out of the BOUND condition, even though they display different outcomes. An additional 
analysis of the SUIN consistency and coverage values for BOUND+LOCCON reveals a value 
of 0.978, which suggests that the SUIN condition is necessary. The coverage of 0.936 indicates, 
also, that it is not trivial. Although Figure 5 shows that there are six cases in Cell 3 that reduce 
                                                 
1 In Nshara, temporary transfer took place within the same irrigation system with neighbours or relatives, 
providing that whoever borrowed or bought water (although selling water was considered illegal) also participated 
in maintenance activities. To reduce risk and inequality of water access, farmers in Mkanyeni located their plots 




the sufficiency effect, it does not contradict the necessary condition evaluation (Goertz, 2006; 
Rohlfing and Schneider, 2013). This implies that while it is necessary, the SUIN condition 
alone is not sufficient to achieve ROBUST irrigation system institutions. Figure 5 also shows 




Figure 8. Enhanced XY plot of BOUND+LOCCON conditions 
2.4.4 Sensitivity analysis 
One way to test the robustness of fs/QCA analysis is to reduce the number of cases (de Bora et 
al 2016). We, therefore, re-ran the analyses using complete case studies only, to discover that 
GRADSAN and CONFRES are also necessary for ROBUST outcomes. The result is expected 
because, as discussed earlier, these two conditions were usually the source of missing data. The 
test for ~ROBUST also returned consistent results showing that only ~BOUND is necessary. 
Likewise, the truth table analysis indicates that the parsimonious solutions remained the same, 
while the intermediate solutions showed only four configurations in Figure 3; that is, 1a, 1c, 




findings as a result of the presence of some missing data. For further detail, readers are directed 
to the sensitivity analysis section in the Supplementary Materials. 
2.5 Discussion 
The results reported above support Ostrom’s view that no list of DPs, if complied with, is likely 
to be sufficient to ensure institutional robustness. For the irrigation institutions included in the 
study, however, it has been possible to identify a set of four necessary conditions which 
increase robustness: these are clearly-defined boundaries, user monitoring, system-wide 
monitoring, and minimum rights to organize. The seven configurations of conditions that 
appear to be sufficient for robustness agree with previous studies that have found that not all 
DPs have to be present in successful CPR management (e.g. Baggio et al., 2016). The 
configuration of causal conditions is context specific. Our findings are consistent, however, 
with Ostrom’s (2009) view that the presence of more design principles in a self-organizing 
institution increases robustness. The solution path to 2B, however, needs to be treated with 
caution as it includes the absence of proportional benefit and cost as a pathway to robustness. 
Three cases in this group, (i.e. Valencia, Bada Spate irrigation and Mkanyeni) all have full cost 
recovery but the distribution of benefits was generally inequitable (fuzzy value 0.33). This  
indicates that calibrating the concept requires treatments of ‘more in than out’ (0.67), in which 
the design principle includes the concept of cost recovery that distributed proportionally to the 
benefit received by the users. In traditional irrigation systems, cost recovery typically is not a 
major issue as most irrigation infrastructures are built using cheap materials sourced from the 
surrounding landscape, and are thus easier to maintain with labour and in-kind contribution by 
the farming community. By contrast, modern irrigation delivery systems may be capital 
intensive, where the cost of operating and maintaining such systems may not be resolved by 




been a concern for modern irrigation institutions, especially in developing countries (Sampath, 
1992). 
The results also found two alternative configurations that consistently present in 
institutions characterized by robustness. As can be seen above, the causal conditions in the 
parsimonious solutions mirror the necessary conditions except for that of clearly-defined 
boundaries and congruence with local conditions, which we identify as SUIN conditions 
(discussed below). Given that this study has highlighted the importance of some DPs including 
clear user and resource boundaries, rules that are congruent with local conditions, monitoring 
of both users and the resource system, and local rights to organize—and the relevance of these 
DPs as alternative pathways to success—we expand upon each of those with some additional 
examples and detail from the case study materials. 
2.5.1 Clearly-defined boundaries and congruent appropriation rules as SUIN conditions. 
In the face of future scarcity and unpredictability, robust water institutions must include 
property-right structures that are secure yet adaptable enough to support change while 
providing incentives for users to invest in maintaining the resource and the parts of the system 
that are under their control (Howe et al., 1986; Quiggin, 1988). Clearly-defined user/resource 
boundaries and congruent appropriation rules both represent the requisite property rights 
structure. In our case studies, typical appropriation rules reflect the boundary definition of the 
resource setting: who gets water, when, where, how much and for what use are the shared rules 
that clearly and completely define the boundary of the resource system, and at the same time 
clearly guide the development of  working rules that enable efficient and equitable 
appropriation. Further, all of the ROBUST outcomes cases displayed some degree of security 
and flexibility in their institutional arrangements. These two characteristics do not necessarily 
contradict one other; rather the irrigation community usually managed to design shared access 




assignment of longer-term property rights structures (e.g. annual scarcity pressures can be 
managed separately from longer-term considerations). 
Two types of flexibility are typically discussed in the literature, and appear in the cases. 
First, Ostrom (1990) emphasizes the congruence of appropriation rules with local conditions 
where water is allocated in response to the changing water availability either by rotation or 
turn-taking, reducing water proportionally, or assigning different use priorities under different 
situations. Second, there may be flexibility in the way that longer-term opportunities to access 
water can be transferred to other uses or users, or from one place to another, as climate, 
demographic and economic conditions change over time (Howe et al., 1986). Table 8 provides 




Table 8. Comparison of failed and robust surface and groundwater irrigation systems 
 Failed Systems Robust Systems 
Surface water Kuhl Tharigat watershed 
Access to water Priority of water in kuhls are given to 
paddy farmers. (Water use right to 
kharif is formally registered/ 
documented). 
Ten villages shared water in the 
Tharigat watershed according to a pre-
agreed schedule. 
Sharing rules at system 
level 
Clear among kuhls irrigation before 
new entrants started using water in 
the upper and middle reaches of the 
irrigation system. 
Clear time sharing and rotation 
schedule for water allocation for each 
village. 
Source of change in the 
access to water 
New entrant: new rice fields in the 
upper stream. 
New entrant: government takes water 
from the river in the upper stream to 
supply drinking water to the nearby 
city. 
Impact or response to 
change in access to water 
Uncontrolled use of water upstream. 
Useless downstream water rights 
because irrigation ran dry/system 
became non-operational. 
Water supply decreased significantly. 
Re-arranged water time sharing and 
rotation is organised for each village. 
Proportional reduction of cultivated 
area. 
Surface water Mendoza Valencia (Old) 
Access to water Proportional to cultivated area. Water 
right is attached to land. 
Proportional to cultivated area. Water 
right is attached to land. 
Sharing rules at system 
level 
Proportional ownership. Proportional ownership. 
Response to water 
shortage/ scarcity 
Rotation; proportional reduction 
irrespective of different needs. 
Applied different priority in short 
term, long term and emergency 
planning based on equity principles; 
proportional reduction. 
Impact on access to water Unable to respond to scarcity or 
drought. Increased illegal pumping 
by big farmers to augment water 
supply. 
Different strategy of water allocation 
allows the system to achieve efficiency 
while still maintaining equity 
principles.  
Groundwater Gnangara aquifer system Eastern La Mancha aquifer system 
Access to water 10-year fixed annual entitlement. The 
licensing system specified an 
authorized use or purpose to which 
extracted water is to be put. Water 
rights are transferable. 
Proportional to cultivated area. Water 
is attached to land.  
Response to water scarcity Variability of water resource 
condition is not considered; 
information on water condition not 
readily available.  
Reduction of abstraction volume per 
hectare to increase water level in the 
aquifer as agreed by farmers’ 
association and water authority. 
Impact on water resources Water overdraft, water resource 
degradation  
Water levels still show downward 
trend but farmers’ association and 
water authority are building a solid 
institutional framework in which to 
introduce sustainable practices. 
 
Whichever sharing/appropriation rule mechanisms apply, there are two main lessons 
that can be derived from the case studies. First, water-sharing arrangements at the system level 




sense of equity in maintaining user resource sharing in CPR management is important 
(Quiggin, 1993), in practice the distribution arrangements must be allowed to evolve. 
Therefore, it is critical to establish individual water use rights that are clearly-defined and 
difficult to contest. Only by gaining secure access to water will users be willing to invest in the 
operation and maintenance of the system, and to ensure productive use of the irrigation system 
resources over time. The case studies also assist us to understand how robust institutions 
emerge as a consequence of these conditions. Spate irrigation systems in Eritrea 
(Ghebremariam and van Steenbergen, 2007; Mehari et al., 2005) have existed for many 
generations despite unequal access to water. Since this irrigation institution relies on access to 
seasonal floods, water supply is highly uncertain and unpredictable. As a result, complex 
arrangements for water appropriation are mixed with other social mechanisms to ensure 
members perceived the rules as fair. This has resulted in continued farmer membership in the 
resultant CPR collective. Similarly, in Valencia, the irrigation community maintained equality 
of access through proportional appropriation rules and applied different access priorities as 
conditions changed to ensure fair access perceptions by users (Glick, 1970; Maass and 
Anderson, 1978). Alternatively, Barnett et al. (2016) provide evidence of how the application 
of proportional access in two groundwater-based irrigation systems in Spain became 
incongruent with the broader economic, social and technological conditions surrounding the 
system, causing the institutions to fail. This highlights the relevance of local conditions for 
robust outcomes, and the importance of property rights structures, as suggested by Quiggin 
(1988), in keeping the appropriation rules congruent with the nature of the characteristics of 
the physical resource and social demands on it. 
2.5.2 User and system-wide monitoring 
The parsimonious solutions in Table 7 show that the raw coverage of 




addition, it has a unique coverage of 0.231 which shows that around 23% of the cases can be 
explained by this solution alone, without the need for others. Based on these two features, the 
USERMON*SYSTMON solution may, therefore, be considered more important than the 
LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT solution. However, it is important to note that the concept 
used for monitoring users and resources in our systematic coding was slightly different to that 
of Cox et al. (2010). While separating monitoring of users (DP4A) from the monitoring of 
resources (DP4B) in their modified DPs (see Table 1), Cox et al. (2010) suggest that they 
indicate the presence of monitoring for both users and resources in DP4A, while DP4B 
indicates any accountability of the monitors in the institutions.2 The same approach was used 
by Baggio et al (2016). In our view, keeping the two monitoring types included in DP4A 
separate (as in Table 1) is beneficial in helping to search for and find ways of increasing the 
robustness of irrigation institutions. In our view, combining the monitoring of individual user 
behavior with the benefits of reporting on the status of the entire resource is about two separate 
issues that run the risk of being ignored by researchers when investigating CPRs using 
Ostrom’s DPs.  
In support of this view, we found evidence of such oversight in some of the case studies. 
In the case in Kenya (Likii WRUA) and two cases in China (Wang and Wen villages), for 
example, the authors clearly identified the presence of monitoring (focusing on users and the 
status of use), and that the monitors were accountable to users. However, despite the presence 
of all DPs according to the authors, they observed significant inequality between users (in all 
cases), difficulties in coping with changed socioecological conditions (Likii WRUA), and over 
exploitation of water resources (Wang and Wen villages). These three cases indicate two 
                                                 
2 “Principle 4A stipulates the presence of monitors, whereas 4B stipulates the condition that 
these monitors are members of the community or otherwise accountable to those members.” 
(Cox et al 2010: Principle 4: Monitoring). However, the authors reviewed the importance of 




important points: i) there can be a lack of enforcement despite the presence of accountable 
monitors and monitoring the users/resources, and ii) if resource monitoring does not exist, or 
the information cannot be accessed in a timely manner to adapt to the social-ecological change, 
failure is more likely. We coded these three systems as ‘fragile’. In addition, the comparison 
of two groundwater-based irrigation institutions in Table 8 indicate how monitoring of, and 
timely available information on, resource conditions clearly contribute to robust institutions. 
Therefore, establishing an effective individual use monitoring system is important so that 
aspiring, but ineligible, users can be excluded and that allocations, once made, are complied 
with.  
Different from other types of CPR where failure of the system tends to impact all 
resource users in the same way, often weak water institutions involve adverse unidirectional 
impacts where the actions of upstream users can impose unfair and socially inefficient impacts 
on downstream users – especially during short-term water scarcity. This is particularly evident 
in the three ‘fragile’ cases mentioned above. Separate system-wide monitoring should ensure 
equitable sharing of the available resource. At the broader level under effective enforcement 
rules, eligible downstream users are able to exercise their rights while not violating others; thus 
preventing infringement upon the common property resource. Further, resource monitoring is 
essential for effective planning and decision-making in natural resource management contexts 
(Babu and Reidhead, 2000). Finally, the flexible appropriation and provision rules discussed 
above depend on timely information from the monitoring process, which will inform the need 
for the system and users to adapt to various conditions as they change. In support of this 
conclusion, all of the FAIL cases in this study had no proper monitoring systems in place, nor 




2.5.3 Combining congruence principles, system-wide monitoring and the right to organize 
to aspire adaptive capacity 
As outlined above, water is unique compared to other types of natural resources as it tends to 
flow from upstream to downstream, with sequential use and re-use values and extremes in 
terms of quantity, quality and time of impact (Hanemann, 2006). It has destructive power 
during floods or can create severe competition in a long drought. These features make water 
management more challenging, especially where management requires rapid adaptation. The 
second parsimonious solution which combines congruence of appropriation and provision rules 
with local conditions, system monitoring and the minimum right to organize 
(LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT) represents a pathway to increased adaptive capacity, and 
through this system robustness. Consistent with acting upon the information provided from an 
effective monitoring system, institutional success necessitates active group management with 
the authority to hold members in check over their use of system resources (Bromley, 1992). 
Most importantly, these arrangements must also be capable of responding to dynamic changes 
in economic, social and environmental conditions at particular times and places as rapidly as 
these changes occur. To achieve rapid adaptation, authority appears to be best left with the 
local users/managers since they are more familiar to the local context and directly face the 
immediate changes or problems (Cundill and Fabricius, 2009) but these authorities need to be 
nested within robust system-wide structures.  
In all irrigation systems, the minimum information required typically includes access 
to continuously updated information on the quantity of water available for irrigation so that the 
community and individuals can plan for water allocation and use, and, also, maintain 
infrastructure in a timely manner. The more complex the irrigation delivery system and 
generally the larger it is, the more important system-wide monitoring. Table 8 shows how 




condition including how they adjust the working rules to maintain congruence with local 
conditions over time (as discussed earlier). By comparison, in institutions where information 
paucity prevents timely adaptation and response to socio-ecological change, or where links to 
larger irrigation systems outside of operating boundaries prevent local modification of 
operational rules (e.g. the Kuhl case study), institutional decline or failure is the typical 
outcome. Our finding that RIGHT design principles constitute a necessary condition for robust 
outcomes is highly consistent with these outcomes. Local decision-making, however, is only 
part of the solution; there is a need to also incorporate wider political, economic and 
environmental information into the local decision-making process and prevent resource users 
in one part of the system having impacts on other parts of the system in a manner that is 
inconsistent with agreed system-wide rules. That is, the right to organize locally should not 
compromise the shared rules at the system level. 
2.5.4 Proposed design principle modifications 
Our analysis of 62 irrigation systems corroborates Cox et al.’s (2010) conclusion that 
Ostrom’s DPs are well supported by empirical evidence. In this study, the fs/QCA approach 
proved useful for examining institutional arrangements with respect to each of the design 
principles in more detail; it allowed us to identify certain necessary conditions and alternative 
configurations of causal conditions that could lead to robust irrigation institutions. Based on 
this analysis, we are in a position to suggest some further irrigation-system focused 
modifications to Ostrom’s DPs (Table 9) with respect to ongoing congruence (DP 2A), the 
linking of monitoring to enforcement arrangements (DP 4A), and the clearer reporting 
responsibility by system monitors to system users—rather than monitoring alone that could be 






Table 9. Proposed further modifications to Ostrom’s DPs for broad application 
 Three DPs as listed in Ostrom (2010)  Modified DPs based on the comparative 
analysis 
2A. Congruence with Local Conditions: 
Appropriation and provision rules are 
congruent with local social and 
environmental conditions. 
Congruence with Local Conditions: 
Appropriation and provision rules are 
congruent with local and system-wide 
social and environmental conditions as they 
change. 
4A. Monitoring Users: Individuals who are 
accountable to or are the users monitor 
the appropriation and provision levels 
of the users. 
Monitoring Users: Monitors are accountable 
to the users with enforcement capacity 
necessary to for ensuring compliance 
with agreed appropriation and use rules 
4B. Monitoring the Resource: Individuals 
who are accountable to or are the users 
monitor the condition of the resource. 
System-wide monitoring: System-wide 
monitoring and reporting exists and is 
reported to users in a timely manner.  
 
Consistent with Ostrom’s desire to test theory with empirical data in this space, we, 
therefore, offer these modifications for application and testing by scholars whose work aims to 
increase the robustness of irrigation institutions. We would be interested to see tests of 
necessity and sufficiency in other CPR settings to determine any common DP conditions or the 
identification of additional alternative solution pathways. Such research would bring us closer 
to the objectives set out by Ostrom for determining if the DPs continue to stand the test of 
time—as we hope future water governance institutions will. 
2.6 Concluding Comments 
The design of water governance and allocation systems remains an art and, while many get to 
write about opportunities to improve them, very few people are invited to participate in their 
renewal; especially when the necessary changes involve the significant re-specification of the 
processes and institutional arrangements that determine who gets access to water. Moreover, 
in the real world of water governance and allocation, there is an immense amount of detail that 




convince communities that the current suite of institutions used to manage their water resources 
are flawed, can be fixed and, if fixed, will help to deliver prosperity. The collection of evidence 
from many case studies across a substantial number of countries is one way of doing this. The 
results, which emerged from a careful examination of a fuzzy set of data, identified a) four 
necessary conditions; b) seven solution path configurations; and, perhaps more importantly, c) 
a union of conditions that, when absent, are likely to result in system failure during times of 
stress and/or when demands for access are shifting. 
The approach taken attempts to deal, as objectively as possible, with the need for 
concrete advice in a world where, at best, the concepts are fuzzy and situation specific. We 
have aimed, as objectively as possible, to come up with a suite of recommendations that could 
assist in the transformation of failing systems into ones that could confidently be described as 
robust, and also for changes that can be made in order to ensure that systems which are currently 
performing well continue to do so. That is, we aspire to the development of institutional 
arrangements that those reliant upon the system’s water resources can be confident will serve 
them well, especially in times of stress and as new demands emerge. The recommended 
modifications of three of Ostrom’s DPs add a new temporal dimension to her work; emphasis 
on the importance of attending to appropriation arrangements designed to facilitate change and, 
also, stressing the importance of monitoring both system-wide and individual use conditions. 
Our suggested modifications also identify a need to understand how design principles interact 
with one another. Robustness is enhanced by arrangements that, for example, understand the 
interdependence of monitoring at different scales, allocation arrangements and enforcement 
capacity. 
Finally, the research reported here is reliant on the development of analytical techniques that 
seek to reduce arbitrariness. All the judgements made are summarized in the Appendix and 




skewed nature of the data collected suggests a need for more fine-grained analysis. At the 
moment, the best that we can do is identify relationships among broad, very fuzzy, concepts. 
Much more research is needed, for example, on concepts like “enforcement capacity;” 
“appropriation and use rule” options; and ways to ensure that “appropriation and provision 
rules are congruent with current, and flexible enough to cope with future, local social and 
environmental conditions.” 
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Chapter 3: Sustainable irrigation in Indonesia: a case study of 
Southeast Sulawesi Province 
Abstract 
This study employs Ostrom’s Design Principles to examine the robustness of institutional 
arrangements employed by water user associations to manage access to water resources in 
Southeast Sulawesi Province, Indonesia. The outcome is a set of eight propositions which, 
if implemented, can be predicted to significantly improve water use in Indonesia. Emphasis 
is placed on the development of institutional arrangements that encourage and empower 
local action within an agreed system-wide framework so that communities can prosper as 
pressures and demands for water access increase—a requirement generally applicable to 
situations found in many other countries. 





• Indonesia like many countries faces increased water competition 
• As a solution for irrigation, the country is exploring institutional change 
• We employ Ostrom’s design principles to identify institutional opportunities 
• A return to cooperative arrangements is recommended via set propositions 







There are many examples of hydraulic civilizations that bear testimony to the benefits of 
collective water governance (Hassan, 2003). These civilizations can be described as resilient 
where they have enjoyed uninterrupted access to water for human consumption and for 
agriculture because of the robustness of the institutional design and social coordination 
mechanisms used (e.g. Brohier, 2016). Resilience in these systems was achieved, in part, 
because of the robustness of collective governance arrangements that over centuries have 
been able to evolve with changing demands, conditions and technology. The pace of change 
now, however, is much more rapid. As a result, new approaches and new systems are needed. 
The objective of this paper is to outline a series of propositions aimed at dealing with such 
rapid change needs, based on decision-making under uncertainty, using Indonesian data. 
Irrigated agriculture in Indonesia started with small-scale, simple hydraulic systems 
around ancient Java in the 5th Century (Van Setten Van der Meer, 1979). It is believed that 
the irrigation system in ancient Java was similar to subak systems in Bali, where both 
employed cooperative irrigation arrangements based on relatively high levels of system 
organization and careful monitoring of effective performance (Van Setten Van der Meer, 
1979). However, by the 15th Century colonial influences stemming from Netherland East 
Indies intervention on agricultural matters led to changes in the Javanese traditional 
arrangements, and by the 1930s differences of up to 50% were being recorded between 
Javanese and Balinese yields per hectare (Booth, 1977). This outcome is similar to what 
Bromley (1992) exemplifies as deterioration of local institutions following the emergence 
of colonial systems. Once Indonesia gained independence in 1945, irrigation development 
policies shifted to achieve government policy public objectives focused on increased 
production of irrigated rice. The achievement of self-sufficiency in rice production in 1984 




arrangements, but with increased tension between local farming systems and state or national 
institutions. Unlike their older cooperative governance counterparts, modern irrigation 
systems in Indonesia are at increased risk of failure in the face of rapidly altering demand 
and supply conditions. This is, in part, due to irrigation authority focus on infrastructure and 
maintenance issues, rather than management institutions, as a solution to existing problems. 
Thus, the resilience of Indonesia’s modern irrigation communities will be being tested by 
increased local demand, changes to historic supply conditions, decreased local contributions 
to operating costs and maintenance, poor system performance, and increasing complexity as 
more users enter and compete for access to a previously abundant resource (Bruns, 2004; 
Sumaryanto, 2012). 
In the last 30 years, successive regulatory changes have been made in an attempt to 
address this poor performance, with little success. Centralized approaches to modern 
irrigation management appear to be weakening local capacity to engage in collective 
management processes that previously enabled rapid resolution of local irrigation problems, 
and timely investment in improvements (Bruns, 2004; Pasandaran, 2004). Moreover, poor 
performance is viewed as a a consequence of deferred maintenance, justifying further 
construction of physical infrastructure (Bruns 2004; Suhardiman and Molinga 2012) over 
investments in institutional change. This may be because earlier attempts to transfer 
responsibility for system management back to local water user associations (WUAs) under 
the 1987 Irrigation Operation and Maintenance Policy (IOMP) (Oad, 2001) failed where 
local farmers no longer viewed labour contributions to maintenance necessary, and 
significant impacts on agricultural performance did not emerge (Vermillion et al 2002).  
As a result, modern approaches to irrigation governance appear to be reaching their 
limits in Indonesia where institutional capacity for effective and efficient water reallocation 




Consequently, the Indonesian government is searching for new water governance 
arrangements that can be expected to play a key role in resolving an increasing array of poor 
performance issues (Direktorat Irigasi & Rawa, 2011; Pasandaran, 2004). With these goals 
in mind, this paper searches for a set of institutional arrangements that will incentivize 
collective action at the local level and result in the emergence of institutions capable of: i) 
dealing effectively with future water supply uncertainty; ii) efficiently reallocating scarce 
water resources among competing demands; and iii) thereby increasing the potential for 
resilience in Southeast Sulawesi irrigation systems, with lessons for other areas. To achieve 
this aim, we first examine previous studies of collective institutional reform with respect to 
the improvement of irrigation management systems in Indonesia and elsewhere to identify 
relevant research questions. We then employ a case study of modern irrigation systems in 
Southeast Sulawesi Province to collect and analyze data on current irrigation governance 
arrangements and potential institutional changes. Finally, we discuss the implications of our 
analysis for Southeast Sulawesi—with a view to further application in other relevant regions. 
3.2 Literature review 
Small-scale irrigation systems can provide effective examples of long-lasting, self-
governance institutions (Janssen and Anderies, 2013). Shepsle (1989) defines long-lasting 
institutions as robust where operational rules are devised and modified over an extended 
period such that governance institutions persist and cope under duress to produce efficient, 
socially-acceptable outcomes (Young, 2014). Often they are characterized by a rigid set of 
administrative structures and arrangements that enable rapid response to changing conditions 
(Young, 2019). A large body of literature documents the factors critical to positive 
performing governance institutions, where the choices for resolving dilemmas no longer 




sustainability are involved (Agrawal, 2001). To accommodate equity or sustainability issues, 
collective action governance has often been recommended. With regard to collective action, 
Wade (1989), Ostrom (1990) and Baland and Platteau (1996) suggest such choices are most 
prominent when and where property rights are well-defined, legally protected, and shared 
equally. Ostrom (1990) examined both public and private property right institutions and, 
ultimately, came to the conclusion that the public versus private debate was missing a third 
alternative—namely the development of self-governing institutions. Unlike Olson’s (1965) 
pessimistic view on the possibility that individuals can contribute voluntarily to achieve 
common interest, Ostrom (1990) found that individuals have the capacity to devise specific 
management and maintenance rules with either no or limited intervention by external parties. 
Building upon this insight Ostrom provided eight general principles for the development of 
sustainable governance systems (Ostrom, 2008). According to her, these design principles 
(DPs) provided a basis for the development of successful self-governing institutions and, 
more importantly, identifying the changes need to repair systems which, for one reason or 
another, have become dysfunctional (Ostrom, 1990). However, Steins and Edwards (1999) 
showed in their case study that, while the design principles may all be present, if cooperation 
is hampered by contextual factors, dysfunctional outcomes may persist. Similar findings are 
reported from case studies in China by Yu et al. (2016) and Kenya by Dell’Angelo et al. 
(2016) where, despite the presence of Ostrom’s DPs, significant access inequality and a total 
dwindling of water resources ensued. Based on their observations, Yu et al concluded that 
Ostrom’s DPs were insufficient to assess successful irrigation institutions. Further, Del 
Angelo doubted the capacity of the DPs to cope with rapid change in socioecological 
contexts. 
We concur with Steins and Edwards’ (1999) view that contextual factors matter when 




the DPs as a panacea (Ostrom, 2007, 2008; Ostrom and Cox, 2010). Instead, we believe it 
more appropriate to use the DPs as a diagnostic approach for analyzing and identifying 
practical institutional change (Ostrom, 2008; Ostrom and Cox, 2010), while taking into 
account the local context or characteristics under observation within the system-wide set of 
arrangements. Thus, when examining existing local institutions—or the need for change—
it is more meaningful to turn the DPs into questions, as Ostrom (2008) suggested, so that 
current (nested) institutional arrangements can be tested and improved to better manage 
future common goals in the face of dynamic change (Ostrom and Cox, 2010). 
Therefore, in this paper we search for the DP conditions and institutional 
arrangements that, if implemented, would improve water use, enable more efficient 
management of changes to supply and demand conditions in Southeast Sulawesi, and 
improve community resilience. We define resilience as the capacity for an irrigation 
community to react, adapt and avoid resource deterioration that may arise from internal or 
external disturbances (Aligica and Tarko, 2014). As a result, we are interested in: i) whether 
or not there is scope for institutional change at the local level relevant which could inform 
Southeast Sulawesi irrigation management system reform; and ii) if so, what institutional 
reforms should be considered? Previous studies elsewhere in Indonesia have evaluated 
effective policy reform to improve irrigation management, institutional performance (e.g. 
Bruns et al., 2005; Oad, 2001; Suhardiman, 2013; Suhardiman and Mollinga, 2012), 
participatory organization (Ricks, 2016), and the general performance of farmer-managed 
irrigation systems (Pasaribu and Routray, 2005; Sutawan, 1987). Very few, however, have 
studied or suggested practical institutional arrangements at the local level, and their potential 
to deal with the challenges now facing water users in Southeast Sulawesi. Therefore, the 
contribution of this study is a local-based analysis aimed at informing a wider set of 




grow in their capacity to manage current supply/demand constraints and, at the same time, 
provide opportunities for other economic sectors to grow. 
3.3 Material and Methods 
3.3.1 Case study area  
In order to explore the case for change, we decided to focus on the Southeast Sulawesi 
Province in eastern Indonesia (Figure 1). As it receives around 2,000 mm of mean annual 
rainfall, the Province of Southeast Sulawesi is considered a water abundant province (BWS 
Sulawesi IV, 2012). Prior to the 1980s, this abundant rainfall meant that irrigated agriculture 
was not common among the indigenous population. Shifting cultivation was common 
practice and most agriculture crops were rain-fed. Consequently, as is the case in many other 
parts of Indonesia, the province has not had a deep historical or cultural experience with 
water management. Small scale irrigation systems were first introduced by migrant farmers 
from Java, Bali and Lombok who settled in the province in the early 1970s. The first major 
irrigation projects took place in 1988 with the construction of Bendung Wawotobi 
(Wawotobi reservoir) on the Konaweha River. Initially around 18,000 hectares of rice paddy 
farming was established. This was followed by construction of the Bendung Ameroro 
reservoir and a number of other smaller reservoirs. Unlike the larger Wawotobi-Ameroro 
irrigation districts (ID), irrigation farming in other districts relies upon the extraction of 
water from smaller rivers or streams with highly variable flows during wet and dry seasons; 





Figure 9. Map of study area in Southeast Sulawesi Province and irrigation villages 
 
There are signs that the irrigation management systems being used in Southeast 
Sulawesi are approaching failure. Decreasing irrigation water availability, for example, has 
been noted in DAS Konaweha (Konaweha watershed) as a result of upstream land-use 
changes including deforestation to enable construction of new upstream rice paddies, 
establishment of palm oil or pepper cropping, and increased sand or other mining activity 
(Baco, 2012; Marwah, 2014). Baco (2012) forecasts that upstream land-use change will 
decrease total water availability up to 39% by 2031-2035 (as compared to the period 2011-
2015), with further reductions to total supply of up to 60% by 2046-2050. During this same 
period, it is expected that water demand will increase from 29m3/second in 2031-2035 to 




which represents an emergent demand supply gap that is nearly as large as current use 
(Figure 2). Clearly, this is infeasible. 
Development of a suite or mix of institutional arrangements that are capable of 
managing the resultant tensions is becoming increasingly urgent. At some stage in the next 
ten years, demand can be expected to regularly exceed supply. It is important to note that 
DAS Konaweha is the biggest and most strategic river in Southeast Sulawesi as it supplies 
water for various purposes across four districts. Further, similar supply reductions/demand 
increases are also expected for other rivers and watersheds in the province. 
 
Figure 10. Forecast of Water supply and demand in DAS Konaweha Watershed as a result 
of continuous land-use change (Baco, 2012) 
In such a situation, typical policy responses search for ways to augment supply in an 
attempt to postpone institutional reform (Young, 2019). Rather than taking this approach, 
and in a stark break from previous governance choices discussed above, the Indonesian 
government is applying a concurrent strategy involving a search for new water supplies and 
institutional reform. With regard to supply enhancement, two multi-purpose dams are being 
proposed with the capacity to provide 23,644 new hectares of paddy fields, 850l/s of fresh 




expected gains, other small reservoir projects in the province have been planned and are 
awaiting implementation. 
At the same time, the Indonesian government is looking closely at how best to 
restructure, form and develop new organizations and institutions capable of managing this 
constellation of challenges. In order to assist with this process, we have used Ostrom’s DPs 
as a framework of questions to guide the collection of qualitative data from key stakeholders 
in the province using interviews, focus group discussions and workshops. In this paper, we 
focus on the nature of required water policy reforms at the water user association level and, 
while we draw attention to the need for reforms at the district, provincial and national level, 
we leave full consideration of this dimension to another paper. We do this partly because of 
the methodology used and partly because we found that Ostrom’s design principles are 
written in a manner that avoids full consideration of this important dimension of many 
governance issues associated with water. 
3.3.2 Data collection 
The study was designed to explore different perspectives of irrigation institution at local 
levels from farmers and irrigation officials, and to contextualize where these farmers and 
irrigation officials perform their activities. Therefore, we used a number qualitative 
approaches to collect field data that represented a broader perspective on irrigation 
institutions from multiple sites for comparison, which we could also use as a method of data 
triangulation (Yin, 2011). 
Interviews, a stakeholder workshop, and focus group discussions were carried out 
between August and October 2017. Except for farmers’ groups, all participants were chosen 
purposefully considering their roles and activities directly related to water allocation or work 




village heads or water user association. In the beginning of each data collection activity 
participants were provided consent forms to record their agreement to participate, noting that 
they could withdraw at any point during the data collection process without penalty. 
We conducted interviews with 15 officials at different management levels including staff 
from agriculture departments, heads of villages, and heads of WUA Unions. Topics 
discussed included water resource and irrigation management issues in respective areas, 
what methods (if any) are used to allocate water to different uses, and what problems or 
conflict (if any) resulted from the use of water resources. We also took the opportunity to 
seek guidance on the most appropriate villages in which to hold focus group discussions 
(FGDs). 
The stakeholder workshop was facilitated by the Department of Research and 
Development in Kendari, the capital of the province. The workshop involved 18 invited 
stakeholders from government institutions including state water companies, River Basin 
Organisations, the Forestry Department, the Watershed Management Institute, the 
Environment Department, and the Department of Regional Planning. The aim of the 
workshop was to collect a further layer of supplementary qualitative data in support of the 
institutional analysis and, in particular, to allow fuller consideration of the views of those 
responsible for provincial level management. 
FGDs were subsequently carried out in three kabupaten (districts): Konawe, Konawe 
Selatan and Kolaka Timur. Two villages were chosen to represent each district in an effort 
to ensure representation in the FGDs of diverse water resource conditions and institutional 
arrangements. Five to eight farmers, including heads of district Perkumpulan Petani 
Pemakai Air (P3A or farmers’ groups/WUAs) participated in each FGD—typically 




water management arrangements in their WUAs; how water was allocated among farmers 
through the tertiary canal infrastructure; what rights and responsibilities existed in the 
irrigation system; the risk (if any) of water shortages; problems and future uncertainties (if 
any) within the system; and existing mechanisms (if any) to resolve water allocation conflict. 
Follow-up interviews were later conducted with some FGD participants to clarify issues that 
were identified as missing from the dataset and/or not clear to the research team following 
reflection on the nature of the information collected. 
3.3.3 Data coding and analysis 
As discussed above, Ostrom’s design principles provided the question framework for this 
study. Consistent with prior research, we utilized a modified version of Ostrom’s DPs 
(Ostrom, 2010) created by Ma'mun et al. (under revision). This modified list brings a sharper 
irrigation focus to Ostrom’s original list of principles for the management of water resources, 
and focuses on conditions for the realization of robust governance systems. These modified 
DPs were derived from a meta-analysis of 62 case studies from 37 countries. As a basis to 
organize our data, Table 1 provides the list of Ostrom’s DPs modified by Cox et al (2010), 
except for DP2A, DP4A and DP4B where we used the definition from Ma’mun et al (under 




Table 10. Ostrom’s design principles 
 Condition (DP) Definition 
1. Clearly defined Boundaries Legitimate users are clearly defined and identifiable. Physical limits on 
the extent of the resource are defined at all points in time and across 
space. 
2a. System congruence with 
local condition 
Appropriation and provision rules are congruent and can be expected to 
remain congruent with local and system-wide social and environmental 
conditions as they change. 
2b. Proportional equivalence 
between benefit and cost 
The benefits obtained by water users are in proportion to fixed and 
system-wide costs of operation. 
3. Collective choice 
arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in the 
processes leading up to rule modification. 
4a. Monitoring users Monitors are accountable to the users with enforcement capacity for 
ensuring compliance to the appropriation and use rules. 
4b. Monitoring of resources System-wide monitoring and reporting exists and is reported to users. 
5. Graduated sanction Appropriators who violate operational rules face sanctions, preferably 
graduated. 
6. Conflict resolution 
mechanism 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local 
arenas to resolve conflicts. 
7. Minimum recognition of 
rights to organize 
The rights of local appropriators to devise their own institutional 
structures and rules are not challenged by external government 
authorities. 
8. Nested enterprises Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, 
and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested 
enterprises. 
 
Coding of the data follows Ostrom’s (2008) suggestion to think of the design principles as a 
starting point for identifying practical implications from the design principles, i.e. 
identifying appropriate arrangements to improve water management at a local level. We then 
used Yin’s (2011) procedure which i) compiled the field notes into general themes, ii) 
disassembled the data using Ostrom’s DPs as overarching concepts, after which we iii) 
reassembled the data by unpacking the DPs into elements relevant to water characteristics 
and whose presence was easier to observe and analyze (Simon, 1978), then we iv) 
interpreted the reassembled data, and finally v) drew conclusions from the entire study. We 
used the initial interpretation stage to revisit and refine the reassembled data, and arrived at 





Table 11.  List of design principle elements for coding the data. 
Design principles Description and support from the literature 
1. Clearly defined boundaries The elements need to consider whether the legitimate 
user are easily identified, how much water can they 
take from which point, and whether their use rights is 
secured and protected (Howe et al., 1986; Matthews, 
2004; OECD, 2015) 
 
Legitimate user 
Limit of water withdrawal 
Rules for new entrants 
Security of tenure 
2A. System congruence with local condition The congruence with local and system wide 
condition need to have flexibility in a defined 
structure so that the outcome can be predicted and so 
that that the users can adapt to various changes 
(Howe et al., 1986; Young, 2019) 
 
Flexibility 
Reliability of supply 
Transferability 
Expectation for future irrigation 
2B. Appropriation and provision rules Unlike traditional irrigation systems which simple in 
nature and easier to maintain, modern irrigation 
systems are capital intensive, thus making the cost 
recovery become one of the major issues (Sampath, 
1992; Ward, 2010). 
 
Contribution to O&M 
Cost recovery 
3. Collective choice arrangement Involving most farmers in collective governance is 
not always effective or feasible. Thus involving 
individual who can act as trusted representative 





4A. Monitoring of user Apart of the accountability of the monitors, effective 
monitoring should have enforcement capacity to 
ensure compliance to the operational rules (Ma’mun 





4B. System wide monitoring Successful management requires constant monitoring 
of resource system and that the information available 
in timely manner to enable community to adjust and 
adapt to various water resource condition (Folke et 
al., 2005).  
 
Access to information 
Transparency 
 
5. Graduated sanction Types of graduation sanction may be informal or 
formal, and has been discussed in the literature 
(Ostrom 1990; Cox et al. 2010 and many others).  Informal sanction 
Formal sanction 
 
6. Conflict resolution mechanism (CRM) The elements of the DP were discussed in clearly in 




7. Minimum recognition of right to organize The important of authority system of self-governing 
institution and its acceptability by local community 
and external government had been discussed by 







8. Nested enterprise Since irrigation system is part of complex water/river 
system, horizontal and vertical coordination become 
important to ensure that the community can realize 
their socioeconomic objectives within a defined 
system-wide framework (Knieper and Pahl-Wostl, 
2016). 
Vertical and horizontal coordination 
 
Ultimately, the coding and analysis resulted in a better understanding of the local context 
and characteristics for the case study areas, and a final set of coded DPs within those local 
contexts. This enables us to follow Ostrom’s (2008) suggestion that the DPs be used to 
answer questions of how to improve the broader set of irrigation management institutions in 
Southeast Sulawesi. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Village context 
In the main, results provide further evidence of poor institutional performance in Southeast 
Sulawesi irrigation districts. We begin with some general village context. All village farms 
are served by public irrigation systems with reservoirs to regulate water, except for Cialam 
Jaya, which relies on water extraction directly from their stream. Two villages (Duria Asih 
and Wonggeduku in the Konawe district) receive water from the Wawotobi reservoir which 
helps avoid seasonal water shortages. Water supply in other villages are more variable. 
Atypically, Cialam Jaya also has a domestic water supply system managed by a village-
owned company. Most village households have an average plot size of one hectare that is 
used predominantly to grow two rice crops two times a year. Over the last 10 to 15 years, all 
of the villages have experienced a trend of decreasing water availability and, also, a range 
of water quality issues. 
Table 3 provides a more detailed overview of the village by village issues identified 




identified upstream expansion of palm oil plantations and illegal logging in the DAS 
Konaweha watershed as prime causes of reduced flows and a decline in water quality. 
Farmers and irrigation district officials also reported water quality issues caused by C-type 
(sand) mining within the riverbed which has increased sedimentation in both the river and 
irrigation supply canals. Importantly, the expansion of palm oil plantations and mining 
operations have occurred with district and central government approval following the receipt 
of positive technical recommendations from the Balai Wilayah Sungai Sulawesi IV (BWS) 
and permits enabling these developments from both district governments and the central 
Department of Energy and Mineral Resources. FGD participants, however, informed us that 
while these permits do not allow downstream impacts, a general lack of enforcement (despite 
monitoring) means that any negative externalities go unpunished. 
Local problems also exist. Farmers in Duria Asih voiced their concern on water 
quality during the FGD. It is common for some people to use poison when fishing in the 
canals during low flows, and for pesticides to be overused by farmers leading to water quality 
issues. This problem was echoed by the irrigation official in Wawotobi ID. As a result, the 
state-owned water company located downstream on the Konaweha River reported that it had 




Table 12. Summary of selected village characteristics and water related issues 
 
Konawe District South Koanwe District East Kolaka District 
Wonggeduku (West 
Wonggeduku Subdistrict) 
Duri Asih (Wonggeduku 
Subdistrict) 








Population/HH 1256/242 1347/349 1726/426 1133/290 1811/NA 2333/NA 
Irrigated area (ha) ± 250 ± 175 ± 245 ± 122 ± 171 + 50 ha (new) ± 320 






Springs, wetland and 
groundwater 
Lapoa River (Lapoa 
ID) + groundwater 
Loya ID from Loya 
and Nango-Nango 
Rivers 
Ladongi River : 
Ladongi ID + Gunung 
Jaya ID groundwater  
Water management 
type 
Farmers’ groups WUA & farmers’ group Farmers’ groups WUA & farmers’ 
group 
WUA & farmers' 
group 





(irrigation service fee 






grain contribution of 
20kg/ha/season for Ulu-
Ulu and canal cleaning, 
 Labor contribution 
Labor contribution IDR 25,000/ha/season 
(zero compliance) 
Labor contribution 
±4 cans of grain/ha/ 
season for Ulu-Ulu 
Labor contribution 




Risk of water 
shortage 
Low (rarely experience 
water shortage in the 
last 10 years) 
Low (rarely experience 
water shortage in the 
last 10 years) 
High risk of water 
shortage especially at 
the tail-end of an 
irrigation system 
High risk of water 
shortage especially at 
the end tail of an 
irrigation system 
High risk of water 
shortage especially at 
the tail-end of an 
irrigation system 
High risk of water 
shortage especially at 




Water rotation in the 
first two weeks of 2nd 
cropping season at 
secondary canals 
Water rotation in the 
first two weeks of 2nd 
cropping season at 
secondary canals 
Natural flow, where 
end of the system gets 
the highest risk of 
water shortage 
Water rotation 
between paddy field 
area (right and left 
side of the canals) 
Water rotation among 
farmer groups 




Land use change: palm 
oil plantation, 
deforestation; water 
quality (type-C sand 
mining) 
Land use change: palm 
oil plantation; 
deforestation, water 
quality (type-C sand 
mining; overuse of 
pesticide; fish poisoning 
in the canals 
Deforestation; long 
drought 
Land use change; new 
paddy fields in upper 
river; discharge of 
materials from nickel 
mining; long drought 
Land use change: new 
paddy fields within the 
irrigation system; 
pepper tree farming 
Deforestation; pepper 
tree farming 




In the Konawe Selatan district, especially the Tinanggea subdistrict, nickel mining has resulted 
in adverse impacts on water quality. In FGDs, farmers reported that mining is causing siltation 
in the Lapoa River and reducing flows through irrigation canals. The worst reported siltation 
case was in the Roraya village irrigation system where four hectares of rice fields had been 
destroyed which, for the farmers involved, has meant that they have lost access to their 
investment in the village irrigation system and also their asset and income. Maga (2018) has 
estimated that this uncompensated impact costs those involved AUD$15,000. In fairness, local 
irrigation staff have sought justice for the affected farmers by reporting the losses to provincial 
government authorities but, at the time of writing, there has been no redress. Worsening the 
extent of the problem, development of the nickel mine also made it possible for around 100 
hectares of new rice fields (sawah) to be established above the small Lapoa reservoir near 
Asingi village in a manner that is expected to reduce the quantity of water available 
downstream. At the other end of the river system, and as a result of unapproved upstream 
development, the low-lying Raraa village both receives less water during the dry season and, 
also, is now more prone to flooding during rainy seasons. FGD participants from Raraa 
reported that, in the rainy season, around 70 hectares of village farmland is now regularly 
water-logged and that, as a result, local villagers and irrigation officials have been trying for 
two decades to obtain permission to build a drainage canal through the Rawa Aopa National 
Park to address this issue. Their power, however, is far less than that of the National Park 
Management Authority and affected farmers have become deeply dissatisfied because they 
have to pay the same taxes as any other farmer even though their land is much less productive. 
Overall, these general FGD observations support a view that the value of the existing property 
rights system is perceived as worthless and, as a result, the level of farmer dissatisfaction is 
high and farmer participation in system maintenance is low. Against this background we can 




3.4.2 Using modified DPs to evaluate institutional arrangements 
Several different institutional arrangements were found in the study areas (Table 4). For each 
of the ten modified DPs, we expand those arrangements to identify areas of institutional change 
that might improve management and performance—included as propositions. 
Table 13. Summary of evaluation based on themes discussed in the FGDs. 
Design Principles Evaluation of existing arrangements 
1. Clearly defined boundaries 
Legitimate user Member of WUA or paddy farmer in the irrigation service area 
Limit of water withdrawal Unclear, based on land sufficiency (for paddy) 
Rules for new entrants Not clear 
Security of tenure Weak 
2A. System congruence with local conditions 
Flexibility Water rotation during water shortage period 
Reliability of supply Other than WUAs in Wawotobi ID, high uncertainty of water supply in the dry 
season especially for the tail-end of irrigation systems 
Transferability Not allowed 
Expectation for future 
irrigation 
Only WUA in Lapoa has clear contingency plan for future water conditions 
2B. Appropriation and provision rules 
Contribution to O&M In-kind contribution for water master payment and canal cleaning 
Cost recovery No cost recovery. Only the Duria Asih WUA has implemented an irrigation 
service fee (ISF) for operational costs and minor maintenance 
3. Collective choice arrangements 
Farmer’s participation Not all farmers participate in rule-making processes 
Accountability Respected/strong leadership in Lapoa, Duria Asih and Simbelai 
4A. Monitoring of users  
Accountability Self-monitoring exists in all WUAs 
Enforcement capacity Weak enforcement capacity, especially for those outside the system(s) 
4B. System wide monitoring 
Access to information WUAs have easy access to information on water availability from the water 
master(s) 
Transparency Every WUA has agreed planting schedules in each ID, known to its members 
5. Graduated sanctions  
Informal sanction Informal sanctions applied for rule infringements in all villages 
Formal sanction Only Simbelai has formal sanctions 
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms (CRM) 
Local CRM Local informal conflict resolution exists in all villages 
Formal CRM Formal mechanisms are not effective and easy to access when conflict arises 
with outside users 
7. Minimum recognition of rights to organize 
Autonomy Farmers are encouraged to form WUA to manage their own tertiary canals 
Acceptability WUA in Cialam Jaya is less acceptable of rights to organize. Farmers organize 
themselves in groups according to source of natural flow for village irrigation 
8. Nested enterprise (not applied to Cialam Jaya) 
Vertical and horizontal 
coordination 
Strong vertical and horizontal coordination between WUA and irrigation officer 
under Department of Public Works 
Lack of coordination with other related departments/sectors 





1) DP1: Clearly defined boundaries 
This principle relates to limits on the total amount of water that may be taken by new users and 
options for the definition of this limit. Irrigation system boundaries in Southeast Sulawesi 
typically conform with initial irrigation system development areas. As development expanded, 
new farming (paddy field) areas were opened or extended, and legitimate water users were 
allowed to access water only within the irrigation service area. However, farmers do not enjoy 
individual physical water withdrawal unit rights; their share of total water resources is usually 
set at district level. Thus, the only limit on water withdrawal is related to the land area owned 
by farmers and the rules associated with access. 
For example, the Wawotobi ID has (for now) a reliable annual supply, while the Lapoa 
and Simbelai village WUAs need to implement strict farm-rotations of irrigation water during 
dry periods. Water shortages during dry seasons are not, however, shared equally across farm 
districts. As a result, farmers in the Raraa village appear to be losing out as a result of upstream 
development. Initially, Raraa was part of the Ladongi ID and its’ 2,722 hectare area. However, 
due to a tail-end location and, as all Raraa farms could be supplied by Ladongi ID with enough 
water for a second rice-crop, it was decided to allow them to make use of groundwater, pump 
water from the drainage system, or attempt to get access from the neighbouring village 
(Gunung Jaya) on the understanding that they would be exempted from some WUA 
obligations. While pragmatic in its outcome, this action illustrates the importance of defining 
boundaries to access in a rigorous manner and, if system function is to be maintained, then 
establishing mechanisms that prevent increased access without compensation. 
Illustrative of the extent of this challenge, in the Lapoa and Loya IDs, for instance, 
FGDs participants stated that they thought they would eventually need to share their water with 




new users and ‘illegitimate’ pepper tree farmers who steal water from primary and secondary 
canals in the Loya and Ladongi IDs. Some FGD participants recognized that pepper farmers 
received a livelihood from their trees, and needed water to keep these trees alive to protect 
long-term investments—however, none were able to identify a solution to the problem. We 
suggest a first proposition solution as follows: 
Proposition 1: System robustness can be improved by formally defining a limit on 
water withdrawal for individual farmers, either by area or volume, and clear criteria 
for priority allocations if/when scarcity occurs. 
2) DP2A: System congruence with local conditions 
Sustainable use requires appropriation and provision rules that are compatible with local social-
economic and environmental conditions (Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 1990). Thus, the system’s 
water allocation arrangements must be able to adapt with new or altered conditions in a manner 
that simultaneously maintains consistency with biophysical realities, is judged to be fair, and 
promotes socio-economic progress (Young 2014). As a test, it should be possible for changes 
to be made to allocation arrangements in a manner that does not result in an increase in conflicts 
and/or a decline in compliance with operational rules. FGDs revealed that not all WUAs in 
Sulawesi met this design principle. For example, the Cialam Jaya system delivers natural flows 
to end-tail irrigation users but without the capacity to modify water allocations among users as 
flow conditions change. In particular, it is not uncommon for mutual consensus arrangements 
between users to occur in a manner that violates other users’ capacity to access water. 
During the second cropping season in Cialam Jaya when flows tend to be lower, there 
is no agreed set of rules for working out how to partition access between farmers who access 
water directly from the river and those who can access water only when it reaches the end of a 




supply uncertainty with the consequence that farmers are unwilling to pay operational and 
maintenance costs. Thus, since its formation in the 1990s, the WUA has not been able to 
function properly. However, appropriation arrangements in Lapoa, Simbelai and Raraa 
villages are better that those of Cialam Jaya. During low flow periods farmers share the 
available water by rotation between blocks, quaternary, or tertiary canals. Even so, low flows 
coupled with water losses along the distribution channels make water supply to tail-end farmers 
insecure. Some of these farmers use groundwater to augment supply, which incurs additional 
costs of fuel in their agricultural (rice) production. Water abundance in the Konaweha River 
allows farmers in Wonggeduku and Duria Asih to enjoy more reliable supply compared to other 
areas. Any required water rotation takes place at main intakes along primary or secondary 
canals. However, without clearly defined withdrawal limits farmers at the top of the irrigation 
system have been taking water indiscriminately, causing tail-end farmers to wait to receive 
water. This increases the risk of crop failure due to water logging or shortages in the first and 
second cropping seasons respectively, as mentioned by irrigation staff in Wawotobi ID. 
Importantly, there is a need to develop appropriate rotation or other mechanisms that 
enable enforcement of any modified ‘property rights’. If this could be achieved, there would 
be increased transparency and the creation of institutional conditions necessary to allow all 
users to better plan and adopt coping strategies for the management of supply scarcity. 
Maintenance of transparency and fairness in the process of water allocation might also help 
improve farmers’ willingness to contribute to the costs of operation and management. Our 
second proposition for Indonesian systems is therefore: 
Proposition 2: All farmers in WUA-managed areas need to be registered and records 
need to be kept and updated by the WUA. Records may include total area, number of 
plots, location, and type of crops (in different seasons), and rules for water sharing 




3) DP2B: Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs 
This design principle requires that the cost of irrigation system operation and maintenance 
(O&M), whether cash or in-kind, is equivalent to the benefit that farmers receive—and will 
depend on how institutional arrangements in other DPs provide farmer incentives to recognize 
these benefits/costs. In Indonesia, in addition to labor contributions toward canal cleaning 
before planting, farmers commonly pay the Ulu-Ulu (water master) a unit of harvest each 
season (see Table 2). Within the IOMP framework in 1989, an irrigation service fee (ISF) was 
introduced to cover some of the cost of irrigation system maintenance. Typically, the size of 
this fee is agreed upon by WUA members and used to pay for administrative costs and minor 
maintenance works. Our FGDs, however, revealed that the Duria Asih is the only WUA that 
has managed to collect an ISF from its members on the understanding that any member who 
cannot pay the ISF is required to work on designated tasks arranged by the WUA. This enables 
the WUA to financially contribute to the WUA Union (GP3A, Gabungan Perkumpulan Petani 
Pemakai Air) at the secondary canal level. 
Flexible ISF payment methods for irrigation O&M are worth considering in more detail. A 
reason for past sustainability in subak systems was a combination of service-provision and 
monetary obligations by members (Birkelbach, 1973; Geertz, 1964). The estimated total 
monetary and labor requirements for routine maintenance were carefully calculated, and 
members could purchase exemption for excess labor proportional to land owned. Yet levies for 
extraordinary activities were also imposed on an ad hoc basis (Birkelbach, 1973). In Southeast 
Sulawesi, beside in-kind payments to Ulu-Ulu, farmers’ contribute mainly to canal cleaning 
before planting season as discussed, and minor repairs beyond 50 meters of tertiary canal 
sections. To support extended tertiary canal maintenance, governments provide public funding 
through the Department of Agriculture and/or the Ministry of Public Works under the Program 




increase farmers’ participation by providing funds directly to WUAs to rehabilitate and 
improve their irrigation system, but in general it is not expected to motivate increased farmer 
participation in system maintenance. Thus, WUA members need to agree on mechanisms that 
enable them to recover the cost maintaining the productive use of irrigation systems if/when 
government funding is no longer available. Therefore, our third proposition follows: 
Proposition 3: Providing choices for ISF payments through service or monetary 
obligations, or a combination of both, may increase farmer contributions to irrigation 
O&M. 
4) DP3: Collective choice arrangements 
Effective irrigation performance includes two major decision-making activities: i) setting the 
cropping schedule and ii) setting working rules within the WUAs. At present, public irrigation 
system cropping schedules are decided at the district level with inputs from the WUA (or 
farmers’ group) and irrigation field staff. Not all farmers participate in the process, and may 
instead send a representative from their WUA or farmers’ group. The process usually involves 
a report from the Ulu-Ulu that summarizes what farmland went into production (lahan 
fungsional) in the last season/year. After this initial progress has been received, however, the 
system outcomes may vary significantly. In the Konawe district a cropping plan for all sub-
districts is decreed by the district head (Bupati) based on recommendations from the Irrigation 
Committee. By contrast, in Konawe Selatan and Kolaka Timur WUA or farmers’ 
representatives attend a meeting organized by Pengamat Pengairan (Irrigation Overseer) to 
discuss the cropping season before it begins. Finally, in Lapoa WUAs and farmer groups from 
the four villages belonging to Lapoa ID make decisions on water rotations and which WUA in 




either young innovative farmers and/or senior respected leaders often play a role in bringing 
the irrigation community together and acting as mediator when conflicts arise. 
In conclusion, with regard to the nature of collective choice arrangements in Southeast 
Sulawesi irrigation we suggest that these require no change. 
5) DP4A: Monitoring of users 
Monitoring is essential for evaluating the performance of any system. In the villages studied, 
farmers typically reported self-monitoring of use/users while going about their daily activities. 
Their motivation was to ensure they received their resource provision, while also checking 
resource conditions and water extraction activities by other farmers/users. Self-monitoring 
ensures user compliance with appropriation rules and reduces illegal abstraction. Additional 
monitoring of resource use and user behavior may also be carried out by an Ulu-Ulu who is 
accountable to WUA members. In Cialam Jaya use monitoring was much stricter; uncertain 
water rotation schedules during dry seasons required farmers to also monitor other users at 
night to prevent detrimental interventions. 
However, while use monitoring was effective within irrigation system boundaries, it 
was more difficult where water resources were affected by/dependent upon external factors; 
i.e. there is generally no robust system-wide water sharing system. For example, Lapoa, 
farmers could not control sediment impacts on river flows and canal capacity from upstream 
mining activity. Likewise, rice farmers in Simbelai and Raraa could not prosecute upstream 
pepper farmers whose illegal extraction reduced their water supply. Such significant water-
affecting activities are beyond the scope of the local governance, requiring effective authority 
to enforce and prosecute (where relevant) infringements upon legal property rights. This leads 




Proposition 4: At WUA level, enforcement capacity and monitoring needs to be 
improved. Although farmer decisions to hold water at the head-end of irrigation 
system may not affect neighboring farmers in water-abundant areas, such decisions 
may be harmful to tail-end users as discussed in the DP 2a section. Affected users must 
be able to rely on effective monitoring and compliance mechanisms. 
6) DP4B: Monitoring of resources 
Monitoring of resources is also a key issue in Indonesia, where flooding impacts can damage 
infrastructure or dry conditions can lead to reduced willingness by farmers to participate in 
system maintenance (Ma'mun, 2018). Typically, the head of a farmers’ group, Ulu-Ulu, sluice 
guard (Penjaga pintu air) or Assistant Overseer (Juru Pengairan) will monitor infrastructure 
conditions and report defects requiring maintenance or rehabilitation to the Irrigation Overseer 
(Pengamat)—depending on the governance system in place. Resource monitoring activities are 
also required to evaluate water availability in the reservoir for allocation planning at the ID and 
WUA levels. 
In conclusion, the capacity of WUAs and farmers to participate collectively in the process of 
resource monitoring and reporting suggests good coverage of this DP in existing institutions 
requiring no change at the WUA Level. 
7) DP5: Graduated sanctions 
Most WUAs apply penalties ranging from mild rapprochement of user infringement to strict 
penalties on users who take water out of turn. However, many farmers stated that their local 
methods were often ineffective for preventing repeat offending. Only water users in Simbelai 
reported effective sanctions, where famers that violated the operational rules were subject to 
severe penalties; that is, farmers who extract water out of turn are subject to the loss of watering 




been tested once when the penalty was applied to a farmer that took water illegally in 2004. No 
other case has since been recorded, suggesting effective protocols. We therefore suggest our 
fifth proposition: 
Proposition 5: Formal graduated sanctions which define penalties for low to severe 
infringements will be useful for preventing rule violations; particularly where those 
sanctions or penalties are transparent and apply to all users. 
8) DP6: Conflict resolution mechanisms 
By contrast to sanction arrangements, conflict resolution mechanisms are more informal in 
Southeast Sulawesi irrigation systems, and usually WUA-facilitated. The term musyawarah is 
very common in Indonesia, used to describe informal methods or fora where leaders or trusted 
community elders debate and decide important issues. These fora are also often used to resolve 
water disputes within the community. More formal conflict resolution appears in the Ladongi 
ID where conflict resolution is usually facilitated by the Irrigation Overseer together with the 
head of village, a Babinsa (lowest military rank at village level), and the parties to the dispute. 
Conflict with external parties often proved difficult to resolve, and in most of the 
villages mechanism to resolve conflict between cross-district or system farmers/WUAs were 
not present in the institutional arrangements. In Roraya for example, farmer protests against 
nickel mining activities affecting water and land quality had not been resolved during the time 
of this study.3 Ideally, conflict resolution mechanisms should be present across all levels of 
management and easily accessed by users to resolve conflict among farming communities, 
between competing users, among irrigation districts, and between users and the environment. 
                                                 
3 Roraya village was not part of our case study. However, some farmers in Lapoa were also members of the WUA 
in that village, and the impact of mining activities affected the irrigation water in both villages and the surrounding 




This is especially urgent given expected changes to resource availability and variability in 
future. 
Proposition 6: Informal conflict resolution mechanism exists locally. What is urgently 
needed is a mechanism to resolve conflict at higher management levels. 
9) DP7: Minimum recognition of rights to organize 
Indonesian Ministry of Public Works’ Regulation No. 30/PRT/M/2015-Article 9 specifically 
states that WUAs have the right and responsibility for: i) developing and managing tertiary 
irrigation systems; ii) maintaining effective and efficient irrigation development and 
management; and iii) approving the development, utilization and alteration of irrigation 
infrastructures using a participatory approach. This provides WUAs (and perhaps by 
association farmers’ groups) with considerable capacity to organize with respect to irrigation 
system performance improvements. In support of this, WUAs also have a recognized right and 
responsibility to devise operation rules, such as water distribution and ISF payment 
mechanisms as discussed above. 
However, the FGDs and other collected data suggested that WUAs can also be 
overlooked/overruled. For example, in Simbelai village, canal rehabilitation works have been 
carried out by consultants without prior discussion with WUA or the farmers’ group. As a 
result, one part of the tertiary canal system has experienced rehabilitation with private gains 
for the related users, while other parts of the system also urgently needing rehabilitation have 
been ignored. This suggests that, while apparently well-resourced and authorized, WUA rights 
may be in need of further strengthening and protection—particularly in some areas of Southeast 
Sulawesi—consistent with the graduated sanction proposition incentives discussed earlier. We 




Proposition 7: Individual gains at the expense of others in a system can be avoided by 
giving WUA/farmers’ group more authority (rights) to decide what they want to do 
within their irrigation system, and how they want it to be developed—as long as it does 
not contradict the system-wide rules or responsibilities. 
10) DP8: Nested enterprises 
In complex and large systems, successful management governance activities are organized in 
multiple layers of nested enterprises (Ostrom, 1990). Cox et al. (2010) generalize this principle 
to include both vertical (between user groups and larger governmental jurisdiction) and 
horizontal linkages (between user groups themselves). 
As discussed above, the water governance system in Southeast Sulawesi is nested, 
complex, and operates on the basis of operational size across central (>3,000 hectare command 
area), provincial (between 1,000 and 3,000 hectare command area), and district levels (<1,000 
hectare command area). Further, water allocations for each irrigation district are decided at the 
river basin level which, again, may be assigned to a central, provincial or district government 
agency. Figure 3 details the structure of irrigation management in the study area. Development 
and maintenance of irrigation district systems down to primary and secondary canal level is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works (from central to district level), while 
responsibility for tertiary and quaternary canals currently falls under the (provincial) 





Figure 11. Structure of water management in public irrigation schemes 
 
Indonesian water allocation in each river basin is typically planned annually by a 
technical team, and discussed within a Tim Koordnasi Pengelolaas Sumber Daya Air 
(TKPSDA) or Basin Council made up of stakeholders/water users including WUA 
representatives. For irrigation purposes, a cropping schedule and water distribution plan is also 
decided by the Irrigation Commission. The plan is then synchronized with the water allocation 




coordinates down to the secondary and tertiary canal levels under close coordination with 
WUAs or farmers’ groups. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the nested governance works in terms of 
irrigation provision. However, as outlined in the previous sections, other design principles are 
weak or absent at system-wide level. Some problems found in this study are related to cross-
village systems that cannot be resolved internally by WUAs. Only the Lapoa WUA had strong 
inter-village linkages to facilitate sharing of limited water with three villages that had resulted 
in minimum conflict for more than 20 years. This brings us to our final proposition for 
institutional change: 
Proposition 8: In the absence of system-wide rules, WUAs need to strengthen the 
horizontal linkages between them, to share water more equitably and increase their 
bargaining position when facing current/expected impacts of other user activities that 
are directly/indirectly relevant to the irrigation system. 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we have sought to draw lessons from local level institutional assessments to 
provide insight on wider system change that may facilitate community resilience in the face of 
dynamic supply and demand changes. An evaluation of local irrigation systems using a 
modified version of Ostrom’s design principles is useful for identifying current institutional 
arrangements at local levels, how those institutional arrangements incentivize/disincentivize 
individuals to participate in collective operation and maintenance of irrigation systems, and 
whether those institutions will enable sustainable performance and productive future water use 
in the face of dynamic change. 
The timing for institutional review and reform is ideal at present. Following the 




set out irrigation reforms with the redefinition of irrigation institutions as one of its five 
principles. This principle signified a need to grant farmers more authority as decision-makers 
on irrigation system management in their respective area. However, further reforms via Water 
Resource Law No. 7 in 2004 have been criticized by experts and NGOs as an attempt to 
recentralized irrigation system management (Pasandaran, 2015; Suhardiman, 2013). While 
Water Resource Law No. 7 was cancelled in 2015 by Mahkamah Konstitusi (the Constitutional 
Court) under a view that the law was prone to multi-interpretation that could harm public rights 
to access water (Al'Afghani, 2006; Pasandaran, 2015), a current lack of legal frameworks 
makes existing rules at the system level more difficult to enforce, as evidenced by our case 
study. With respect to the objectives of our study, we have outlined a series of propositions for 
specific institutional change in Southeast Sulawesi that may improve irrigation system 
performance and sustainability at local levels, in line with Ostrom’s design principles. 
However, if we reflect on those suggested changes there are several specific changes that 
should be discussed further. 
Our analysis has highlighted the importance of clearly defined boundaries, which is 
also identified as a necessary (but insufficient on its own) condition for robust irrigation system 
outcomes (Ma'mun et al., 2019). The rationale behind this requirement according to Ostrom 
(1990) is to prevent over-abstraction and free-riding problems. However, as we have shown 
here, specifying authorized users and the physical boundary of the resources is not enough. 
Limits to development at the system-wide level need be established, and an offset (reallocation 
of rights at the margin) rule introduced for successful future management—especially with 
respect to dynamic change. This will provide institutional certainty about the rules for 
managing supply uncertainty from basin level down to the local irrigation systems. In Southeast 
Sulawesi, while resource and use boundaries are mostly observed by internal (and some 




provision issues where users had different access to water, and endured unequal risk-sharing 
of water shortages during dry periods. This led to agreed or (more typically) passive 
disengagement by farmers from operational and maintenance contributions, and a greater 
requirement for government subsidized O&M programs—despite policy to reduce financial 
burdens on taxpayers by transferring irrigation system management to WUAs. The availability 
of other sources of water may also reduce water users’ participation in collective action (Tang, 
1992) as seen in Raraa. 
When farmers access different sources of water it is difficult to discern who then has a 
responsibility for contributing toward system maintenance. While requirements to seek water 
access elsewhere might be reduced by current storage construction projects, infrastructure itself 
cannot guarantee the sustainability of the irrigation system, and high canal distribution 
performance can only be cost-effectively achieved through farmers’ cooperation toward 
maintenance (Lam and Ostrom, 2010). We have shown that equal capacity to access water and 
appropriate incentives to share the costs and risk of water access among farmers/WUAs will 
improve the probability of collective action; a finding echoed by other studies (Baland and 
Platteau, 1999; Janssen et al., 2012; Kosanlawit et al., 2017). But it will also be important to 
incorporate and collectively manage relevant external users, such as pepper farmers in Simbelai 
and Ladongi, as members of the WUA to avoid free-riding, collective participation toward 
O&M, and equitable cost-sharing with other WUA members (Vermillion et al., 2000). 
A second major issue was external impacts on current water users, and effective 
authority to enforce, protect and sanction violations against ‘legal’ water use. As revealed by 
our research, some external actors or activities that have direct impact on water users’ 
appropriation and use status in modern irrigation systems may be challenging to sanction—but 
the same can be said of Indonesia’s older irrigation systems under dynamic change impacts to 




holder farmers are supposed to be prioritized, farmers tend to lose when facing a bigger player 
in the economy (e.g. Komakech et al., 2012; Levine et al., 2007). Examples of this have been 
reported in Bali (Cole, 2012; Cole and Browne, 2015; Strauß, 2011) and West Java (Hadipuro 
et al., 2014; Kurnia et al., 2000) where tourism and manufacturing industries were given 
precedence over agricultural sectors. In this study mining provides an additional example. 
Mining activities have increased significantly in the last ten years and, without proper 
management, the associated negative externalities could increase similar to issues reported in 
the Philippines (Castañeda and Bhuiyan, 1993). Shifts in allocation priority in Bali have put 
the long tradition of subak collective systems at stake (Strauß, 2011), which has important 
implications for modern irrigation systems of Indonesia with reduced collective foundations. 
As a response to such threats in a forestry management context Gautam and Shivakoti (2005) 
highlight the importance of strong property right, monitoring and sanction institutions 
providing local communities with capacity to monitor and exercise effective restrictions and/or 
injunctions to ‘illegal’ use. We find similar requirements for irrigation management in 
Indonesia, especially given the complex and often ineffective nature of central and provincial 
authority to deal with matters of conflict and resource misappropriation. 
Finally, farmers and their irrigation systems exist in a complex environment. External factors 
that affect water flows will naturally affect the quality and quantity of resources supplied to the 
tail-end of irrigation systems. Our propositions to improve institutional arrangements for 
sustainable irrigation in Southeast Sulawesi signify a need for hierarchical arrangements to 
foster the emergence of locally defined solutions that tend to naturally accommodate the total 
length of irrigation systems. Our findings align with Sjah and Baldwin's (2014) 
recommendation for multi-nested governance of water management in Lombok, another 
province in eastern Indonesia. Similarly, Suhardiman and Giordano (2014) observe that 




suggest beginning with farmer-agencies based on a case study in Kulon Progo District in 
Yogyakarta. We would argue such approaches might help to resolve underlying tensions and 
complexity associated with sustainable management requirements in the face of dynamic 
supply and demand changes. 
Collective action is important for the future sustainability of the irrigation systems 
(Baldwin et al., 2018; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002). However, as we have seen in this study, 
system-wide rules defined by central/provincial governments could either facilitate or 
downgrade local collective management. To date, irrigation reform in Indonesia continues 
under an integrated water resource management (IWRM) framework with the (central) 
Ministry of Public Works as the leading actor. Indonesia has initiated legal frameworks for 
extending water use rights to farmers through relevant WUAs, but much more work is needed 
to create the needed institutions that will effectively protect those rights, and provide resilience 
in the face of future change. While we have outlined and justified specific changes in Southeast 
Sulawesi that could be trialed immediately, with lessons for other areas, future research is 
needed to develop and implement a nested framework that could facilitate local institutions to 
grow in their capacity to manage current supply/demand constraints and, at the same time, 
provide opportunities for other economic sectors to grow. 
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Chapter 4: Putting Ostrom’s nested principle first: Lessons from 
water governance in Southeast Sulawesi 
 
Abstract 
During the last three decades, many studies have provided empirical support of the relevance 
of the design principles (DPs) proposed by Elinor Ostrom as a way to examine the robustness 
of CPR institutional arrangements. Amid this support, a question has emerged regarding the 
DPs’ relevance to the analysis of complex, large-scale CPR systems—especially those 
involving the management of large, interconnected water resource systems. Ostrom’s last 
principle, her nested enterprises, requires large and closely-connected resource governance 
arrangements to be organized in multiple nested layers. In this paper, we argue that by putting 
Ostrom’s nested enterprises principle first, much more precise guidance as to how best to apply 
her other principles emerges. Some require application at all levels in the hierarchy, while 
others apply only at some levels. The resultant narrative is richer and better recommendations 
for the improvement of governance arrangements tend to emerge. We test our argument in 
Southeast Sulawesi Province, Indonesia, through a transaction cost lens. The resultant regional 
narrative produces a new set of recommendations for the improvement of water governance 
arrangements in Indonesia. 
 






• We apply the re-ordering of Ostrom’s design principle to examine water governance. 
• We evaluate the design principles using transaction cost economics theory  
• We focus on hierarchical institution design arrangements. 





Over the last few decades, a rapid increase in competing demands by agricultural, 
urban, and industrial use(r)s has tested the institutions that manage scarce water resources. 
Designed and implemented under different demand/supply conditions, many institutional 
arrangements are failing to cope with a rapidly changing and dynamic environment. As current 
water institutions struggle to cope with these new conditions, crisis management is becoming 
increasingly common (Garrick et al., 2020). The successful management of a crisis can produce 
political benefits, yet tends to entail a high cost for society. The alternative approach is to seek 
ways to transform older regimes into ones that are sufficiently robust to facilitate the 
management of scarcity (Young, 2014, 2019). 
Building robust water sector institutions is a continuous and difficult endeavour 
(Ostrom, 1993). All governance contexts have examples of institutions that have withstood the 
test of time and examples of others that have failed. Moreover and to date, variation across and 
within water governance contexts has prevented the development of a single blueprint for 
managing water resource systems. As argued by Ostrom, however, underlying principles can 
be derived from an examination of arrangements that have brought long-lasting success in the 
management of common-pool resources (CPRs). Ostrom (1990) summarized these underlying 
principles of self-governing institutions into eight design principles (DPs), which have 
contributed greatly to CPR theory and application. Ostrom ( 2008) argued that, when and where 
applied properly, these DPs increase the probability of the emergence of robust CPR system 
governance outcomes. A vast quantity of literature has examined CPR case studies in which 
the DPs have been employed, and have played an important role in attempts to increase the 
effectiveness and robustness of self-governing institutions. Such studies have evaluated 




their capacity to withstand the test of time. Ultimately most, if not all, of Ostrom’s DPs have 
proved useful for describing robust CPR systems (Baggio et al., 2016; Cox et al., 2010)). 
Studies using CPR theory have also, contributed to myriad policy-making insights that 
recommend the transfer of CPR management responsibility to local users (Agrawal, 2001; 
Carlsson & Sandström, 2008). Many of these recommended institutional transitions, however, 
have not resulted in the desired outcome (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002). Kerr (2007) reasoned 
that, while complete replicability is limited to a relatively small number of cases, it can be 
observed that local institutions have restricted capacity to resolve trade-offs between local and 
higher-level needs, which tends to constrain opportunities for collective action. Additional 
critiques of Ostrom’s DPs observed that many previous studies have focused on relatively 
simple, local-scale institutions involving single-use resource management regimes that are 
isolated from the larger complex and dynamic environment surrounding them (Agrawal, 2001; 
Berkes, 2006). When an interaction between resource units exists across multiple scales, 
institutional organizations, and jurisdictional boundaries—and is coupled to diverse user 
groups with different types of rights to access available resources—the study and identification 
of principles driving robust self-governing institutions has proven to be difficult (Berkes, 2006; 
Evans et al., 2014; Fleischman et al., 2014; Young, 2002). Thus, a scaling-up of Ostrom’s DPs 
to evaluate and analyze the effectiveness of large-scale resource institutional systems has been 
contested (Young, 2002). This is especially the case with large water resource systems where 
impacts can be unidirectional, and downstream users have little opportunity to control upsteam 
users unless these issues are equitably and efficiently managed at higher levels. 
Critically for this study, some researchers believe that further research on the 
development of the nested principle is necessary. For example, Fleischman et al. (2014) argue 
that the complexity of large-scale CPR systems renders difficult, if not impossible, the 




The alternative, which we examine, is to devote attention to such arrangements in national and 
provincial laws and regulations as a primary, rather than final, process. We seek to further test 
this premise using transaction cost analysis as a basis for placing nested institutions at the top 
of Ostrom’s list in an Indonesian water resource management case study. Within a broader 
social, economic, and environmental framework, we then assess DP capacity to manage 
resource allocation under existing rules, as well as periodic requirements to reallocate resources 
between sectors (robust arrangements) during scarcity. 
4.2 Putting Ostrom’s nested principle first: justification of the framework 
As stated above, some studies that have applied Ostrom’s DPs provide insight into how 
their ordering—with nesting arrangements considered last—has constrained understanding by 
frequently isolating local governing institutions from the wider environment and resource 
system context. We argue that, by putting the nested enterprises principle first, the remaining 
DPs will be better framed to encapsulate regional- (local-) level institutional arrangements. 
Earlier consideration may also better guide the design and structure of hierarchical 
management rules to take maximum advantage of the characteristics of self-governing 
arrangements, which inspired Ostrom (1990, 2010) to propose them as a way to move beyond 
the tragedy of the commons. This argument is further justified as follows. 
First, CPRs exist in multiple layers across complex systems that affect self-governing 
institutional performance (Agrawal, 2001; Berkes, 2006; Young, 2002). Ostrom (1990) 
demonstrated that local communities can regulate themselves and create a common property 
regime to ensure that co-owners’ expectations of right to access resource units are met. These 
communities, however, are particularly vulnerable to external pressures—especially scarcity-
related pressures that have not been part of their historical experience (Berkes, 2006). Once 




Routine shifts in supply have to be accommodated in a dynamically challenging manner. This 
includes changes in demand for access as a result of changes in product prices (and other 
substitute or complementary inputs), and technology changes. These changes are all 
complicated by a tendency for rural-urban migration and population increases. Anticipated and 
actual climatic changes are also challenging traditional decision-making processes and/or 
accepted rules of behavior. These factors mean that stationarity can no longer be used as a 
guiding concept. To succeed, either local resource users and managers need to be protected 
from these changes made elsewhere in the system, or empowered to adapt in a manner that is 
socially and economically acceptable. 
From an institutional design perspective, care needs to be taken to understand which 
decisions are best left to the individual, which are best managed by the local community, and 
which decisions have to be taken—or are more effectively taken—at a higher (nested) level. In 
this scope, the role of the state is critical, as the guardian of natural resources has the ultimate 
authority to define how rights are defined and issued, to grant these rights, and then enforce 
compliance. In well-designed systems, some of these authorities can be passed to or shared 
with local institutions in the pursuit of effectiveness, equity, and efficiency benefits (Ojha, 
2014; Sarker, 2013). Others, such as the form that the rights might take and how they assign 
responsibility for managing changing conditions, need to be managed centrally so that local 
and regional communities have the power to manage change via mechanisms that can cope 
with alterations to supply and demand. This suggests a requirement for early, if not primary, 
consideration of the nested enterprises as a basis for working out how to apply Ostrom’s other 
principles. The insight offered in this paper is that it is critically important to work out where 
in the nesting hierarchy to establish authorities, whether or not to establish top-down or bottom-





Second, it is clear from the above that many CPR challenges are beyond the capacity 
of local community institutions to manage (Gautam & Shivakoti, 2005; Ojha, 2014). 
Conceptually, standardized nesting frameworks can be used to enable the better management 
of scale-related complexities (Lacroix & Richards, 2015; Tyson, 2017), especially when, as we 
argue here, local communities may be empowered to thrive because the form of the hierarchical 
or nesting rules and governance arrangements is robust. For this to occur, we argue that nested 
enterprise arrangements need to be addressed first. With this outcome in mind, Bray (2013) has 
stated that the focus of Ostrom’s DPs must be incorporated in national regulations, so that local 
institutions are empowered and designed to facilitate equitable, efficient and environmentally 
sustainable forms of adjustment in a dynamically complex, ever changing CPR system. This 
would suggest a dominant role within the DP ordering for nested enterprises governance 
institutions, and we would agree. 
We find further support for our nested-dominant institutional argument in transaction 
cost economics (TCE) theory. Williamson’s (2000) TCE states that we should first establish 
the formal rules and play of the game (L2 and L3 in Figure 1) before (re)allocating resources 
within the lowest levels of economizing at more frequent intervals (see L4 in Figure 1). 
According to Williamson (1985), TCE focuses on ensuring that the institutional environment 
is suitable, and implementing governance structures that align with the dimensions of 
transactions to create credible commitment and security of expectation by actors operating in 
the lower levels of the economy. For local communities and the individuals found at these 
lower levels, this approach provides an incentive to grow their capacity and confidence to 
manage resources, which can subsequently also be consistent with system-wide natural 







Figure 12. Economics of institutions (source: Williamson, 2000) 
 
Notably, Williamson (2000) stated that the capacity for lower-level institutions to affect 
change to the higher levels after establishment is challenging (denoted by the dashed upward 
arrows in Figure 1) and requires significant time, investment, and effort to achieve. We would 
add, also, that it requires great clarity of thought and development of a compelling narrative. 
This again highlights to us the relevance of focusing on and correctly ordering the sequence in 
which DPs are addressed. Thus, we hypothesize that a reordering of Ostrom’s DPs and, in 
particular, the placement of her nested-enterprises principle first can be expected to increase 
the probability that widespread consideration of them will improve the management of water 
and other common property resources. To test this hypothesis, we examine the current 




Province. In the following discussion, we seek to identify constraints to the design and 
operation of robust systems, and potential institutional arrangements to resolve them. 
4.3 Background of the study area 
4.3.1 General overview of water governance in Indonesia 
Water governance in Indonesia provides a useful example of the nature of nesting issues 
in a country involving at least three layers of government and many large basins and aquifers. 
Early Indonesian water governance models focused on small-scale, simple hydraulic systems 
under traditional cooperative institutions. Typically, these institutions involved relatively high 
levels of organization at the local level and careful monitoring of performance, such as in the 
subak system in Bali. Colonial influences stemming from the Dutch East Indies intervention 
period led to changes in the traditional system and the introduction of modern irrigation 
practices. Water was relatively abundant and most systems were run conservatively so that 
scarcity was either not, or rarely, an issue. 
Recent developments in the form of increased local demand, changes to historic supply 
conditions, decreased local contributions to operating costs and maintenance, poor system 
performance, and increasing complexity as more users enter and compete for access to a 
previously abundant resource is testing the robustness and resilience of these systems (Bruns, 
2004; Sumaryanto, 2012). All of these factors have worsened under the hydraulic mission 
adopted after the colonial era, which has tended to lock in the perception of defferend 
maintenance as the core problem  and worsen irrigation performance (Suhardiman & Mollinga, 
2012). This perception reinforces a justification of the need to focus on physical infrastructure 
development (Bruns, 2004; Suhardiman & Giordano, 2014) rather than a review and 
modification of institutional arrangements. One response to these issues, the Irrigation 




participation in irrigation system monitoring and maintenance (Oad, 2001). Further, despite 
targeting smallholder irrigated agriculture as a priority for water allocation, in practice, 
farmers’ access to water has been set below that of the industrial sector in many areas. This has 
allowed industrial users to increase the proportion of the available water that they take (Cole 
& Browne, 2015; Kurnia et al., 2000) without compensating the farmers for their associated 
losses. That is, while official policy statements give priority to farmers, in practice, industrial 
and urban water users are given first access – especially when they are located upstream of 
irrigated landscapes. 
In response to increasing recognition of the need for reform, a narrative centred around 
“integrated water resource management” has been articulated by the Central government. Thus, 
over the last three decades, institutional reform has gradually occurred, most notably marked 
by the promulgation of the National Water Resource Law (WRL) No. 7 in 2004. However, 
institutional reform consistent with first-order economizing (L2 in Williamson’s framework, 
including polity, judiciary and bureaucracy) remains largely theoretical and prescriptive 
(Fulazzaky, 2014), and has resulted in increased uncertainty for managers, investors, and users. 
For example, after being in place for just 10 years, the National WRL No. 7 was annulled in 
2015. Since then, numerous Government Regulations have been promulgated, subsequently 
annulled, and replaced with yet another attempt to lock-in a sensible reform pathway, illustrated 
most recently by the passing of  WRL No. 17 in October 2019. 
4.3.2 Case study area 
Consistent with the messy and highly uncertain processes described above, over the last 
20 years water governance in the Southeast Sulawesi Province of Indonesia has experienced 
significant change in terms of water resource use and economic development. Southeast 
Sulawesi has two main seasons: a rainy season that typically occurs from April to August and 




per year and there are five main river basins or “Wilayah Sungai” (WS). Two of these river 
basins—the WS Lasolo-Konaweha and WS Towari-Lasusua—are managed by Balai Wilayah 
Sungai (BWS) Sulawesi IV, which as a result of National legislation is a river basin 
organization with direct access to the Central Indonesian Government. The Central 
Government’s role in these two river basins stems from their trans-boundary nature—that is, 
they extend across three provinces: the Southeast Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, and South 
Sulawesi. Located within the Province, the WS Poleang-Roraya, WS Muna, and WS Buton are 
managed by Bidang Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Air (BPSDA) or the Water Resource 
Management (WRM) agency, which is part of the province’s Department of Public Works. 
All these mainland river basins have somewhat achieved second-order economizing 
strategic water system-wide resource plans, or Pola as they are known locally. The 
development of plans is now underway for two other river basins on the islands of Muna and 
Buton. Among these five mainland river basins, WS Lasolo-Konaweha is the largest and most 
strategically important for provincial development, covering 1,361,068.34 ha in total, of which 
94.74% is located in the Province. While first-order economizing arrangements appear to be 
present, it is less certain whether the second-order contracting arrangements necessary to 
enable the reallocation of water entitlements have been put in place. For many years, irrigated 
agrilcutre enjoyed relatively uninterrupted water supply. But growth in mining activities, and 
increased commercial agriculture, have placed pressure on land and water as principal inputs 
to production, leading to increased tension and conflict among user groups. A gold mining 
boom in Bombana regency (akin to district or local area in Indonesia), located in WS Poleang-
Roraya in 2008, has also caused environmental degradation and disrupted agricultural sectors 
in the area (Ma’mun, 2016). In more recent years, this conflict has spread to other regencies as 




These characteristics, particularly those of the WS Lasolo-Konaweha River Basin, 
suggest that the Southeast Sulawesi Province offers an excellent example of a complex CPR 
resource that can be used as a case study to consider first-ordered nested enterprise governance 
arrangements. Our focus is on institutional robustness – the capacity of a system to efficiently, 
equitably and sustainably manage changes in supply and demand conditions and to function 
well during times of extreme stress and supply uncertainty (Young 2014). Robust institutional 
structures are designed to enable effective management of the full range of possible futures, 
and particularly can be expected to perform well during times of high pressure. We consider 
that this requires full consideration of scale and scope, as set out in our proposed reordering of 
Ostrom’s DPs. The following section details the methods and data used to conduct this analysis. 
4.4 Material and methods 
4.4.1 Analytical framework 
As indicated above, we combine Ostrom’s DPs and Williamson’s TCE in the analytical 
framework. Following Commons (1932), Williamson (1985, 2000) uses transaction costs as 
the basic unit of analysis in the TCE framework. According to Commons (1932, p. 13), water 
allocation can be classified as a rationing transaction, “on account of expected scarcity, thus 
prescribing who may make use of them, and when.” In the water sector, arrangements used to 
prescribe who may access water – when, where, and in what quantities – form key elements of 
the institutional design. 
Ostrom (2008) argued that institutional design is the result of rational choice. However, 
this rationality is bounded by incomplete information or limited human cognition to process all 
the information of the complex system they are within (Simon, 1972). This bounded rationality 
assumption, coupled with opportunism (i.e., self-seeking interest with guile), may create a 




upstream – with the result that conflict emerges, and socially sub-optimal outcomes result. We 
use TCE to further understand the robustness of water allocation systems, including assessment 
of the question of whether the current institutional arrangements align with the arrangements 
used to create order, mitigate conflict, and achieve mutual gains (Williamson, 2000). 
To understand the complexity of institutions and their interaction in the Indonesian 
water sector, we first created a general water governance framework (Figure 2). This 
framework does not provide an exhaustive list of all attributes related to the governance of 
water resources; rather it should be seen as an example of the different aspects that interact 
with each other and influence the status of water supply and demand and the outcomes it may 
achieve. In effect, this highlights the complex nature of water governance arrangements in most 
contexts, where the way that water is allocated to different uses and users will depend on the 
nature of the socio-economic objectives held for the water resource and the regional economy. 
 





Figure 2 also draws links between institutional arrangements designed to manage 
access to abundant water resources and those for which access is, or should be, “closed”; that 
is, whenever someone wants access to a larger share, someone else has to accept a lesser share. 
The shadow boxes in Figure 2 indicate the nature of the links between Ostrom’s DPs and 
Williamson’s TCE frameworks. 
In Indonesia, the water resource is under the control of the state and legislation requires 
that water must be used for the greatest benefit of the people.4 Recognizing that demand tends 
to outgrow supply, the law also requires that water be managed by considering and pursuing a 
balance of social, environmental, and economic functions of water in an integrated, sustainable, 
and environmentally sound approach.5 When water is scarce and, in particular when the nature 
of this scarcity changes, trade-offs need to be made between objectives in a manner that has 
consequences for competing users. 
Having determined our assessment framework, we then developed a checklist of DPs 
to determine which attributes were subordinate to the (now) dominant nested hierarchy DP. 
Using Williamson’s TCE as a guide, this resulted in five broad governance arrangements that 
could be grouped as follows: 
• first-order institutions for (1) legal frameworks 
• second-order institutions for (2) system-wide planning and (3) sub-system 
arrangements 
• third-order institutions covering (4) local management arrangements and (5) 
individual users. The local management (WUA) was included based on the 
regulation that smallholder farmers have the right to use water through their 
WUA. 
                                                 
4 Chapter 3, “State Control and People Right to Water,” article 5 WRL No 17 in 2019. 




Across these (now) dominant nested institutional types, we then itemized and assessed both the 
presence and clarity of the other DPs to highlight gaps—and positive institutional outcomes—
at scaled management levels to identify institutional reform opportunities at governance levels. 
This also enabled us to consider institutional capacity to deal with scale complexities and 
interconnectedness, as suggested by Hagedorn (2008), where the configuration of these 
arrangements could be expected to increase robustness. Finally, with respect to outcomes 
associated with capacity to adjust, we considered Williamson’s (2000) transaction attributes 
(i.e., asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency) as a test of governance structure alignment 
with allocation objectives to further evaluate institutional appropriateness. 
4.4.2 Data collection 
Given that the aim of this research was to more fully understand the relevant 
institutional and contextual conditions with respect to how access to any water resource should 
be allocated, managed and used we relied mainly on qualitative methods. The overarching 
objective for this data collection strategy was to collect information on institutional capacity to 
cope with changing water demand in the area and, more recently, manage the increasingly 
uncertain future water supply conditions. 
Following Yin (2011), we used a combination of interviews, focus group discussions 
(FGDs), a stakeholder workshop and document inspection to enable us to capture the diversity 
of sub-basin water resource users and the complexity of water allocation (sub)-systems. The 
methods used also served as a means to triangulate the information. The process commenced 
with a desktop review of key documents on Indonesian water law, government regulations 
related to water management, and strategic water resource development plans managed by the 
Central and Provincial Governments. The desktop review included research articles in the 
period following the 2004 promulgation of WRL No. 7 to identify any relevant research and 




interviews, a stakeholder workshop, and six FGDs in the period spanning August to October 
2017. The fieldwork interviews were undertaken with four officials at BWS Sulawesi IV, six 
officials from the Water Resource Division at provincial and regency levels, a staff member 
from the Water Division of the Agricultural Department, three irrigation district staff, and the 
head of a local WUA (GP3A). Our study also focused on three regencies: Konawe and Kolaka 
Timur, which are part of Lasolo-Konaweha River basin, and Konawe Selatan, which is part of 
both the Lasolo-Konaweha and Poleang-Roraya river basins. These are the main areas of 
economic development and activity. A semi-structured interview format was used. Each 
interview lasted between one and two hours and covered topics including water resource and 
irrigation management in each of the respective areas, water allocation mechanisms, and the 
nature of problems or conflicts associated with the water resource. Another round of interviews 
was conducted in June 2019 to follow up on any issues requiring further clarity or insight. 
The Department of Research and Development of Southeast Sulawesi facilitated a one-
day workshop with 18 stakeholders. These included officials from BWS Sulawesi IV; staff 
from WRM at both provincial and regency/district levels; and staff from the Forestry 
Department, Watershed Management Institute, Environment Department, and Regional 
Planning Department. Finally, in order to enable consideration of the diversity of water 
resource conditions and the state of WUA development and related institutional arrangements, 
we selected two villages from each regency listed above to conduct FGDs in a local farmer’s 
house. Five to eight farmers participated in each FGD, which lasted for an average of two 
hours. The FGDs were aimed at understanding the realities of water allocation regimes in the 





Initial output from the data analysis was an institutional map of current water 
governance arrangements in the case study area (Figure 14). This map attempts to reveal the 
nature of the hierarchial structure of surface water allocation and management arrangements in 
WS Lasolo-Konaweha, under BWS Sulwesi IV regulations. The structure generally focuses on 
two properties: (1) responsibility for water allocation and (2) responsibility for irrigation 
infrastructure. In the case study area, there is a clear hierarchy of institutions with nested 
properties. All decisions related to water resource development and allocation are authorized 
by the Central Government through the Directorate General of Water Resources (Dirjen SDA). 
Governance structures in WS Poleang-Roraya are similar; although, in that case, the Provincial 
Government sits atop the structure (BPSDA-P) for water allocation decisions, where the “-P” 
designates provincial level. Therefore, depending on the type of river basin, water allocations 
are decided by either the Central or a Provincial government. 
By contrast, responsibility for irrigation infrastructure decisions sits across all three 
levels of government (Central, Provincial and regency; for example, the BPSDA-R). Each 
irrigation district uses primary-, secondary-, and tertiary-level canal systems to deliver water 
to users. At the lowest level (tertiary), only the first 50 meters of canals are maintained by the 
relevant government authority; beyond that point, they become the responsibility of local 
WUAs, including cost-recovery. Even so, each WUA needs permission from the relevant 
authority if they wish to modify their tertiary canal. Finally, at the lowest levels of organization, 
we find individual farmers, who are encouraged strongly to belong to a WUA. All other 
licensed water users (e.g., mining companies) are under the same pressure. The institutional 
map highlights the complex, nested and hierarchical nature of institutions in the case study area 
and the importance of hierarchal or nested arrangements in determining governance options at 







Figure 14. Hierarchical arrangement of water governance in WS Lasolo-Konaweha 
 
We next turned to our evaluation of Ostrom’s DPs across these nested institutional 
levels and roles (Williamson’s first-, second-, and third-order economizing properties) to 
identify gaps in the governance structure (Table 1). A brief explanation of each DP attribute, 









Table 14. Checklist for evaluation of Ostrom’s design principles 













Clearly defined boundaries      
- For entire connected water resource + ++ + + NA 
- Of the boundary for each component NA ++ ++ ++ ++ 
- Of the administrative structure ++ ++ ++ ++ NA 
- Clearly defined water-sharing 
framework 
+ 0 0 0 NA 
- Clear sharing priorities and obligations 
during shortages  
+ 0 0 0 NA 
- Clear flood risk-management rules NA + + 0 NA 
Congruence with local social and environmental conditions 
- Protection of minimum flow to the end 
of the system 
+ + + – NA 
- Clear limit of water abstraction NA 0 + + + 
- Efficient and equitable adjustment mechanism:     
• Within each component 0 0 + + NA 
• Between components 0 0 0 0 NA 
• Within administrative regions/units 0 0 0 0 NA 
• Between administrative 
regions/units 
0 0 0 0 NA 
Proportion of benefit and cost      
- Budgeting rules and process NA ++ + + NA 
- Budgetary independence and 
accountability 
NA ++ + ++ NA 
- Beneficiary-pay requirement + ++ 0 + + 
Collective governance      
- Stakeholder/user participation + + + ++ + 
- Effective representation + + + + + 
- Timely access to information NA + – – + 
Monitoring of users      
- Timely monitoring and use reporting + 0 + + ++ 
- Timely status reporting  + 0 + + + 
Monitoring of resources      
- Of hydrological condition and status, 
including risks 
NA + + + NA 
- Of infrastructure condition and needs  NA ++ ++ ++ + 
- Timely data reporting, access, and 
information review 
NA ++ ++ ++ + 
- Of water supply and quality-affecting 
activities 
++ 0 + + + 
- Robust accounting rules (return flow) 0 0 0 0 NA 
Graduated sanction      
- Clear graduated sanctions for all types 
of infringement 
+ 0 0 + NA 
- Transparency of sanction enforcement  NA 0 0 0 NA 
Conflict resolution mechanism (CRM)   
- Low-cost and rapid CRM ++ + + ++ ++ 
Minimum rights to organize      
- Minimum right to organize NA ++ + + NA 
- System-wide accountability ++ ++ + NA NA 
Notes:      
++ = the rule exists and is clear NA = not applicable 
+ = the rule exists yet is not clear (or weak) – = not available 
0 = the rule is nonexistent   





4.5.1 DP1: Clearly defined boundaries 
DP1 requires the following: (1) “User boundaries: clear and locally-understood 
boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers are present” and (2) “Resource boundaries: 
clear boundaries that separate a specific common-pool resource from a larger social-ecological 
system are present” (Cox et.al, 2010). In order to enable management of each specific part of 
a CPR and thereby secure access for legitimate users, the first step is to define the entire 
connected system boundary, the boundaries for each sub-component of the system, and then 
assign responsibilities for management of each sub-component and each of its hierarchal layers. 
Once clear boundaries are established, a water-sharing framework can be defined for 
the management of sub-system interactions under different conditions and for different periods. 
In this case, while physical and administrative boundaries are generally clear, in the Southeast 
Sulawesi Province definition of access rights and priorities as required under national law are 
generally unavailable. Such water-sharing frameworks typically clarify the total amount of 
water that is allocable to water users and the timing of when allocation announcements can be 
made (Davis, 2007; Young, 2014). Importantly, a robust sharing framework provides security 
to water users, including environmental uses, alongside use conditions and rules that allow 
water users to plan long-term production/conservation activities and day to day use. Further, 
these frameworks detail how access to water will be shared equitably under periods of short-
term scarcity, such as during a drought. Thus, we find that, while DP criteria are generally well 
represented across institutions, the definition of allocation priorities needs to be clarified in 
system-wide plans and enabled through the National Water Law, so that the options available 
to local level managers are clear. Another important issue is the separation of local and system-
wide flood risk management (FRM) rules. According to Henstra et al. (2019), shared 
responsibility among stakeholders, including the property owner, is central to any FRM regime. 




stakeholders to create individual or group incentives to independently mitigate flood risk and 
prepare for post-flood recovery (Henstra et al., 2019). Henstra, however, is silent on how to 
assign risk management responsibilities through a hierarchy. Currently, FRM in the study area 
is focused on the coordination of government agencies to address effects with infrastructure, 
with minimal, if any, participation by users exposed to flood risk. The tone is one that expects 
top-down direction and assigns minimal, or possibly even no, responsibility to local managers. 
4.5.2 DP2A: Congruence with local social and environmental conditions 
DP2A requires that: Appropriation and provision rules are congruent with local and 
system-wide social and environmental conditions as they change. Here, we use a slightly 
modified version of Ostrom’s original DP, as suggested by Ma’mun et al. (2019a), which 
captures the capacity of institutional arrangements to adapt to change. In particular, 
institutional arrangements that can be expected to maintain congruence over time signify an 
ability to respond to scaled effects on CPRs as conditions alter (Bohensky & Lynam, 2005). 
Congruence with local social and ecological conditions is perhaps the most challenging issue 
in any natural resource management context. 
Our analysis of the information collected from respondents found little evidence of 
local system-congruency. Only the Konaweha River in WS Lasoko-Konaweha has an annual 
water allocation plan. This plan involves five users: two state-owned water companies (PDAM) 
who supply water to Unaaha (the capital of the Konawe Regency) and Kendari City (the capital 
of the province), and three IDs under Central Government management. Importantly, the plan 
does not consider water demands from the downstream power plant located in the Konawe 
industrial zone. Furthermore, other IDs managed by Provincial and regency WRM agencies 
within tributaries that flow to the main river have been omitted from the plan, and none of these 
users have been formally registered. As a result, even at the sub-system level, the total limit on 




displays current water use, not limits to abstraction. For each ID, water abstraction is estimated 
only for the district as a whole, using rice area equivalents. All (rice) farmers are eligible users, 
and water “sufficiency” is the abstraction limit. However, “sufficiency” is understood 
differently by different farmers; thus, compliance is difficult to measure. Further, the total area 
of rice equivalent is not defined in a way that enables water rights to be adjusted in a fair and 





Figure 15. Dry year scenario (Q80) of annual water allocation plan in Konaweha River in 2018/2019 





























Figure 15 suggests that, most of the time, water supplies are sufficient to satisfy 
demand; thus, scarcity reallocation rules are not yet a pressing issue. However, this is not true 
for smaller river tributaries, where IDs are exposed to significant seasonal flow variability and 
operate under different management arrangements (Province and regency) in the 
interconnected system. The wide use of continuous-gravitation flow methods also means that 
IDs and farmers do not equally share the risk of shortage during dry years. In these areas, the 
standard sharing mechanism applied during shortages is water rotation within the ID. Our 
interviews, however, revealed that the absence of scaled and equitable institutional 
arrangements to deal with scarcity events tends to increase the potential for rent-seeking 
behaviour to emerge between private agents and decision-makers at higher levels, at the cost 
of smallholder farmers, especially in WS Poleang-Roraya (Ma’mun, et al, 2019b). Without a 
clear water-sharing framework, efficient and equitable adjustment is difficult to achieve and is 
a clear threat to robust outcomes. 
4.5.3 DP2B: Congruence between benefit and cost 
DP2B requires that: Appropriation rules are congruent with provision rules [and] the 
distribution of costs is proportional to the distribution of benefits (Cox et.al, 2010). When the 
nested enterprises principle is put first, two essential questions emerge: (1) whether DP2B 
should apply to each level of the institutional hierarchy and (2) whether the determination of 
budgets is more efficiently decided centrally by a system-wide manager, at the ID level, or at 
both levels. As summarized in Table 14, budgets for water resource and irrigation development 
are determined at each level in the hierarchy; no single ID has its own budget or any authority 
to expend money on maintenance. Further, only BWS Sulawesi IV and the WUAs have the 
authority to set and collect fees from their users. However, although the DP implies a cost 
recovery objective, where proportional benefits are expected to be gained by users, compliance 




beyond in-kind methods are unable to cover the cost for operation and maintenance, the current 
response is to search for and secure a government subsidy to ensure that system costs are met. 
Centrally provided and determined subsidies mean that infrastructure rehabilitation or 
replacement may be delayed because of budget constraints and distance from the decision-
makers, often resulting in reduced system viability and productivity and community intolerance 
of mismanagement. 
Thus, achieving DP2B congruency requires that the short-term costs of maintenance be 
recovered by local farmers at a minimum, leaving long-term costs to be recovered by the local 
WUA or ID managers. Of 152 WUAs in Konawe District under BWS Sulawesi IV authority, 
however, only 37 WUAs have managed to collect an ISF. Moreover, even though licensed 
users (i.e., hydropower, state-owned water companies, industry, and commercial agriculture) 
have been required to pay water charges called Biaya Jasa Pemanfaatan Sumber Daya Air, 
since 2004 delays to their formal definition has meant that this revenue has yet to be collected. 
4.5.4 DP3: Collective governance 
DP3 states that: Most individuals affected by a resource regime are authorised to 
participate in making and modifying its rules. (Cox et.al, 2010). Congruence with this DP is 
possible across the different institutional levels, from the national Dirjen SDA which discusses 
and seeks consultation on regulatory frameworks for water resource development, through the 
Basin Council which coordinates consultative forums at the basin level, down to the Irrigation 
Commission at the regency level where individual WUA, farmer, and licensed-user views can 
be captured. Only the WS Lasolo-Konaweha, however, currently has a Basin Council in 
Southeast Sulawesi. In all of Sulawesi Province’s other Basins, a basin management institution 
has yet to be established. Moreover and under current law, the capacity of Basin Council 
institutions to act as a consultative or system-wide administrative body has proved challenging. 




is no clear metric available to determine how to evaluate the performance of each level in the 
administrative hierarchy and/or by each group of stakeholders listed in the Basin Plan. Instead, 
Basin Plans are typically drafted and promulgated by BWS Sulawesi IV or the relevant WRM 
agency, and it is seen as the responsibility of the Basin Council to simply implement the plan 
without any commitment to enabling “collective governance” and with neither the power to 
enforce compliance with the plan or raise the money necessary to implement it. 
There is, however, evidence of collective coordination among and across the IDs. Each 
ID must supply a collective cropping plan for the WUAs in its area which is passed onto the 
Irrigation Commission. These cropping schedules, and a corresponding water distribution plan, 
are then discussed by the Commission, legitimized by the Bupati (regent), and validated for all 
irrigation systems in the regency (including those managed by BWS Sulawesi IV or the 
province’s WRM). This process usually occurs at the beginning of the year, and each ID is then 
authorized to take water in accordance with that cropping plan with no further need to consider 
impacts on other IDs. 
4.5.5 DP4A: Monitoring of users 
DP4A states that: Monitors are accountable to the users with enforcement capacity for 
ensuring compliance with the appropriation and use rules (Ma’mun et.al, 2019a). Lack of 
monitoring appears to be significantly constraining the effective management of water 
resources in Southeast Sulawesi. Not all users are registered and enforcement of non-
compliance with governance rules is weak. Monitoring and enforcement was originally 
regulated under the 2004 WRL and performed by a team of Penyidik Pegawai Negeri Sipil, or 
civil servant investigators, through BWS Sulawesi IV. With the annulment of the WRL in 2015, 
however, that legal authority and thus the capacity of the agency to enforce compliance at the 




Although water users at ID level should be familiar with the importance of collective 
monitoring and enforcement, over the last two decades similar reductions in system compliance 
have also been noted. As discussed above, different interpretations of water “sufficiency” also 
make it difficult to hold WUAs and farmers in check. This issue was mentioned several times 
during the FGDs and interviews. While farmers at the top of an irrigation system will enjoy 
abundant water, conveyance losses from deteriorated infrastructure and excessive abstraction 
by other users typically mean that farmers at the tail-end of the system either receive less water 
or experience delays to their agreed schedule. As a result, downstream farmers bear most of 
the risk of waterlogging (poor infrastructure) and non-delivery during variations in climatic 
conditions (e.g., flood or drought).  
In a typical hierarchical institutional arrangement, each level would be accountable to 
their stakeholders and have the authority to enforce compliance at the next level down, but not 
be responsible for levels two or more removed from their own (Simon, 1962). With respect to 
this DP, we find that attention to user enforcement is needed, particularly at the system-wide 
level. To do this, arguably the first step is to require each level in the hierarchy to document all 
use entitlements and assemble them into a framework so that effective monitoring and 
enforcement at each level is established. 
4.5.6 DP4B: Monitoring of resource system 
DP4B requires that: System-wide monitoring and reporting exists and is reported to 
users (Ma’mun et al., 2019a). In Southeast Suluwesi, regular monitoring of water resource 
conditions exists at the river basin level. The Basin Council coordinates with other sectors—
such as the Meteorology and Geophysics Institute and Department of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, who are responsible for groundwater—to turn the data collected into a coherent 
description of aggregate water use at the basin level. This progressive coordination has not 




can be accessed through the BWS Sulawesi IV website. These data are also used to develop 
annual water allocation plans, and for the IDs to schedule water distribution at the beginning 
of a cropping season. While available, typically, this hydrologic information is not yet being 
used optimally to inform users about the risk of drought or flood in a timely manner. 
Furthermore, coordination of monitoring and enforcement of water abstraction activities has 
not been fully integrated in many basins. Although some of these activities require technical 
guidance from the river basin authority, as discussed above rule enforcement is lacking. As a 
result, according to FGD and workshop participants, deterioration of water resources, 
accumulation of sediment yield in rivers and irrigation canals, and declining water quality is 
being tolerated. It needs to be acknowledged, however, that while the system-wide monitoring 
necessary to include facilitate robust water accounting is nonexistent, the data which is 
available is being used to guide water allocation planning in Konaweha River (Figure 15). 
4.5.7 DP5: Graduated sanction 
DP5 states that: Sanctions for rule violations start very low, but become stronger if a 
user repeatedly violates a rule (Cox et.al, 2010). The 2004 WRL set clear penalties for 
infringements of water use rights by water-affecting activities, which have persisted and been 
updated in WRL No. 17 (2019, article 68–74). Similarly, Government Regulation No. 68 
(2014) details graduated or tiered administrative sanctions progressing from three written 
warnings to the temporary suspension of a water license and finally the revocation of a water 
permit for repeated offences. Given this experience, it seems reasonable to assume that 
regulations under the new WRL will be similar. At present, the Ministry of Public Works 
Regulation Act (2015) is being used as an interim regulatory mechanism; however, it is less 





At the river basin level, however, Basin Plan operational polices are general in their 
description of sanctions and, generally, fail to establish the processes necessary to apply 
sanctions. Thus, at present, the majority of rule violations go unpunished. The FGD and 
interviews also revealed that the same issues are present at the ID level. At best, ID sanctions 
extend to informal sanctions, such as user shaming or reproach by irrigation staff. Thus, we 
conclude that there is considerable scope to improve sanction processes at all institutional 
levels. 
4.5.8 DP6: Conflict resolution mechanism 
DP6 requires that: Rapid, low-cost local arenas exist for resolving conflicts among users 
or with officials (Cox et.al, 2010). Conflict resolution mechanisms between WUA members 
and among WUAs in an ID are aligned with what Ostrom (1990) described as rapid and low 
cost. At the local level, the use of customary Indonesian practices that consider the musyawarah 
(a forum for discussion and negotiation to reach mutual consensus) are a preferred way to settle 
disputes. Importantly, the WRL allows the use of this customary practice to resolve conflict 
before escalating to formal adjudication in the courts. As such, musyawarah practices at the 
lowest institutional levels are legally binding. In support of this, BWS Sulawesi IV, the WRM 
agencies, and an Ombudsman provide channels for mediation between conflicting parties. 
FGDs, however, revealed that this mechanism is not always effective when dealing with 
national or multinational companies operating in the area. This situation links to Design 
Principle 4A and 5 and may, in part, to be associated with a lack of system-wide monitoring 
and failure on the part of the WS Poleang-Roraya authority and related government agencies 
who issued the permit. The result is an arrangement where there is opportunity for mis-
compliance with system obligations as companies are not held accountable for the external 
effects of their activities. For example, conflict between local farmers and a nickel mine in the 




at the time of this study, despite several years of farmer efforts to seek justice through formal 
and informal channels including assistance from field irrigation staff in the area (Ma’mun et 
al., 2019b, under review). As such, we conclude that there is scope for the improvement of 
conflict resolution arrangements at all levels in the institutional hierarchy. 
4.5.9 DP7: Minimum rights to organize 
DP7 requires that: The rights of local users to make their own rules are recognised by 
the government (Cox et.al, 2010). Water resource management in the study area is largely the 
responsibility of central and provincial authorities. Both have the mandate to administer, 
organize, and manage water resource development in their respective river basins. Likewise, 
separate authorities exist for each defined irrigation districts as outlined in Figure 3. Typically, 
each management structure includes staff from BWS Sulawesi IV, the provincial WRM, or the 
regency’s WRM. Also, the regency’s WRM can ask BWS Sulawesi IV or the provincial WRM 
to replace any staff who is experiencing or causing problems with water users or failing to 
properly coordinate with WRM requirements. Meanwhile, the Central Government can 
appropriate infrastructure from a regency’s WRM if they lack capacity to deliver the required 
outcomes. More generally, At the local level, WUAs have the right to create and implement 
their own rules and WUAs are encouraged to organize into unions and federations at secondary 
and primary canal levels, respectively. This enables WUAs to be represented in decision-
making processes at higher ID or province levels. 
4.6 Discussion 
4.6.1 Insights from the dimensions of TCE and nature-related transactions 
Water governance in Southeast Sulawesi is currently transitioning to a new set of 
institutional arrangements. In particular, as the regulations necessary to implement the 2019 




this transition we have trialled, and herein applied, a revised ordering of Ostrom’s DPs to search 
for gaps and mismatches. The approach we have taken is in line with prior suggestions by 
Simon (1962, 2001). Under the current regime, appropriate balancing of social and economic 
objectives while maintaining sustainable use appears challenging. Before offering a summary 
of possible alternative governance structures that arise from this assessment, the nature of this 
challenge is examined through a transaction cost framework and the dimensions of nature-
related transactions to explore how the current institutional structure fails to mitigate ex-post 
implementation hazards. 
Four transaction dimensions are used to evaluate current structure alignment: asset 
specificity, uncertainty, frequency, and complexity/interconnectedness. TCE suggests that 
asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency are needed to assess transactions (e.g., reallocation 
outcomes) and the governance structures that support transactions (Williamson, 1985). Asset 
specificity exists where the bilateral dependency on an asset (e.g., water resources) is high, and 
resources cannot be instantaneously transferred to the best alternative use. Asset specificity 
assumes greater importance in the presence of uncertainty, where conflict and dispute drive the 
emergence of non-standard contracting arrangements. Under such scenarios, assessment of 
governance structures is highly warranted. High transaction frequency allows the cost of 
specialized governance investments to be recovered, whereas low transaction frequency 
incentivizes high costs to settle disputes and continued uncertainty. Finally, the extent of 
complexity and interconnectedness determine the extent to which the users of a system are 
affected by the choices of others, and the extent to which problems may need to be decomposed 
into smaller units of analysis to cope. Ideal institutions will facilitate such processes as motives 
for transacting to adapt, reallocate, and meet shared objectives (Hagedorn, 2008). For the case 





We observed that reallocation between water users—all with asset-specific 
requirements to a range of production systems (e.g., agricultural, urban consumption, power 
generation, and industrial uses)—will be challenging in the case study sites during times of 
water scarcity. Institutional arrangements that allow trade-offs between users have not been 
built into the system; thus, either capital losses or increased illegal activity (e.g., water theft) 
can be expected to occur. Different users will experience different losses depending upon the 
scale and scope of asset specificity effects. As such, there is an opportunity to amend Basin 
Plan governance arrangements so that these issues can be taken into account. To do this, 
effective sharing and priority management rules could be added to the Basin Plan so that such 
arrangements can be applied when needed. 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty can take many different forms. The effect of a random act of nature on the 
water sector is unpredictable. As discussed, any lack of clarity about how managers will 
respond to water scarcity creates uncertainty for users. Similarly, where user compliance with 
contracts or sets of rules is uncertain for other users, transaction costs tend to rise (Coggan et 
al., 2010). Our interviews also suggest that many stakeholders still consider Southeast Sulawesi 
to be characterized by water abundance and, hence, consider little need to worry about supply 
or demand uncertainty. However, we contend that, while the governance system may appear 
capable of dealing with seasonal or incremental change, the current system would struggle to 
cope with a rapid change in supply and demand. The cost of introducing priority sharing 
arrangements before they are needed is low; however, once they are needed, the cost will be 
high. In particular, the literature suggests that there are opportunities to increase both the 
security and flexibility of the current system (Livingston, 1995; Quiggin, 1988). Sharing 
arrangements are also missing in the Basin Plan, as already discussed. The highly attenuated 




(Williamson, 1985), which also undermine existing institutions and future reliance upon them 
by users. 
Frequency 
At each management level, water allocation is a recurring transaction. Questions that 
must be considered in this context include how often transactions occur, how many users are 
involved, and whether users or types of water right holders are treated equally or whether 
defined priority management rules would improve use. Designing appropriate institutional 
arrangements to deal with frequency issues can be predicted to reduce the cost of collecting 
information and, also, negotiation between users. System changes should seek to increase the 
frequency of reallocation and reduce transaction costs (Coggan et al., 2010), and build trust 
among users, agents and authority at all levels. Further, it can be predicted that increases in 
transaction frequency will reduce uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour (Rørstad et al., 2007) 
and overcome the existing sense of distrust which, among other things, has caused declines in 
farmer willingness to contribute to maintenance and generally contribute to management in a 
constructive manner. 
Complexity and interconnectedness 
Water management is complex, as its flows and losses often make sequential or re-use 
possible (Hanemann, 2006). In particular, Basin Plans could be rewritten so as to acknowledge 
the fact that many groundwater systems contribute water to surface water systems and vice 
versa. As a general rule, interconnectivity needs to be acknowledged before it can be managed.  
Variability of supply in time and space adds to this complexity and requires 
coordination at the system-wide level. Further, system interconnectivity means that 
externalities resulting from water-affecting activities also need to be considered. Whether this 
complexity is most effectively managed at the basin level or devolved via manageable tasks to 




have the same conditions or face the same problems and challenges. Limitations to human 
cognition and high transaction costs for collecting information suggest that detailed decision-
making is most efficiently left to the lowest level of governance, where people are more 
familiar with the local context (Garrick, 2015; Hayek, 1945; Marshall, 2008) and special 
arrangements can be implemented to facilitate trade-offs between or among sub-systems. 
The assessment across these four transaction dimensions suggests a low level of 
alignment between current institutions and (future) reallocation objectives/requirements, in 
turn suggesting poor design and implementation with respect to Ostrom’s DPs. The following 
section discusses the implications of this situation and the case for the development of 
alternative governance structures. 
4.6.2 Options and opportunities 
The above attributes help to identify the nature of institutional changes that would bring 
increase alignment with Ostrom’s DPs and, more importantly, with Central, Provincial and 
local objectives. Ostrom design principles were developed in an effort to assist, not as an 
objective in themselves. The rigidity of the current system means that it is incapable of 
accommodating changes in supply and demand without a major restructure, which, if required 
as a result of a crisis, could prove extremely expensive. This has two consequences that have 
been noted elsewhere in Indonesia. In particular, the current system can be predicted to: (1) 
create conflict between sectors or users and (2) in the future, encourage more (unsustainable) 
groundwater abstraction. Without appropriate regulation, monitoring, and enforcement, this 
will ultimately lead to environmental and salinity problems, as already reported in Bali (Cole 
& Browne, 2015). As Srinivasan et al. (2012) have observed such institutional design flaws are 
one of the root causes of the unsustainability and sectoral vulnerability that tends to drive the 




If efficient and equitable forms of development are to be encouraged, then mechanisms 
that enable inter-sectoral and inter-regional adjustment are necessary. While administrative 
reallocation may be justified, it is prone to rent-seeking behaviour at the expense of violating 
the principle of equity and fairness (Livingston, 1995). Without actual compensation through 
voluntary transfers of existing user rights to others, traditional users (smallholder farmers) tend 
to be marginalized.  
To safeguard priority uses and balance socio-economic objectives, as stated in the 
Water Law, it can be reasoned that the regulations, subsequent Basin Plans and associated 
institutional arrangements must be crafted to maintain order, mitigate conflict, and foster 
mutual gains among competing uses and users (Williamson, 2000). One of the options 
identified in this paper is the development of sharing arrangements that enable the development 
of nested adjustment mechanisms at both the sub-basin and local level. These would benefit 
further from their coupling with arrangements that limit total withdrawals from the system as 
a whole, for each sub-system and most diversion points, and the introduction of prioritized 
proportional adjustment rules when the full share entitlement cannot be met (Young, 2019).  
For example, if a state-owned company locates downstream (Figure 15), requiring more 
water to supply Kendari City, then one or more IDs or WUAs in the system will need to forgo 
some of their use rights. In consideration, the Basin Plan and proposed regulations could 
require the city to provide compensation equal to the value of loss imposed on the ID, WUA, 
and/or individual farmers. Such a rule would do much to reduce uncertainty and provide the 
security and legitimacy necessary to bring trust and respect back to the entire system and each 
hierarchical layer, as it is only when water use rights are secured and protected that stakeholders 
can be expected to be willing to invest to maintain the actions necessary to ensure the 




Changing the subsidiarity status of local IDs is another possible governance option. 
Subsidiarity arrangements are designed to prevent system-wide managers from interfering with 
local management decisions so that they can be made in a timely manner. They operate by 
limiting the extent by which system-wide managers can interfere. They can, for example, 
determine broad sharing rules and sub-system exchange rates but not where and what water is 
used for. Granting more authority to IDs would allow more efficient use of local knowledge 
about users, and opportunities for users to interact with one another and the wider economy. 
This would, for example, enable the local development of institutional rules that enable the 
immediate reallocation of water, rather than waiting for system-wide responses to be negotiated 
and implemented (Ostrom, 1999). Moreover, since WUAs already have legal status, unions or 
federations of WUAs could act as monitors of IDs’ performance. This arrangement would 
make IDs more accountable to the WUAs/farmers they serve and increase the likelihood that 
WUAs/farmers would be fairly treated and could exercise their access rights, as specified by 
the Water Law. At the same time, IDs could hold WUAs accountable for rule compliance, as 
under such a system each ID would be required to conform with system-wide regulations. The 
BWS Sulawesi IV and/or the WRM agencies would then only need to ensure that system-wide 
monitoring, enforcement, graduated sanctions and easy access to conflict resolution 
mechanisms are in place and are being used. 
4.7 Conclusions 
Indonesian water governance is entering another era and as it does so an opportunity to 
address hierarchical arrangements has emerged. The WRL in 2019 is designed to balance 
social, economic, and environmental needs while safeguarding public rights to access water 
and ensuring that water is used for the greatest benefit of the people. The WRL also requires 




Sulawesi Province, however, appear to be hindering progress towards high-order social and 
economic objectives, as well as the development of a capacity to cope with efficiently manage 
predictable future changes to water supply and demand.  
Using a revised ordering of Ostrom’s DPs with a focus on hierarchical institution design 
arrangements, and the use of TCE, we have examined institutional arrangements for several 
river basins in Southeast Sulawesi. In particular, we sought to assess how this perspective can 
be used to help inform efforts to improve institutional arrangements. In systems where 
hierarchical structures are necessary, we conclude that additional emphasis on boundary 
definition enables efficient development of the institutional arrangements necessary to improve 
outcomes. In particular, it forces the development of inter-sectoral and inter-regional allocation 
and reallocation rules and, through this, enables the development of more sustainable 
outcomes. 
Moreover, our analysis suggests that an initial focus on boundary definitions is an 
essential starting point for the development of Basin Plans that are characterized by security in 
a manner that does not compromise system capacity to facilitate and even encourage regional 
development. In practice, we have concluded that a revised ordering of Ostrom’s DPs helps 
draw attention to this significant institutional design opportunity. By considering Ostrom’s 
“nested enterprises” first, rather than last, in her list of principles, it becomes much easier to 
apply all the other principles in her list—especially when large-scale CPRs and a multitude of 
governments are involved. This concept is currently lacking in the literature.  
When she published her work, Ostrom (1990) asserted the importance of the nested 
enterprises principle when a CPR is part of a large, complex system. We concur with her 
argument, as have Evans et al. (2014) and Lacroix and Richards (2015). However, whenever 




earlier rather than later attention to this principle will produce significant benefits. When the 
nested enterprises principle is placed first in her list, an important hierarchical perspective is 
added to all her remaining DPs. 
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Chapter 5: Summary, conclusions and policy recommendations 
5.1. Introduction 
Indonesia has long been known as an agrarian country. The history of irrigated 
agriculture dates back to the fifth century in Java and Bali. Its remains can still be seen in the 
Subak system in Bali, one of the UNESCO’s World Heritage cultural landscapes. Nevertheless, 
the future of irrigated agriculture in Indonesia, including the sophisticated Subak system, is 
challenged by uncertainty in the ever-changing environment. To address these challenges, a 
series of policy reforms in the water and irrigation sectors began in 1999. They started with the 
renewal of the Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) policy, as part of the Water Sector 
Adjustment Loan (WATSAL), funded by the World Bank. The results, however, did not meet 
expectations (Oad, 2001; Suhardiman, 2013). Many of the reforms were therefore abandoned. 
Against this background, this study sought to find answers to the research questions: 
1. Are there plausible water management options that could maintain Indonesian 
agricultural systems and rural economies, without constraining water availability 
for the development of other sectors? 
2. What set of institutional arrangements would enable the most efficient and equitable 
use of water in Indonesia? 
Using the above questions to guide the research agenda, this thesis used the Common-
Pool Resources (CPRs) theory, specifically the eight design principles (DPs) for robust 
institutions, proposed by Elinor Ostrom in 1990. The research had three objectives: 
1. To investigate necessary and sufficient conditions for institutional arrangements 




2. To investigate whether institutional arrangements at the local level are capable 
of dealing with future uncertainty and changes in water availability. 
3. To search for possible alternative institutional arrangements to govern water 
resource development in Indonesia, and the processes needed to create the 
capacity of the governance systems to properly manage water.  
The first objective was discussed in Chapter 2. It outlined lessons learned from long-
enduring, community-based irrigation systems around the world. The results produced the 
insights necessary to consider the second objective, addressed in Chapter 3, by employing an 
adapted set of principles to a case study of local irrigation systems in Indonesia. The findings 
in Chapter 3 were then used to inform Chapter 4’s investigation at the system-wide level, 
thus addressing the third objective.   
The remainder of this chapter provides a summary of the main findings, including the 
contributions to methodology and CPR theory in this thesis and, also, policy recommendations. 
Finally, the last section discusses the limitations of the study and outlines suggestions for 
further water and CPR research. 
5.2. Summary of main findings 
Studies on CPR management have been criticized for their lack of analytical rigour (Agrawal 
2001). Moreover, there have been few attempts to determine the relationship between specific 
DPs and the outcomes that CPR management institutions are expected to deliver. The research 
presented in Chapter 2 aimed to fill this gap through the examination of sixty-two irrigation 
case-studies located within thirty-seven countries. 
Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA), Chapter 2 explored the 
question of whether Ostrom’s DPs represent a complete set of necessary conditions or, better 




handle fine-grain causal complexity, fsQCA offers an effective methodology. I find that 
fs/QCA is especially useful in unpacking relationships among the equifinal, substitution and 
complementary effects of institutional arrangements and the overall effectiveness of an 
institution.  
Out of the eight principles, the study identifies four principles that can be described as 
necessary conditions for a robust water institution; these are: 1) Clearly defined boundaries, 
2) Monitoring of users, with enforcement capacity, 3) System-wide monitoring of resources, 
and 4) Minimum rights to organize. Ostrom’s other principles are useful but were not found to 
be necessary. The result also shows two parsimonious solutions (minimum or core 
configuration of conditions) that are sufficient for robust institutions.  
The first solution involves user monitoring AND system-wide monitoring. That is, the 
productive use of water resources and irrigation systems can be sustained when the monitoring 
of user behaviour entails enforcement capacity, helps to ensure compliance and prevent 
opportunistic behaviour and is organized so as to provide timely information necessary to allow 
adjustment of rules for maintenance and appropriation. 
The combination of congruence with local condition AND system-wide monitoring 
AND minimum rights to organize is the second parsimonious solution. That is, when users 
have the authority to self-organize and devise their operational rules within a defined 
framework, they can adapt to changes in various conditions, providing that they have access to 
timely information about the state of their resources.  
As a result of this analysis, a water-specific version of Ostrom’s design principles was 
developed.  
The modified version of Ostrom’s DPs was applied in Chapter 3. This chapter 




Indonesia. The research collected data from a series of interviews, a stakeholder workshop and 
six focus group discussions in three of the province’s regions. The study resulted in 
recommendations to improve irrigation management institutions in Southeast Sulawesi and 
Indonesia, generally; summarised in Table 5.1. The recommendations are presented as a list of 
propositions worthy of consideration by Indonesian water managers. 
Table 5.1. Propositions for sustainable irrigation institutions in Southeast Sulawesi 
Proposition 1 System robustness can be improved by formally defining a limit on water 
withdrawal for individual farmers, either by area or volume, and clear criteria 
for priority allocations if/when scarcity occurs. 
 
Proposition 2  All farmers in WUA-managed areas need to be registered and their records need 
to be kept and updated by the WUA. Records may include total area, number 
of plots, location, and type of crops (in different seasons), and rules for water 
sharing during periods of supply scarcity. 
 
Proposition 3 Providing choices for irrigation service fee (ISF) payments through service or 
monetary obligations, or a combination of both may increase farmer 
contributions to irrigation operation and maintenance (O&M). 
 
Proposition 4  At WUA level, enforcement capacity and monitoring needs to be improved. 
Although farmer decisions to hold water at the head-end of irrigation system 
may not affect neighbouring farmers in water-abundant areas, such decisions 
may be harmful to tail-end users as discussed in the DP 2a section. Affected 
users must be able to rely on effective monitoring and compliance mechanisms. 
 
Proposition 5  Formal, graduated sanctions that define penalties for low to severe 
infringements will be useful for preventing rule violations, particularly where 
those sanctions, or penalties, are transparent and apply to all users. 
 
Proposition 6  Informal conflict resolution mechanisms exist locally. What is urgently needed 
is a mechanism enabling local institutions to engage in conflict resolution at 
higher management levels. 
 
Proposition 7  Individual gains at the expense of others in a system can be avoided by giving 
WUA/farmers’ groups more authority (rights) to decide what they want to do 
within their irrigation system, and how they want it to be developed—as long 
as it does not contradict the system-wide rules or responsibilities. 
 
Proposition 8 In the absence of system-wide rules, WUAs need to strengthen the horizontal 
linkages between them, to share water more equitably and increase their 
bargaining position when facing current/expected impacts of other user 







As Chapter 3 developed, it became clear that putting the nested principle last in 
Ostrom’s list of eight principles tends to encourage insufficient consideration to its relationship 
with the other seven principles. That is, this ordering of the principles tends to focus attention 
on local issues and discourage consideration of hierarchical issues. Chapter 4 focused on the 
development of guidelines for the nesting of local management arrangements within broader 
hierarchical arrangements.  
Chapter 4 begins by putting Ostrom’s nested principle and considering it first in the 
examination of the robustness of the institutional arrangements used to manage a complex, 
large-scale CPR system, with heterogeneous values and uses. Many studies of large-scale CPR 
systems, using Ostrom’s DPs, show mixed results; that is, not all principles are relevant to 
large-scale CPRs. As this work progressed, it was found that the order in which principles are 
considered matters. By putting the nested principle first, a new perspective emerges – all 
principles remain relevant. Specifically, the user of Ostrom’s DPs is forced to consider how to 
interpret and apply them throughout the hierarchy in the way Ostrom acknowledges is 
necessary. 
To test this argument, in Chapter 4 the approach is tested through an examination of 
river basin management arrangements in the province of Southeast Sulawesi. The chapter 
makes use of Chapter 4’s data, in addition to a review of regulations, existing basin plan 
documents and relevant studies conducted during the period of the promulgation of the first 
water law. That is, Ostrom’s DPs are combined with a transaction cost analysis.  
In the basin examined, the results show that institutional arrangements do not provide 
the flexibility necessary to enable users to adapt to foreseeable future changes in an efficient 
and equitable manner. This is important. As suggested in the literature, hierarchical 




Simon, 1962). Further, the analysis also found that the hierarchical structures of the extant 
institutions do not align with the complex nature of water resources in the province. The results 
provide a list of gaps in the institutional arrangements that need to be addressed and changed 
so that water use can be kept within sustainable limits as communities pursue a range of 
economic and social development objectives.  
5.3 Methodological insight: A fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is a relatively new methodology, developed 
by Charles Ragin in 1987. The use of the methodology has increased in the last three decades 
and has become one of the mainstream approaches in sociology, political science and health 
service research (de Block and Vis, 2018). Recently, the methodology has also been used in 
the environmental and water sectors (see, for example, Hamidov et al., 2015; Knieper and Pahl-
Wostl, 2016; Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014; Srinivasan et al., 2012). Nevertheless, these 
developments have yet to achieve a standardized method, especially in the use of fuzzy-set 
calibration techniques necessary to enable analysis. My search of the literature revealed that, 
to date, only Basurto and Speer (2012) and Toth et al. (2017) have proposed a specific fuzzy-
set calibration technique. These techniques they have developed are valuable but remain 
subjective in helping research assemble the final fuzzy-set scores necessary to enable analysis 
(de Block and Vis, 2018). Moreover, as we proceeded, we found that their techniques not to be 
suitable for analysis of the meta-data used in this study.  
The method used in this research offers an alternative technique, which can be applied 
to qualitative concepts/data in general and helps to reduce arbitrariness in the development of 
fuzzy scores. The methods section in Chapter 2 provides a clear and replicable iterative 
procedure for qualitative data calibration. The technique emphasizes the importance of 




concept, both in causal conditions and in outcomes. The Analytic Hierarchy Process used to 
score the fuzzy-set, as an important part of the calibration procedure. The score is developed 
by assigning suitable criteria to each concept from a careful assessment of best practice 
examples and insights gleaned from the established literature. Then, a two-step, pair-wise 
ranking process is used to weight each criterion and assign scores that can be applied to each 
case and used for the analysis. 
5.4 Revisiting Ostrom’s Design Principles for robust institutions: a water 
focus. 
In all the analytical chapters, Ostrom’s DPs were used as diagnostic tools to organize 
information and search for insights and practical ways to improve existing arrangements. In 
doing so, following Ostrom’s (2005, 2008) suggestions, each DP was turned into a question: 
what further arrangements does each design principle need to improve the robustness of the 
institution in governing common-pool resources (CPR)? This approach proved to be powerful. 
It replaces the search for the presence or absence of a design principle with a search for gaps 
between institutional arrangements prescribed by a DP and the reality, and it then goes on to 
identify measures that can be taken to address these gaps.   
With an extensive review of the literature and the assumption of bounded rationality, I 
developed the fuzzy concepts of the DPs to evaluate the irrigation institutions discussed in 
Chapter 2. The same approach was used in Chapter 3 to develop a checklist for use in 
Chapter 4. Findings from these chapters provide the basis for the policy recommendations 
made in this chapter.   
5.4.1. Modifying Ostrom’s design principles: putting the nested principle first 




“When a common-pool resource is closely connected to a larger social-
ecological system, governance activities are organized in multiple nested 
layers” (Ostrom, 2010 p. 653) 
 
Arguably, the most important insight offered in this thesis is the proposition that, when 
considering the robustness of any set of institutional arrangements being used to manage a 
CPR, Ostrom’s nested principle should be considered first, rather than last. As Berkes (2006) 
suggests, rather than focusing on the scaling-up problem, it is more meaningful to understand 
the nature and dynamics of the cross-scale linkages when dealing with multi-level CPRs. 
Putting the nested principle first forces such analysis. In particular, it forces application of the 
principles within a well-defined institutional structure (Bromley, 1985) and, where appropriate, 
forces careful consideration of the case for ensuring that they are implemented at one, or more, 
levels in the hierarchy. Bromley (1985) discuss how institutional arrangements can fit together 
when the legal frameworks, which are defined at the policy level, are refined and further 
specified at the organizational level in a manner that creates codes of conduct and drives the 
behaviour of individual maximizing agents, as they go about their daily activities.  
The importance of a hierarchic perspective in examining complex systems was 
discussed much earlier by Simon (1962). In essence, well-designed hierarchical structures 
assign tasks to levels in ways that decrease transaction costs by reducing the need for 
continuous consultation between levels in the hierarchy and reducing the need to have all 
decisions taken at a lower level approved by a higher level (Simon 2001).  
The nested concept creates an expectation that the higher-level system rules take 
precedence over the lower-level rules. However, if lower-level rules are organized so that they 
conform with constraints imposed from levels higher in the system, this arrangement need not 
result in higher transaction costs. That is, the nested framework chosen needs to be designed 
so that there is no overlap in the nesting and full accounting of the interactions between the 




for what and who is accountable for what. The other seven design principles can then be applied 
to those levels where they are likely to be most effective but careful account must be taken of 
the consequences of implementing them at one level on the processes managed at another level 
in the hierarchy.  
5.4.2 Where to from here 
Institution is complex and multidimensional. It is dynamic and evolves overtime. 
Institutional arrangements are shaped by human interaction, and interplay of various aspects, 
including social, economy, political and environmental aspects (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015). 
This raised critique that Ostrom’s DPs are too simplistic and overlook the complex nature of 
the CPR and the community where the principles must be applied (Stenins and Edward, 1999; 
Cleaver and Franks, 2005). While admitting this limitation, Ostrom’s empahasized the 
importance of understanding how the configuration of the design principles as causal 
conditions affect incentives, behaviour and outcomes (Ostrom, 2008). My analysis in Chapter 
2 support her argument. Further, unpacking the design princples within each layer of the nested 
arrangement is useful to examine the complex nature of human interaction in a particular CPR 
setting, as demonstrated in this study.  
Although the reordering of the design principles is based on analysis of the water sector, 
Ostrom’s design principle is written in general terms and can thus accommodate other types of 
CPR. I believe the lack of specificity of the design principles (Ostrom and Cox, 2010) fits wider 
purposes and so can be applied to all types of CPRs. However, when applying the design 
principles for analyzing CPR institutions, it is more fruitful to identify the design elements of 
each of the principles that best fits with the characteristics of the CPR under study, as well as 
the characteristics and objectives of human interaction with the CPR (Bromley, 1992). 




5.5 Policy recommendations  
5.5.1  The issue 
In the search for a robust method to deal with Indonesia’s significant water supply and demand 
management problems, there have been two recent attempts to reform water law. In both cases, 
in 2004 and 2019, the reform process, its framework and its strategy are incomplete. In 
particular, they fail to deal with the reality that, in an increasing number of regions, water is no 
longer abundant. Current supplies are no longer keeping up with demands and curtailment of 
supply is becoming increasingly common. As a result, conflict among users and competition 
between users is becoming more common and is expected to rise, even in areas where supply 
enhancement is still possible. Focusing investment on supply is not a long-term solution – 
supply enhancement can buy time, but it rarely produces a solution that can be expected to 
endure. Ultimately, an efficient way to manage scarcity must be found. Moreover, Damania et 
al. (2017) warn of the paradox of increasing water supply. Increased demand once 
accommodated creates its own demand and this leads to increased vulnerability to future 
droughts. Because of this, this thesis searches for a suite of institutional arrangements that can 
be relied upon to ensure that the Nation’s water resources are well managed and, hence, are not 
a barrier to social and economic progress. 
Based on the findings of this thesis, two key observations warrant further consideration 
in policy development. First, under the current water allocation regime, keeping use within 
sustainable limits, while allowing social and economic progress, is becoming increasingly 
challenging. In such a situation, the arrangements used to govern water use can impede 
progress. The water law of 2019 has contains a general guideline for water allocation that 
requires the development of priority sharing arrangements but appears to lack flexibility. At 




districts, or regions, and no guidance on the most appropriate manner to manage shortages and 
changes in demand. Moreover, since there is no requirement to register all users and many 
users are not registered, it is impossible to regulate total abstraction and, hence, assure 
compliance with any regime that is developed. These are serious institutional short comings. 
Second, the current law fails to provide guidance on the most appropriate hierarchical 
structure, or structures, and the processes necessary to support local governance arrangements. 
Our data, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, shows that local farmers are extremely vulnerable to 
external pressures.  That is, they are vulnerable to increased water extraction from parts of the 
system above them. Even when they can establish priority use rights within their system, there 
is no arrangement for them to protect their interests from development in other parts of the 
system. In particular, there is no way for them to protect themselves from increases in non-
agricultural sector demands for water. This thesis’ findings indicate that some of the problems 
faced by local communities have their origins outside their local boundaries. To enable their 
management, much more attention to hierarchical arrangements is needed. Communities need 
to be supported by higher-level elements of the system.  
It is suggested that the way forward is to improve the management of hierarchical 
arrangements so that those responsible for allocating, managing and facilitating the use of water 
are able to ensure that water makes the greatest contribution to the full range of social, 
economic and environmental objectives while keeping its use within sustainable limits. It is 
time to search for a way to transition towards the adoption of water allocation systems that 
allow water to be shared fairly and equitably to meet changing circumstances.  
Based on these findings, this thesis recommends that the basin authorities in Southeast 
Sulawesi (BWS IV Sulawesi and the Provincial Water Resource Management Agency), and 




framework that can be used to guide the development of water basin allocation arrangements 
that reliably facilitate the management of two types of change. The first type of change to 
supply and demand involves a rapid event; for example, the emergence of a drought. The 
second type of change involves a slower, but more enduring, change in demand due to, for 
example, urban population growth or the construction of a new factory or mine.  
5.5.2  High-level outcomes 
The Water Law No. 17, enacted in 2019, envisages possible harmony in the pursuit of 
environmental, social and economic objectives affected by water use. The information 
presented in thesis suggests that the pathway to harmony lies with the development of 
hierarchical governance and allocation arrangements that enable local water users to become 
more involved in setting the rules and in determining the way that new demands are to be 
accommodated. That is, there is a need for an institution-wide set of rules that require, without 
compromise, the development of mechanisms that enable adjustment and re-allocation at the 
regional level but require that this be achieved in a manner that does not leave existing users 
worse off. For this to be achieved, much clearer rules about the sharing of water between 
connected water resources are necessary. Formally legislated water sharing rules and plans 
consistent with those rules are necessary. 
5.5.2  Auditable outcomes 
It is important that the high-level guidance, as set out above, is translated into 
operational concepts, or criteria, against which the Basin Authority performance can be 
measured and held to account by provincial and central governments and that the DGWR be 
responsible for ensuring that this happens. The role of water-sharing plans should be to guide 




(according to the period of the Basin Plan, or Pola) and which can be revisited/updated every 
five years.  
Based on this thesis’ findings, and in addition to the propositions in Table 5.1, it is 
recommended that consideration be given to the suggestions made in the Box 5.1 below:  
Box 5.1 
 
1. Clearly defined boundaries of water pools (system-wide, sub-system or components) to be 
managed in a hierarchical structure, and rules for assigning water use rights from each pool that 
are clearly defined. In Indonesia, this will require that: 
 
• The total amount of water available in the pools is known and water for system maintenance is set 
aside before water is issued to environmental and consumptive users. Entitlements should be 
defined as shares and allocations be made in proportion to water availability and in alignment with 
defined priorities; 
• Connectivity between water resource pools is understood and considered when making water 
allocations with careful attention to surface and groundwater connectivity and takes full account of 
downstream impacts; and  
• Ensures that an off-set rule is applied. That is, when the resource pool reaches its developmental 
limit, any new entry or proposal for expanded use by an existing user is permitted only when other 
users giving up their entitlement to the same amount.  
 
There are various terms mentioned in the Basin Plan (Pola), i.e. water district, catchment area, sub-
catchment, and irrigation district. Any of them can be defined as a water pool to be managed as a 
subsidiary unit; the smaller unit is nested within the larger one in the hierarchy. While operating 
independently, the subsidiary unit should conform to the system-wide rules and plan.  
 
Advantages (Ostrom 1999; Simon 1962; 2000) 
These arrangements can be predicted to  
• reduce the distance between decision-makers and local communities and may, therefore, increase 
community participation, as envisaged by the 2019 water law.  
• allow feedback on the system-wide rules for revision when needed and this may increase the 
robustness of the system and reduce the cost of its coordination. 
• enable working rules to be devised to better suit the reality of the local context. 
• reduce transaction costs (seeking information, monitoring, enforcement and coordination). 
• ensure that failure in one unit has little effect on the performance of system-wide management and, 
when failure occurs and, if needed, enable timely intervention by level directly above.  
 
Limitations and risks: 
• Staff currently working in the lowest levels do not have the capacity and skills necessary to ensure 
local compliance with system-wide rules and, thus, more investment in their education and 
training many be necessary.  
• Formation of subsidiary units will take time and their operation might be challenged by conflicts 
of interest among different agencies in relation to budgets and development projects. Strong 
central direction may be necessary. 
 
2. Clear registration system of all types of water users and use rights that facilitate a sharing system 
consistent with hydrological conditions. In Indonesia, this will require registration systems that 
ensure that: 
 
• Individual group entitlements are registered at the lowest level in the hierarchy registry and that 




• The water use entitlements or rights are defined as shares and the volume to be made available at 
any point in time defined as a function of water availability in parallel with a maximum limit on 
the volume that may be taken in normal conditions and an arrangement that unambiguously sets 
allocation priorities that must be followed during times of scarcity. 
• Permitted points of extraction are defined and it is understood that extraction or diversion from any 
other location is illegal. 
• The form, nature of use permit and the license period is easily identified and separated from the 
mechanisms used to determine shares and make allocations. 
• Use rights, responsibilities and obligations are attached to the use permit and/or license and not to 
the entitlement or water right. 
 
Under the current water law, smallholder farmers in the existing irrigation system do not need a license 
to take and use water. It is assumed, as is the case with the previous water law, under the new water 
law, water entitlements will be given to WUA and not given to an individual. Currently, two types of 
WUAs exist in the province. The first type concerns WUAs which are listed with and legalized by a 
notary. The second type refers to WUAs which are legalized by the head of the village. It is 
recommended that all WUAs be legalized by a notary and be registered in the IDs. This will be more 
costly for WUAs/farmers but will provide WUAs with the confidence necessary to make local decisions 
as they will have the same legal standing as licensed users. There is an opportunity for WUAs to engage 
companies which are working in their area to facilitate their association with Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) program in relation to this issue. Alternatively, they can find support from local 
universities with law faculties through universities’ Community Service program.  
 
3. Clear and transparent sharing adjustment rules, which enable the system to respond and adapt to 
changes in the conditions affecting water availability. In Indonesia, this will require that water shares 
are defined as a function of water availability and that volumetric allocations are made in a manner that 
automatically adjusts with seasonal variability and local flow conditions. However, if the change is 
rapid and permanent, an adjustment framework which deals with re-defining and/or allows re-
assignment of water entitlements or shares may be necessary.  
 
The 2019 Water Law currently does not provide enough support for a framework that facilitates 
adjustments in water sharing. The only type of re-allocation that is allowed is when a river basin still 
has enough water available to support use in a nearby area without reducing use within the existing 
area. This relatively rigid system makes it difficult if not impossible for any region to adjust as 
conditions change. Rather than restricting transfer, which increases opportunistic behaviour by state 
agents and private actors to encourage system failure in a manner that adversely affects smallholder 
farmers, it is more efficient and more equitable to facilitate users to voluntarily transfer entitlements. 
These transfers can be recorded either by the management authority of a water pool where the transfer 
is required or by a central authority. Control as to whether or not the transfer occurs, however, should 
be left to the local authority on the condition that they approved only in a manner that complies with 
pre-defined system-wide rules. 
 
 
5.5.3  Where to from here 
One of the main conclusion from this thesis is the idea that the order of Ostrom’s 
principles needs to be changed and, specifically, that her last principle be put first – whenever 
the list is discussed. CPR governance arrangements need to be nested within an agreed set of 
hierarchical arrangements and not have a hierarchical structure imposed on them after all the 




principle must not allow overlap. That is, and as set out in Ostrom’s current first principle, the 
boundaries must be clear, so that full accounting of the interactions between the nests is 
possible and it is always clear who is responsible for what.  
It has been only four months since Indonesia’s new water law was promulgated. Many 
regulations still need to be written to address the intended outcomes of the water law and also 
to identify and fill the gaps at national and regional levels not covered by the law. As a result, 
and with an eye to pragmatism, it may be politically easier and less costly to search for ways 
to implement this thesis’ recommendations as regulations as they are developed rather than 
attempting to go back and amend the recently released 2019 water law. With this outcome in 
mind, one or more river basin authorities like the BWS IV Sulawesi or the Provincial Water 
Resource Management could use one of its basins or catchments to pilot-test the necessary 
reforms. If this approach is taken, it would enable the development of the administrative 
capacity and experience necessary to allow full implementation. Finally, no matter how good 
a suite of institutional arrangements are, without monitoring and enforcement the system is 
bound to fail. The above recommendations need to begin with a focus on monitoring and 
enforcement. 
5.6  Limitations and the way forward 
In a study that makes use of qualitative data, especially in the meta-analysis in 
Chapter 2, the coding process usually involves three or more researchers. However, this is not 
feasible in a PhD thesis; conducting solo coding is therefore unavoidable. Therefore, 
undertaking inter-reliability coding to avoid personal bias was not possible. To mitigate this 
limitation, an iterative coding process was adopted, as presented in Chapter 2. This enabled 
the use of various methods to reduce arbitrariness in the calibration process. In addition, given 




fine-grained analysis. However, it was only possible within this thesis to identify relationships 
between broad, very fuzzy, concepts. It would be interesting for future analysis to compare the 
results of the same approach when applied to different types of common-pool resources. 
Currently, numerous studies of various types of CPR institutions are readily available, thus a 
meta-analysis using fs/QCA is possible.  
Further study on the change in water-use pattern and allocation and its effect on agrarian 
change and rural transformation is also important to shed light on the future direction of 
irrigation develoopent and agricultural policy in general in Indonesia. Multidiciplinary 
approach is needed to understand the overall situation, how the farm households adapt to such 
changes, or whether the current rice based policy is still relevant.  
Finally, apart from the empirical analysis presented in this thesis, the study contributes 
to the theoretical debate on CPR governance. Its findings agree with Cox et al.’s. (2010) 
observation that Ostrom’s DPs can be used as a diagnostic instrument. To be more effective, 
the analysis needs to start from the nested perspective and to unpack the design principles into 
elements that fit with the characteristics of CPR and the objectives of human interaction within 
that CPR.  
Water is unique when compared to other types of CPR like fisheries and forests. Water 
has multiple values and uses. Moreover, it tends to flow in one direction from upstream to 
downstream locations. Therefore, and when not evaporated or transpired, water can be used 
and re-used many times. Also, supplies can vary rapidly and in terms of place where it can be 
accessed and in quality (Hanemann, 2006). These unique features of water suggest the need for 
the development of a water-specific version set of principles in a form that can be workshopped, 




Given the opportunity, I would welcome the chance to develop a water-specific 
adaptation of Ostrom’s Design Principles for further consideration and development by 
interested parties. Water is critical to the future of humankind. Much more work on governance, 
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Appendix 1. Description of fuzzy-set, scoring and calibration 
Table A1: List of fuzzy-set definitions, scores, calibrated score and scoring criteria. 





1.1.  Water use rights are defined 
as proportional share and 
equitable 
Water use rights are defined clearly as an ongoing 
proportional share. Water abstraction is regulated. 
Rules are respected in all seasons, including droughts.  
Exclusion rules are clear and not contested 





and Shaw 1986) 
Proportionality 





1.2.  Water use rights are clear but 
inequitable 
Water use rights are clearly defined as an access 
entitlement for a fixed time, to irrigate a maximum 
area or take a maximum volume. Water abstraction is 
regulated. For some users, the right to access water 
may be reduced or denied especially during shortage 
period or as development occurs 
0.26 0.33 
1.3.  Water use rights are not clear 
and inequitable 
Legitimate users may be not defined and water 
abstraction is unregulated. Robust exclusion is difficult 
0.11 0 
LOCCON 2A.1. Proportional and flexible 
allocation rules 
Resource allocation rules encourage efficient use and 
investment as conditions change.  








2A.2. Proportional but inefficient 
allocation rules 
 
Resource allocation rules can be varied but do not 
allow efficient use and investment as conditions 
change 
0.37 0.67 
2A.3. Use and allocation rules 
inconsistent with local conditions 
Resource allocation rules are inflexible and encourage 







BENCOST 2B.1. Full cost recovery with 
equity 
User contributions (in kind or cash) reflect the full 
costs of O&M. The distribution of contributions is 
proportional to user benefit.  




2B.2. Partial cost recovery with 
equity  
User contributions (in kind or cash) are less than the 
full cost of O&M. However, the distribution of these 
contributions is proportional to the benefit received.  
0.30 0.67 
2B.3. Full cost recovery but 
inequitable 
User contributions (in kind or cash) to the irrigation 
system reflect the full cost of O&M but the distribution 
of contributions is not in proportion to the benefit 
received. 
0.18 0.33 
2B.4. Partial cost recovery but 
inequitable 
User contributions (in kind or cash) are less than the 
full cost of O&M. But, the distribution of these 
contributions is not in proportion to the benefit 
received.  
0.06 0 
COLGOVE 3.1. Individual participation All or nearly all users are involved in the lead up to a 
significant revision of an operational rules.  
0.53 1 Transparency 
Accountability 
Trust 
3.2. Representative participation Significant decisions typically made via a board or 
committee chosen from or by different user groups. In 
the case of a small group/village, decisions can be 
made by respected leader(s) of the group or head of a 
village. Consultation is selective. 
0.34 0.67 
3.3. Unaccountable participation Decision making process associated with a rule change 
involves certain individuals. Typically, the 
consultation process does not involve the full spectrum 
of users. 
0.08 0.33 
3.4. No or very limited 
participation 
Individual users have no guaranteed way to participate 






4A.1. Monitors are accountable 
and have sufficient capacity 
System encourages self-monitoring. Official 
monitoring capacity is sufficient to track use at the user 
level. Rule breaches are reported and dealt with in an 
efficient manner 





4A.2. Capacity of monitors in 
inadequate 
Official monitoring capacity is inadequate and/or 
breach enforcement is selective. 
0.16 0.33 




4B.1. Comprehensive monitoring Comprehensive monitoring of water resource condition 
and status is in place and results are accessible to all in 
a timely manner. 
0.68 1 Transparency 
Reliability 
Easily accessible  
 
4B.2. Inadequate monitoring Monitoring exists but less effective or not available in 
a timely manner. 
0.26 0.33 





5.1. Graduated sanctions exist and 
are enforced 
Graduated sanction system is in place and applied as 
required. Enforcement system may include community 
shaming and other sanctions. 





5.2. Graduated sanction exist but 
enforcement is weak 
Graduated sanctions are in place but all but the very 
weakest sanctions are rarely applied – even though 
significant breaches occur. 
0.18 0.33 
5.3. Rules for graduated sanction 
are not clear 
Sanctions are rarely implemented even though non-
compliance is common. Typically, no graduated 






6.1. Local CRM Rapid and low cost conflict resolution mechanisms are 
locally accessible.  
0.50 1 Rapid 
Easily accessible 
Low cost 
6.2 CRM through a court 
 
Conflict mechanism require appeal to a higher level 




6.3 Local CRM but difficult to 
access less effective 
 
Conflict resolution mechanisms are locally accessible 
but less effective to prevent further conflict. 
0.19 0.33 Effectiveness 
 
6.4. No CRM No CRM process available. Conflict is common and 




7.1. Right to self-organise within 
a defined framework 
Local users have the rights to organise themselves 
without compromising the agreed system-wide rules  







7.2. Full right to organise and 
over-ride system wide guidelines 
Users have the right to organise and implement their 
operational rules in a manner that violates system-wide  
0.35 0.67 
7.3. No right to self-organise Users have no means to organise and devise their own 






8.1. Effective vertical and 
horizontal coordination structure 
exist 
Effective vertical and horizontal coordination exists 
with a clear distribution of authority and task 
responsibilities. 




8.2. Coordination structures is 
flawed but processes ensure 
accountability 
Effective coordination is imperfect and includes only 
exist vertically or horizontally 
0.29 0.67 
8.3. Coordination structures lack 
accountability 
Vertical and horizontal link exist but lack of 
accountability and transparency. Rule enforcement is 
lax and violations are common. 
0.09 0.33 
8.4. Coordination structures don't 
work 





Table A2: List fuzzy set for the outcome, score, calibrated score and scoring criteria 
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Robust System persists and sustains productive use of the 
irrigation system and water resources. Distribution 
systems are well maintained and function well under 
duress. Conflicts, when they occur, tend to be resolved. 
The system is seen to be equitable and encourages 
efficient use and investment. 







Fragile (“robust to what is 
common or anticipated but 
potentially fragile to what is rare 
or unanticipated”) 
Self-governance arrangements work under existing 
environments but are not designed so as to allow efficient 
and equitable management of significant changes in 
demand for or supply of water 
0.19 0.33 
Fail Institution is dis-functional or non-existent. There is high 
conflict over water resources. Accusations of inequity are 









Appendix 2. Truth Table Analysis 
































































































1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Alicante, Balinese Subak, Busao CIS, 
Chaisombat Muangfai, Culebra Asequias, 
Eastern La Mancha, Karya Mandiri, La 
Vega De Valencia, Murcia & Orihuela, 
Porotog, Sacaba, Soprong Muangfai, 
Taiwan IA, Taos Valley, Tihingan Subak, 
Twyford Cooperative, Utah Valley 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Falaj Al-Khatmeen, Nabargram, 
Nishikanbara, Nothern Colorado, Sidi 
Okba, Tharigat watersed, Zanjera Danum 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Huaynacotas, Masai, ORIC, Sanghar 
Lahar 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 Ghayl, Madarounfa, Pongsak Muangfai 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 Raj Kulo, Thulo Kulo 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 Ghazi Qanat, Shirgin 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Bada, Old Valencia 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 Nshara 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 Marakwet 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 Contemporary Subak 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 Wadi Laba 1 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Bahr Seila 1 
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Mkanyeni 1 
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 Lombok Subak 0.744361 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 Likii WRUA 0.744361 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 Saint Raphael 0.66 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 Quashini, Wang village, Wen Village 0.492537 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 Northern Afghanistan 0.492537 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 Taita 0.33 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgarian IS, MIRS Kwa Zulu Natal, 
Nickerie, Yaqut village 
0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Gnangara aquifer, Kuhl 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Qorir SSI, Western La Mancha 0 
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 Jordan Valley WUA 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 Bida 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 Mendoza 0 





Appendix 3. Supplementary material. 
Supplementary material: Robust irrigation institution: A global comparison 
1. Coding process 
Due to the limited resources, the coding process was done individually by the primary author, 
thus interceding reliability cannot be performed. Being aware of the potential bias of individual 
coder, the coding process was done with a strict process as follows:  
1. Building familiarity with the case study. This was done at the beginning of the literature 
review and data collection, to understand the nature of small-scale traditional irrigation 
systems.  
2. Identifying the fuzzy-set concept of the conditions and the outcome.  
3. Importing data from Endnote to Nvivo 
4. The first filter (cover to cover) of the first batch of the case study and coded according 
to the first coding theme. 
5. Revisit the fuzzy-concept.  
6. Based on the study material, the fuzzy-concept was adjusted to enable all the materials 
were covered and minimized the missing data.  
7. Re-coded the materials based on the refined fuzzy concept. 
8. Retrieving more materials with snowball sampling and exporting to Nvivo. 
9. Coding the new materials. 
10. Whenever we gain new insight into the case materials, we revisit the fuzzy-concept and 
(re)coded all the materials accordingly. 
11. Coding summary by code and by file reports were used to compare each case to ensure 
consistency of systematic coding.  
12. Running analysis and compare the result with the coding if there was a conflicting issue. 
13. Missing data on outcome was dropped. 
14. The process was done iteratively.  
2. Fuzzy set for ten conditions and an outcome 
After the iterative process of refining the concept, we arrived at the final fuzzy-set as a 




Table 1. List of fuzzy-set for the conditions 





1.4.  Water use rights are 
defined as proportional 
share and equitable 
Water use rights are defined clearly as an ongoing 
proportional share. Water abstraction is regulated. 
Rules are respected in all seasons, including 
droughts.  
Exclusion rules are clear and not contested 
1.5.  Water use rights are 
clear but inequitable 
Water use rights are clearly defined as an access 
entitlement for a fixed time, to irrigate a maximum 
area or take a maximum volume. Water abstraction is 
regulated. For some users, the right to access water 
may be reduced or denied especially during shortage 
period or as development occurs 
1.6.  Water use rights are not 
clear and inequitable 
Legitimate users maybe not defined and water 
abstraction is unregulated. Robust exclusion is 
difficult 
LOCCON 2A.1. Proportional and 
flexible allocation rules 
Resource allocation rules encourage efficient use and 
investment as conditions change.  
2A.2. Proportional but 
inefficient allocation rules 
 
Resource allocation rules can be varied but do not 
allow efficient use and investment as conditions 
change 
2A.3. Use and allocation 
rules inconsistent with local 
conditions 
Resource allocation rules are inflexible and 
encourage resource depletion and/or degradation as 
conditions change 
BENCOST 2B.1. Full cost recovery with 
equity 
User contributions (in kind or cash) reflect the full 
costs of O&M. The distribution of contributions is 
proportional to user benefit.  
2B.2. Partial cost recovery 
with equity  
User contributions (in kind or cash) are less than the 
full cost of O&M. However, the distribution of these 
contributions is proportional to the benefit received.  
2B.3. Full cost recovery but 
inequitable 
User contributions (in kind or cash) to the irrigation 
system reflect the full cost of O&M but the 
distribution of contributions is not in proportion to 
the benefit received. 
2B.4. Partial cost recovery 
but inequitable 
User contributions (in kind or cash) are less than the 
full cost of O&M. But, the distribution of these 
contributions is not in proportion to the benefit 
received.  
COLGOVE 3.1. Individual participation All or nearly all users are involved in the lead up to a 
significant revision of operational rules.  
3.2. Representative 
participation 
Significant decisions typically made via a board or 
committee chosen from or by different user groups. 




made by a respected leader(s) of the group or head of 
a village. Consultation is selective. 
3.3. Unaccountable 
participation 
Decision-making process associated with a rule 
change involves certain individuals. Typically, the 
consultation process does not involve the full 
spectrum of users. 
3.4. No or very limited 
participation 
Individual users have no guaranteed way to 
participate or engage in rulemaking processes. 
USERMON 
 
4A.1. Monitors are 
accountable and have 
sufficient capacity 
The system encourages self-monitoring. Official 
monitoring capacity is sufficient to track use at the 
user level. Rule breaches are reported and dealt with 
in an efficient manner 
4A.2. Capacity of monitors is 
inadequate 
Official monitoring capacity is inadequate and/or 
breach enforcement is selective. 
4A.3. No effective 
monitoring 






Comprehensive monitoring of water resource 
conditions and status is in place and results are 
accessible to all in a timely manner. 
4B.2. Inadequate monitoring Monitoring exists but less effective or not available 
in a timely manner. 
4B.3. No effective 
monitoring 




5.1. Graduated sanctions 
exist and are enforced 
Graduated sanction system is in place and applied as 
required. Enforcement system may include 
community shaming and other sanctions. 
5.2. Graduated sanction exist 
but enforcement is weak 
Graduated sanctions are in place but all but the very 
weakest sanctions are rarely applied – even though 
significant breaches occur. 
5.3. Rules for graduated 
sanction are not clear 
Sanctions are rarely implemented even though non-
compliance is common. Typically, no graduated 





6.1. Local CRM Rapid and low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms 
are locally accessible.  
6.2 CRM through a court 
 
Conflict mechanism requires an appeal to a higher 
level authority or through a formal court process  
6.3 Local CRM but less 
effective 
 
Conflict resolution mechanisms are locally accessible 
but less effective to prevent further conflict. 
6.4. No CRM No CRM process is available. Conflict is common 
and usually favour the strongest party. 
RIGHT 
 
7.1. Right to self-organise 
within a defined framework 
Local users have the rights to organise themselves 




7.2. Full right to organise and 
over-ride system-wide 
guidelines 
Users have the right to organise and implement their 
operational rules in a manner that violates system-
wide  
7.3. No right to self-organise Users have no means to organise and devise their 





8.1. Effective vertical and 
horizontal coordination 
structure exist 
Effective vertical and horizontal coordination exists 
with a clear distribution of authority and task 
responsibilities. 
8.2. Coordination structures 
are flawed but processes 
ensure accountability 
Effective coordination is imperfect and includes only 
exist vertically or horizontally 
8.3. Coordination structures 
lack accountability 
Vertical and horizontal link exist but lack of 
accountability and transparency. Rule enforcement is 
lax and violations are common. 
8.4. Coordination structures 
don't work 
No effective vertical and horizontal coordination. No 
accountability. 
 
Table 2. List of fuzzy-set for outcome  




Robust System persists and sustains productive use of the 
irrigation system and water resources. Distribution 
systems are well maintained and function well under 
duress. Conflicts, when they occur, tend to be 
resolved. The system is seen to be equitable and 
encourages efficient use and investment. 
Fragile  Self-governance arrangements work under existing 
environments but are not designed so as to allow 
efficient and equitable management of significant 
changes in demand for or supply of water 
Fail Institution is dis-functional or non-existent. There is 
high conflict over water resources. Accusations of 
inequity are common. Resource depletion or 
degradation is common. 
 
3. Addressing different time frames when coding the outcome. 
The majority of the case studies examined displayed a snapshot or dominated by the 
conditions at the time the study was written. For cases where the institution was young (five to 
ten years), if the design principles had higher membership in the design principles (0.5 < X ≤ 




water resources or there was indication that the case in question showed good trend to success, 
the case was coded as ‘robust’. If the design principles were more out than in (0 ≤ X < 0.5), 
even though the author considered it a ‘success’, we coded as ‘fragile’ (more out than in). If 
the case did not provide enough information about the outcome, the case study was dropped.  
4. Analytic hierarchic process 
Data calibration is central to QCA, thus, providing transparency on calibrating 
procedure is highly recommended when using this method. Calibrating qualitative data, 
however, is an issue that has not been addressed by many. The challenge is how to turn the 
qualitative data into a numerical score prior to the calibration procedure. For crisp set QCA 
(cs/QCA) the calibration process is easier since the data is either ‘fully in’ (1) or ‘fully out (0). 
For the fuzzy-set QCA (fs/QCA) is more difficult since we use an additional gradation range 
from ‘fully in’ to ‘fully out’. Basurto and Speer (2012) and Toth et al. (2017) have offered 
guidance to calibrate qualitative data. However, their methods cannot be easily applied to our 
data, since their calibration is pre-determined before the data collection. On the other hand, we 
need to calibrate data after the fuzzy-set is defined. Therefore, we develop a process to structure 
the calibration procedure, in which we start with identifying criteria to classify the fuzzy-set 
into numerical category/score. The procedure is discussed in the following.  
4.1 Identifying measurement criteria. 
Prior calibration of the fuzzy-set, we turned the concept into a qualitative score to facilitate the 




Table 3. Measurement criteria for condition and outcome. 
Conditions and Outcome Measurement criteria 
Clearly defined boundaries 
(BOUND) 
Security of tenure  
Equitability 
Predictability (Howe et al., 1986; 
Matthews, 2004) 
Proportionality (OECD, 2015; von 
Benda-Beckmann, 2007) 




Equitability (Howe et al., 1986) 
Reliability (Matthews, 2004) 
Proportionality (OECD, 2015). 
Proportional benefit and cost 
(BENCOST) 
Equity, 





























Minimum right to organise 
(RIGT) 














4.2 Two-step pairwise comparison 
The method is based on relative measurement for decision making (Saaty, 2008) using 
two steps pairwise comparison. The first level pairwise comparison is to weight the 




based on each criterion. The fundamental scale of absolute numbers (Saaty 2008) is used for 
the scoring method.  
 
Figure 1. Fundamental scale for absolute numbers (Source: Saaty, 2008).  
According to Saaty (1990), the weighted score is acceptable if the consistency ratio (CR) is 
equal or less than 0.1.  





Table 4. Example of first-level pairwise ranking for weighting criteria of BOUND condition. 
Criteria Security Proportionality Equitability Predictability 
Weighted 
score 
Security 1 3 2 3 0.41 
Proportionality 0.33 1 0.33 0.33 0.10 
Equitability 0.5 3 1 4 0.27 
Predictability 0.33 3 0.25 1 0.22 
𝜆max = 4.04      CI = 0.01       CR = 0.01 
    
The Second-level pairwise comparison was done where the fuzzy-set for each DP was 
compared to each other based on the criteria above. Below is the example of pair-wise ranking 
between the fuzzy-set of clearly defined boundaries in terms of ‘security of tenure’.  
Table 5. Example of the second-level pairwise ranking of the fuzzy-set on BOUND condition 
based on ‘security of tenure’ criterion.  
Clearly defined boundaries  A*  B  C  
Weighted 
score 
A. Water use rights are clear 
and equitable 1.00  4.00  9.00  0.62  
B. Water use rights are clear 
and inequitable 0.25  1.00  5.00  0.26  
C. Water use rights are not 
clear and equitable 0.11  0.20  1.00  0.11  
𝜆max = 3.04      CI = 0.02       CR = 0.03     
*A, B, C are the same fuzzy-set in the first row. 
The pairwise comparison was repeated to each criterion, and the final score is presented in 
Table 7. 
Table 6. Total score for the fuzzy-set of BOUND condition. 
Clearly defined boundary 
Criteria 
Fuzzy-set 
score Security Proportionality Equity Predictability 
0.41 0.10 0.27 0.22 
A. Water use rights is clear 
and equitable 0.26  0.06  0.21  0.15  0.68  
B. Water use rights is clear 
and inequitable 0.11  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.23  
C. Water use rights is not 
clear and equitable 0.04  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.09  
 
The above procedure was repeated to classify the fuzzy-set of all conditions and outcome. 




Table 7. List of Fuzzy definition of conditions, scores and calibrated scores and scoring criteria 





1.1.  Water use rights are defined 
as proportional share and 
equitable 
Water use rights are defined clearly as an ongoing 
proportional share. Water abstraction is regulated. 
Rules are respected in all seasons, including droughts.  
Exclusion rules are clear and not contested 





and Shaw 1986) 
Proportionality 





1.2. Water use rights are clear but 
inequitable 
Water use rights are clearly defined as an access 
entitlement for a fixed time, to irrigate a maximum 
area or take a maximum volume. Water abstraction is 
regulated. For some users, the right to access water 
may be reduced or denied especially during shortage 
period or as development occurs 
0.26 0.33 
1.3.  Water use rights are not 
clear and inequitable 
Legitimate users may be not defined and water 
abstraction is unregulated. Robust exclusion is difficult 
0.11 0 
LOCCON 2A.1. Proportional and flexible 
allocation rules 
Resource allocation rules encourage efficient use and 
investment as conditions change.  










2A.2. Proportional but inefficient 
allocation rules 
 
Resource allocation rules can be varied but do not 
allow efficient use and investment as conditions 
change 
0.37 0.67 
2A.3. Use and allocation rules 
inconsistent with local conditions 
Resource allocation rules are inflexible and encourage 






BENCOST 2B.1. Full cost recovery with 
equity 
User contributions (in kind or cash) reflect the full 
costs of O&M. The distribution of contributions is 
proportional to user benefit.  




2B.2. Partial cost recovery with 
equity  
User contributions (in kind or cash) are less than the 
full cost of O&M. However, the distribution of these 
contributions is proportional to the benefit received.  
0.30 0.67 
2B.3. Full cost recovery but 
inequitable 
User contributions (in kind or cash) to the irrigation 
system reflect the full cost of O&M but the distribution 
of contributions is not in proportion to the benefit 
received. 
0.18 0.33 
2B.4. Partial cost recovery but 
inequitable 
User contributions (in kind or cash) are less than the 
full cost of O&M. But, the distribution of these 
contributions is not in proportion to the benefit 
received.  
0.06 0 
COLGOVE 3.1. Individual participation All or nearly all users are involved in the lead up to a 
significant revision of an operational rules.  
0.53 1 Transparency 
Accountability 
Trust 
3.2. Representative participation Significant decisions typically made via a board or 
committee chosen from or by different user groups. In 
the case of a small group/village, decisions can be 
made by respected leader(s) of the group or head of a 
village. Consultation is selective. 
0.34 0.67 
3.3. Unaccountable participation Decision making process associated with a rule change 
involves certain individuals. Typically, the 
consultation process does not involve the full spectrum 
of users. 
0.08 0.33 
3.4. No or very limited 
participation 
Individual users have no guaranteed way to participate 




4A.1. Monitors are accountable 
and have sufficient capacity 
System encourages self-monitoring. Official 
monitoring capacity is sufficient to track use at the user 










4A.2. Capacity of monitors in 
inadequate 
Official monitoring capacity is inadequate and/or 
breach enforcement is selective. 
0.16 0.33 




4B.1. Comprehensive monitoring Comprehensive monitoring of water resource condition 
and status is in place and results are accessible to all in 
a timely manner. 
0.68 1 Transparency 
Reliability 
Easily accessible  
 
4B.2. Inadequate monitoring Monitoring exists but less effective or not available in 
a timely manner. 
0.26 0.33 





5.1. Graduated sanctions exist and 
are enforced 
Graduated sanction system is in place and applied as 
required. Enforcement system may include community 
shaming and other sanctions. 





5.2. Graduated sanction exist but 
enforcement is weak 
Graduated sanctions are in place but all but the very 
weakest sanctions are rarely applied – even though 
significant breaches occur. 
0.18 0.33 
5.3. Rules for graduated sanction 
are not clear 
Sanctions are rarely implemented even though non-
compliance is common. Typically, no graduated 






6.1. Local CRM Rapid and low cost conflict resolution mechanisms are 
locally accessible.  




6.2 CRM through a court 
 
Conflict mechanism require appeal to a higher level 
authority or through formal court process  
0.26 0.67 
6.3 Local CRM but less effective 
 
Conflict resolution mechanisms are locally accessible 





6.4. No CRM No CRM process available. Conflict is common and 
usually favour the strongest party. 
0.04 0  
RIGHT 
 
7.1. Right to self-organise within 
a defined framework 
Local users have the rights to organise themselves 
without compromising the agreed system-wide rules  







7.2. Full right to organise and 
over-ride system wide guidelines 
Users have the right to organise and implement their 
operational rules in a manner that violates system-wide  
0.35 0.67 
7.3. No right to self-organise Users have no means to organise and devise their own 






8.1. Effective vertical and 
horizontal coordination structure 
exist 
Effective vertical and horizontal coordination exists 
with a clear distribution of authority and task 
responsibilities. 




8.2. Coordination structures is 
flawed but processes ensure 
accountability 
Effective coordination is imperfect and includes only 
exist vertically or horizontally 
0.29 0.67 
8.3. Coordination structures lack 
accountability 
Vertical and horizontal link exist but lack of 
accountability and transparency. Rule enforcement is 
lax and violations are common. 
0.09 0.33 
8.4. Coordination structures don't 
work 














Robust System persists and sustains productive use of the 
irrigation system and water resources. Distribution 
systems are well maintained and function well under 
duress. Conflicts, when they occur, tend to be resolved. 
The system is seen to be equitable and encourages 
efficient use and investment. 







Fragile (“robust to what is 
common or anticipated but 
potentially fragile to what is rare 
or unanticipated”) 
Self-governance arrangements work under existing 
environments but are not designed so as to allow efficient 
and equitable management of significant changes in 
demand for or supply of water 
0.19 0.33 
Fail Institution is dis-functional or non-existent. There is high 
conflict over water resources. Accusations of inequity are 








1) Applying the score for cases 
After the systematic coding, we generated qualitative classification from the cross-tabulation 
in Nvivo, and turn it into the numerical score. Table 9 provided the raw data for all cases. The 
yellow box indicates ‘missing data’. 
Table 9. Raw data 
 
No. Case ID Country BOUND LOCCON BENCOST COLGOVE USERMON SYSTMON GRADSAN CONFRES RIGHT NESTENT ROBUST
1 Alicante Spain 0.68 0.57 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
2 Bada Spate Irrigation system Eritrea 0.68 0.37 0.18 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
3 Bahr Seila Fayoum Egypt 0.68 0.57 0.3 0.05 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
4 Balinese Subak Indonesia 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
5 Bida Irrigation system Nigeria 0.09 0.06 0.18 0.34 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.5 0.07 0.29 0.07
6 Bulgarian irrigation system Bulgaria 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07
7 Busao CIS The Philippines 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
8 Chaisombat Muang Fai Thailand 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
9 Contemporary Subak Indonesia 0.68 0.37 0.3 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.19 0.59 0.29 0.74
10 Culebra Asequias USA 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
11 Eastern La Mancha Spain 0.68 0.57 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
12 Falaj Al-Khatmeen Oman 0.68 0.57 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
13 Ghayl Yemen 0.68 0.57 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.5 0.59 0.05 0.74
14 Ghazi qanat Iran 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.59 0.58 0.74
15 Gnangara Australia 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.25 0.18 0.26 0.07 0.09 0.07
16 Huaynacotas, Peru Peru 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.05 0.74
17 JV WUAs Jordan 0.23 0.37 0.3 0.08 0.16 0.69 0.18 0.5 0.07 0.09 0.07
18 Karya Mandiri Irrigation System Indonesia 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
19 Kuhl Irrigation System Pakistan India 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.5 0.07 0.05 0.07
20 La Vega de Valencia Spain 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
21 Likii WRUA Kenya 0.23 0.37 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.06 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.19
22 Lombok Subak Indonesia 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.53 0.77 0.25 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.05 0.19
23 Madarounfa irrigation system Niger 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.5 0.59 0.05 0.74
24 Marakwet irrigation system Kenya 0.68 0.37 0.18 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.19 0.59 0.58 0.74
25 Masai Irrigation System Tanzania 0.68 0.57 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.05 0.74
26 Mendoza Argentina 0.23 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.25 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.07
27 Mkanyeni Furrow Tanzania 0.23 0.37 0.18 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
28 MRIS KwaZulu-Natal South Africa 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.19 0.07 0.05 0.07
29 Murcia & Orihuela Spain 0.68 0.37 0.3 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
30 Nabagram irrigation system Bangladesh 0.68 0.57 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
31 Nickerie irrigation Suriname 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.07
32 Nishikanbara Japan 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.08 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
33 North Afghan irrigation Afghanistan 0.23 0.37 0.18 0.08 0.16 0.25 0.5 0.59 0.05 0.19
34 Northeastern Colorado USA 0.68 0.57 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.26 0.59 0.58 0.74
35 Nshara Furrow Tanzania 0.23 0.57 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.59 0.05 0.74
36 ORIC Zimbabwe 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.05 0.74
37 Pongsak Muang Fai Thailand 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.05 0.74
38 Porotog Ecuador 0.68 0.37 0.3 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.29 0.74
39 Qorir SSI Ethiopia 0.09 0.06 0.3 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.05 0.07
40 Quashini Irrigation System Ethiopia 0.09 0.37 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.25 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.05 0.19
41 Raj Kulo Nepal 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.59 0.05 0.74
42 Saint Raphael irrigation system Haiti 0.23 0.06 0.3 0.34 0.77 0.06 0.18 0.26 0.59 0.05 0.19
43 Sanghar Lahr irrigation system Pakistan 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.05 0.74
44 Shirgin Tajikistan 0.68 0.37 0.3 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.59 0.58 0.74
45 Sidi Okba Algeria 0.68 0.57 0.3 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
46 Soprong Muang  Fai Thailand 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
47 Taita Irrigation system Kenya 0.09 0.06 0.18 0.34 0.16 0.69 0.18 0.26 0.59 0.29 0.19
48 Taiwan IA Taiwan 0.68 0.37 0.3 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
49 Taos Valley USA 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.26 0.59 0.58 0.74
50 Thalo Kulo Nepal 0.68 0.57 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.59 0.05 0.74
51 Tharigat watersed India 0.68 0.37 0.3 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
52 Tihingan Subak Indonesia 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
53 Twyford Cooperative New Zealand 0.68 0.57 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.26 0.59 0.58 0.74
54 Usosyumbro Bolivia 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
55 Utah Valley USA 0.68 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
56 Valencia Spain 0.68 0.57 0.18 0.53 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
57 Wadi Laba Eritrea 0.68 0.37 0.18 0.34 0.77 0.69 0.5 0.59 0.58 0.74
58 Wang village irrigation China 0.23 0.37 0.46 0.34 0.77 0.06 0.74 0.5 0.35 0.09 0.19
59 Wen village irrigation system China 0.23 0.37 0.3 0.53 0.77 0.06 0.74 0.5 0.35 0.09 0.19
60 Western Mancha Spain 0.09 0.06 0.3 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.5 0.07 0.09 0.07
61 Yaqut village Egypt 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07




5. Data calibration 
This study used an indirect data calibration method. The fully in (1) was assigned to the highest 
fuzzy-set with the highest score, and the fully out (0) to the lowest fuzzy-set score. For the 
qualitative fuzzy-set, it is difficult to justify the cross-over point (0.5), and, also, cases with 
maximum ambiguity (0.5) will be dropped from the analysis. Thus, we use the four fuzzy-value 
(Ragin, 2009) and apply the middle value ‘more or less in’ (0.67) for cases whose score was 
relatively complied more to the highest score, and ‘more or less out’ (0.33) for cases whose 
score was relatively complied more to the lowest score. The missing data were assigned to the 
lowest score, to be able to identify and explore further in the analysis why the conditions with 
























Case ID BOUND LOCCON BENCOST COLGOVE USERMON SYSTMON GRADSAN CONFRES RIGTORG NESTENT ROBUST
Alicante 1 1 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bada Spate Irrigation system 1 0.67 0.33 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bahr Seila Fayoum 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Balinese Subak 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bida Irrigation system 0 0 0.33 0.67 0.33 0 0 1 0 0.67 0
Bulgarian irrigation system 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Busao CIS 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chaisombat Muang Fai 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Contemporary Subak 1 0.67 0.67 1 1 1 1 0.33 1 0.67 1
Culebra Asequias 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eastern La Mancha 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Falaj Al-Khatmeen 1 1 1 0.67 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Ghayl 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
Ghazi qanat 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
Gnangara 0 0 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 0 0.33 0
Huaynacotas, Peru 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
JV WUAs 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 1 0.33 1 0 0.33 0
Karya Mandiri Irrigation System 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kuhl Irrigation System Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
La Vega de Valencia 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Likii WRUA 0.33 0.67 1 0.67 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.33
Lombok Subak 0 0 0 1 1 0.33 1 1 1 0 0.33
Madarounfa irrigation system 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
Marakwet irrigation system 1 0.67 0.33 0.67 1 1 1 0.33 1 1 1
Masai Irrigation System 1 1 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Mendoza 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 1 1 1 0
Mkanyeni Furrow 0.33 0.67 0.33 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MRIS KwaZulu-Natal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0.33 0 0 0
Murcia & Orihuela 1 0.67 0.67 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nabagram irrigation system 1 1 1 0.67 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Nickerie irrigation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0
Nishikanbara 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
North Afghan irrigation 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 1 1 0 0.33
Northeastern Colorado 1 1 1 0.67 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1
Nshara Furrow 0.33 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
ORIC 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Pongsak Muang Fai 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
Porotog 1 0.67 0.67 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 0.67 1
Qorir SSI 0 0 0.67 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 0 0
Quashini Irrigation System 0 0.67 1 0.67 1 0.33 1 1 1 0 0.33
Raj Kulo 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
Saint Raphael irrigation system 0.33 0 0.67 0.67 1 0 0.33 0.67 1 0 0.33
Sanghar Lahr irrigation system 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Shirgin 1 0.67 0.67 0.67 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
Sidi Okba 1 1 0.67 0.67 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Soprong Muang  Fai 1 0.67 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Taita Irrigation system 0 0 0.33 0.67 0.33 1 0.33 0.67 1 0.67 0.33
Taiwan IA 1 0.67 0.67 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Taos Valley 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 0.67 1 1 1
Thalo Kulo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
Tharigat watersed 1 0.67 0.67 0.67 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Tihingan Subak 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Twyford Cooperative 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.67 1 1 1
Usosyumbro 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Utah Valley 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Valencia 1 1 0.33 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Wadi Laba 1 0.67 0.33 0.67 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wang village irrigation 0.33 0.67 1 0.67 1 0 1 1 0.67 0.33 0.33
Wen village irrigation system 0.33 0.67 0.67 1 1 0 1 1 0.67 0.33 0.33
Western Mancha 0 0 0.67 0 0.33 0 0 1 0 0.33 0
Yaqut village 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




6.  Result of fs/QCA 










6.2 Analysis of sufficiency condition for ROBUST outcome 

































































































1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Alicante, Balinese Subak, Busao CIS, 
Chaisombat Muangfai, Culebra Asequias, 
Eastern La Mancha, Karya Mandiri, La 
Vega De Valencia, Murcia & Orihuela, 
Porotog, Sacaba, Soprong Muangfai, 
Taiwan IA, Taos Valley, Tihingan Subak, 
Twyford Cooperative, Utah Valley 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Falaj Al-Khatmeen, Nabargram, 
Nishikanbara, Nothern Colorado, Sidi 
Okba, Tharigat watersed, Zanjera Danum 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Huaynacotas, Masai, ORIC, Sanghar 
Lahar 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 Ghayl, Madarounfa, Pongsak Muangfai 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 Raj Kulo, Thulo Kulo 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 Ghazi Qanat, Shirgin 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Bada, Old Valencia 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 Nshara 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 Marakwet 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 Contemporary Subak 1 




1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Bahr Seila 1 
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Mkanyeni 1 
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 Lombok Subak 0.744361 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 Likii WRUA 0.744361 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 Saint Raphael 0.66 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 Quashini, Wang village, Wen Village 0.492537 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 Northern Afghanistan 0.492537 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 Taita 0.33 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgarian IS, MIRS Kwa Zulu Natal, 
Nickerie, Yaqut village 
0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Gnangara aquifer, Kuhl 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Qorir SSI, Western La Mancha 0 
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 Jordan Valley WUA 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 Bida 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 Mendoza 0 





USERMON*SYSTMON Alicante (1,1),   Bada Spate (1,1), Bahr Seila 
Fayoum (1,1), Balinese Subak (1,1),   Busao CIS 
(1,1), Chaisombat Muang Fai (1,1), Contemporary 
Subak (1,1),   Culebra Asequias (1,1), Eastern 
La Mancha (1,1), Falaj Al Khatmeen (1,1),   
Ghayl (1,1), Ghaziqanat (1,1), Huaynacotas 
(1,1),   Karya Mandiri (1,1), LaVega de 
Valencia (1,1), Madarounfa (1,1),   Marakwet 
(1,1), Masai (1,1), Mkanyeni (1,1), 
LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGT Alicante (1,1),   Masai (1,1), Bahr Seila 
Fayoum (1,1), EasternLaMancha (1,1),   Falaj Al 
Khatmeen (1,1), Ghayl (1,1), Nabagram (1,1),   
Northeastern Colorado (1,1), Nshara Furrow 
(1,1), Sidi Okba (1,1),   Twyford Cooperative 




Ghazi qanat (0.67,1), Huaynacotas (0.67,1), 
Karya Mandiri (0.67,1),   La Vega deValencia 
(0.67,1), Madarounfai (0.67,1), Marakwet 









Eastern La Mancha (1,1), Ghayl (1,1), 
Alicante (0.67,1), Balinese Subak (0.67,1),   
Busao CIS (0.67,1), Chaisombat Muang Fai 
(0.67,1), Culebra Asequias (0.67,1),   
Falaj Al Khatmeen (0.67,1), Huaynacotas 
(0.67,1), Karya Mandiri  (0.67,1),   La 
Vega de Valencia (0.67,1), Madarounfa 
(0.67,1), Masai (0.67,1),   Murcia & 
Orihuela (0.67,1), Nabagram (0.67,1), 
Nishikanbara (0.67,1),   Northeastern 
Colorado (0.67,1), ORIC (0.67,1), Pongsak 






Eastern La Mancha (1,1), Twyford 
Cooperative (1,1), Alicante (0.67,1), 
Balinese Subak (0.67,1), Busao CIS 
(0.67,1), Chaisombat Muang Fai (0.67,1), 
Contemporary Subak (0.67,1),  
  Culebra Asequias (0.67,1), Falaj Al 
Khatmeen (0.67,1), Ghazi qanat (0.67,1),  
  KaryaMandiriIrrigationSystem (0.67,1), 
LaVegadeValencia (0.67,1), Murci a 
&Orihuela (0.67,1),   Nabagram (0.67,1), 
Nishikanbara (0.67,1), Northeastern 
Colorado (0.67,1), Porotog (0.67,1), 
Shirgin (0.67,1), Sidi Okba (0.67,1),  
  Soprong Muang Fai (0.67,1) 
BOUND*LOCCON* 
COLGOVE*USERMON* 
Eastern La Mancha (1,1),Twyford Cooperative 






Bada Spate (0.67,1), Balinese Subak 
(0.67,1), Busao CIS (0.67,1), Chaisombat 
Muang Fai (0.67,1), Contemporary Subak 
(0.67,1), Culebra Asequias (0.67,1),  
Karya Mandiri 0.67,1), La Vegade Valencia 
(0.67,1), Marakwet (0.67,1), Murcia & 
Orihuela (0.67,1), Porotog (0.67,1), 
Soprong Muang Fai (0.67,1),  
  TaiwanIA (0.67,1), Taos Valley (0.67,1), 





Eastern La Mancha (1,1),   Valencia (1,1), 
Alicante (0.67,1), Bada Spate (0.67,1),   
Balinese Subak (0.67,1), Busao CIS 
(0.67,1), Chaisombat Muang Fai (0.67,1),   
Culebra Asequias (0.67,1), Falaj Al 
Khatmeen (0.67,1), Karya Mandiri I 
(0.67,1), La Vegade Valencia (0.67,1), 
Murcia & Orihuela (0.67,1), Nabagrami 
(0.67,1), Nishikanbara (0.67,1), 
Northeastern Colorado (0.67,1), Porotog 
(0.67,1),   Sidi Okba (0.67,1), Soprong 
Muang Fai (0.67,1), Taiwan IA (0.67,1),  





Nshara Furrow (1,1),   Thalo Kulo (1,1), 











Alicante (1,1),   Eastern La Mancha (1,1), 
Bahr Seila Fayoum (0.67,1), Balinese Subak 
(0.67,1),   Busao CIS (0.67,1), Chaisombat 
Muang Fai (0.67,1), Culebra Asequias 
(0.67,1),  
  Karya Mandiri (0.67,1), La Vega de 
Valencia (0.67,1), Murcia & Orihuela 
(0.67,1),   Porotog (0.67,1), Soprong Muang 
Fai (0.67,1), Taiwan IA (0.67,1),   Taos 
Valley (0.67,1), Tihingan Subak (0.67,1), 
Twyford Cooperative (0.67,1),  














7. Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis for fsQCA was done in two ways: 1) Analysis of complete cases 
only, and 2) Increase frequency cutoff to two cases instead of one in the truth table analysis. 
The results are presented in the following.  




The results of necessary condition analysis shows that BOUND, USERMON, SYSTMON, 
GRADSAN, CONFRES, and RIGHTORG are necessary for ROBUST outcome (see red box). 
This is different with the results showed in the analysis for all cases (missing case included), 
where GRADSAN and CONFRES are found unnecessary for the outcome. The result is 
expected considering that those two conditions were the source of missing data. However, the 
necessity of GRADSAN is questionable, since there are cases where graduated sanction is truly 
absent (0) but the evaluation of the outcome shows ROBUST. In addition, when we test the 
absence of conditions for the fail or un-success outcome, the result show only ~BOUND pass 
the consistency threshold of 0.9 which indicate that the absence of the condition is necessary 











The results of truth table analysis shows that there are two minimum configurations for a robust 
outcome. The results are consistent with the results from the main analysis. For intermediate 
solution, the results show only four configurations of conditions sufficient to the robust 
outcome instead of seven as shown in the analysis of all cases. These configurations are the 











~SYSTMON Bida(1,1),   Bulgarian IS (1,1),  Kuhl (1,1), Likii 
WRUA (1,0.67),   MRIS KwaZulu-Natal (1,1), Nickerie 
(1,1), Qorir SSI (1,1),   Saint Raphael (1,0.67), Wang 
village (1,0.67), Wen village (1,0.67),   Western 
Mancha (1,1), Yaqut village (1,1), Gnangara (0.67,1),    
Lombok Subak (0.67,0.67), Mendoza (0.67,1), Quashini 
(0.67,0.67) 
 
~BOUND*~GRADSAN Bida(1,1), Bulgarian IS (1,1), Kuhl (1,1), Nickerie 
(1,1), Qorir SSI (1,1), Western Mancha (1,1), Yaqut 
village (1,1), Gnangara (0.67,1), JV WUAs (0.67,1), 
Mendoza (0.67,1),   MRIS KwaZulu-Natal (0.67,1), Saint 













Kuhl (1,1), Yaqut village 
(1,1), Gnangara (0.67,1),    




Kuhl (1,1),   QorirSSI 
(0.67,1), Gnangara (0.67,1), 




LikiiWRUA (0.67,0.67), Quashini  
(0.67,0.67), Wang village 



























7.3 Increasing frequency cutoff from 1 case to 2 cases in the outcome 
Another way to test the robustness of the analysis is to increase the frequency cutoff (Skaaning 
2011).   
















Frequency cutoff: 2 (compete case: 32 cases included in the analysis after cutoff) 
Sufficiency analysis for complete case only. Because all outcome displayed 1 case is dropped 





Based on the above result, the minimum configuration for ROBUST outcome is now reduced 
to BOUND + SYSTMON, which reflect two of the necessary conditions that are more 
important than others based on the coverage (please refer to the necessary conditions for all 
cases). 
The intermediate solution shows two configurations that lead to the ROBUST outcome, in 
which all the seven or eight design principles are included.  However, the low coverage shows 
that there are substantial cases that cannot be represented by the two paths. 
 











8. List of case studies 
8.1. Case study for the meta-analysis 
Table 9. List of case studies for meta-analysis. 
No. Case Identification Country Source / Author 
1 Alicante Spain (Maass & Anderson 1978a) 
2 Bada Spate Irrigation system Eritrea 
(Ghebremariam & van Steenbergen 
2007) 
3 Bahr Seila Fayoum Egypt (De Veer et al. 1993) 
4 Balinese Subak (old) Indonesia (Birkelbach 1973) 
5 Bida Irrigation system Nigeria (Fu et al. 2010) 
6 Bulgarian irrigation system Bulgaria (Theesfeld 2004) 
7 Busao CIS The Philippines (KAKUTA 2017) 
8 Chaisombat Muang Fai Thailand (Ounvichit 2011) 
9 Contemporary Subak Indonesia (Yekti et al. 2017) 
10 Culebra Asequias USA (Hicks & Peña 2003) 
11 Eastern La Mancha Spain 
(Esteban & Albiac 2012; Lopez-
Gunn 2003) 
12 Falaj Al-Khatmeen Oman 
(Al-Marshoudi 2018; Al-Marshudi 
2007; Megdiche-Kharrat, Moussa & 
Rejeb 2017) 
13 Ghayl Yemen (Varisco 1983) 
14 Ghazi qanat Iran (Jomehpour 2009) 
15 Gnangara Australia (Skurray 2015) 
16 Huaynacotas, Peru Peru 
(Trawick 2001a, 2008; Trawick 
2001b) 
17 Jordan Valley Jordan 
(Altz-Stamm 2016; Molle, Venot & 
Hassan 2008; Mustafa, Altz-Stamm 
& Scott 2016) 
18 Karya Mandiri Indonesia (Helmi 2017) 
19 Kuhl Irrigation Pakistan (Sharma, Sharma & Prakash 2015) 
20 La Vega de Valencia (new) Spain (Ortega-Reig et al. 2014) 
21 Likii WRUA Kenya (Dell’Angelo et al. 2016) 
22 Lombok Subak Indonesia (Sjah & Baldwin 2014) 
23 Madarounfa Niger (Norman 1997) 
24 Marakwet Kenya (Adams, Watson & Mutiso 1997) 
25 Masai Tanzania (Caretta 2015) 
26 Mendoza Argentina 
(Chambouleyron 1989; Díaz Araujo 
& Bertranou 2004; Hurlbert & 
Mussetta 2016) 
27 Mkanyeni Furrow Tanzania 
(Komakech, Van Der Zaag & Van 
Koppen 2012) 
28 MRIS KwaZulu-Natal South Africa (Muchara 2014) 
29 Murcia & Orihuela Spain (Maass & Anderson 1978c) 
30 Nabagram Bangladesh (Coward Jr & Ahmed 1979) 
31 Nickerie Suriname (Núñez & Colmenero 2013) 




33 North Afghan irrigation Afghanistan 
(Abdullaev & Shah 2011; Thomas 
& Ahmad 2009) 
34 Northeastern Colorado USA (Maass & Anderson 1978d) 
35 Nshara Furrow Tanzania (Gillingham 1999) 
36 ORIC Zimbabwe (Senzanje & Van der Zaag 2004) 
37 Pongsak Muang Fai Thailand (Ounvichit et al. 2006) 
38 Porotog Ecuador 
(Communal et al. 2016; 
Hoogesteger 2013; Perreault, 
Bebbington & Carroll 1998) 
39 Qorir SSI Ethiopia (Habtamu 2011) 
40 Quashini Ethiopia (Belay & Bewket 2013) 
41 Raj Kulo Nepal (Martin & Yoder 1988) 
42 Saint Raphael  Haiti 
(Boyer, Speelman & Van 
Huylenbroeck 2011) 
43 Sanghar Lahr Pakistan (Kamran & Shivakoti 2013a, 2013b) 
44 Shirgin Tajikistan (Dörre & Goibnazarov 2018) 
45 Sidi Okba Algeria (Hamamouche et al. 2017) 
46 Soprong Muang  Fai Thailand (Ounvichit, Wattayu & Satoh 2008) 
47 Taita Kenya (Fleuret 1985) 
48 Taiwan IA Taiwan (Lam 1996) 
49 Taos Valley USA (Cox 2014; Cox & Ross 2011) 
50 Thalo Kulo Nepal (Martin & Yoder 1988) 
51 Tharigat watersed India (Satyal, Kumar & Kandpal 2006) 
52 Tihingan Subak Indonesia (Geertz 1964) 
53 Twyford Cooperative New Zealand (Boone & Fragaszy 2018) 
54 Usos y costumbres Cochabamba Bolivia (Perreault 2008) 
55 Utah Valley USA (Maass & Anderson 1978e) 
56 Valencia (old) Spain 
(Glick 1970; Maass & Anderson 
1978b) 
57 Wadi Laba Eritrea (Mehari, Schultz & Depeweg 2005) 
58 Wang village irrigation China (Yu 2016; Yu et al. 2016) 
59 Wen village irrigation system China (Yu 2016; Yu et al. 2016) 
60 Western Mancha Spain 
(Esteban & Albiac 2012; Lopez-
Gunn 2003) 
61 Yaqut village Egypt (Radwan 1997) 






Figure 1. Distribution of 62 cases by region 
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